Hints of Iran’s Flexibility Beg for Adroit Diplomacy

The continuation of the Iran-Iraq war, about to enter its eighth year, has been blamed on Iran’s intransigence and its refusal to negotiate with the current Iraqi regime, even under auspices of the United Nations. No doubt that is part of the story, but much more needs to be understood.

Iran has valid reasons for being wary of accepting a cease-fire and unconditional negotiations. These include Iran’s lack of trust in U.N. impartiality. After all, when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, the United Nations did nothing to discipline or even to chastise Iraq. Security Council Resolution 479 did not condemn Iraq for invading Iran, nor did it call for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops that were then deep inside Iran. Yet in 1982, after Iran had reversed the course of the war and was occupying some Iraqi territory, the Security Council called for the withdrawal of troops and a return to internationally recognized borders. The United Nations has also failed to condemn Iraq for its heavy use of chemical weapons.

Still, for a long time the main obstacle to a cease-fire and negotiations was Iran’s precondition that the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, be removed. During the last few months, however, Iran’s position has undergone some fairly significant changes. It now seems that under certain circumstances Iran may be willing to accept a negotiated peace. It did not reject the latest U.N. resolution outright, although in its first response it documented complaints against the United Nations’ handling of the issue and expressed lack of confidence in the Security Council’s impartiality.

Subsequently, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Mohammed Jawad Larijani, visited New York and held talks with the U.N. secretary general and members of the Security Council, except France and the United States. In these talks and in statements to the press, Larijani did not refer to Iran’s past positions, but focused instead on specific points that would have to be addressed in any peace agreement.

Thus in commenting on Iraq’s demand that the two countries should return to internationally recognized borders, he asked, “What are these international borders?” He noted that Iran and Iraq had concluded the Algiers Agreement in 1975, delineating the borders, but that Hussein tore it up on Iraqi television. Larijani also said that his country would need some guarantees about the security of its borders before entering into any agreement with Iraq.

This fear is not unjustified. Arabs maintain a historic claim to the Iranian province of Khuzistan, and one of Hussein’s war aims was to separate it from Iran. Thus it is not surprising that Iran seeks assurances that Iraq will not try again.

Of course, none of these subtle changes in Iran’s attitude amount to a decisive change, nor do they constitute a concrete negotiating posture. But they do indicate some flexibility in Iranian thinking.

Several factors account for Iran’s new flexibility: the mounting human and economic cost of the war, war weariness among the Iranian people, and the political cost of continuing the war without any reasonable prospects for victory. But the most immediate and powerful factor is Iran’s growing fear of confrontation with the United States.

Nevertheless, it is still difficult to assess how unified the Iranian leadership is concerning the need for, or the value of, adopting a more flexible approach. This point should be clarified when and if Iran, as promised by its deputy foreign minister, informs the U.N. secretary general of its new and presumably more realistic conditions for negotiations. In the meantime, new Iranian flexibility has created some possibilities for ending the war that should be fully explored.

First, the West should put pressure on Iraq to stop its attacks on Iranian shipping and oil installations for a reasonable period, during which the U.N. secretary general would try to bring the two parties to the negotiating table. Iraqi forbearance would end the naval war, because Iran has said that it would follow suit, and it would radically reduce the risk of a U.S.-Iran confrontation.

Getting Iraq to comply will not be easy, however. It has already resumed its attacks and has vowed to continue them until Iran accepts a cease-fire. It has also increased its demands by asking Iran to agree to immediate troop withdrawals and the exchange of prisoners of war.

The hardening of Iraq’s position, in both deed and word, has led many observers to believe that it is worried about Iran’s new flexibility. By this reasoning, Iraq is trying to provoke Iran into taking actions that would trigger a U.S. attack on Iran. This would create conditions for Iraq to pursue some of its original war aims, or at least to extract highly favorable peace terms from Iran.

As part of a realistic peace strategy, Iran’s fears and grievances should be given a more sympathetic hearing--an act that would restore its faith in the impartiality of the international community and its agents, including the United Nations. In other words, there must be a skillful balancing of carrots and sticks. A policy that consists only of pressures and no incentives cannot succeed in encouraging Iran to be more flexible. It would also weaken the position of individuals in Iran who favor a negotiated peace.

In sum, recent changes in Iranian attitudes have opened a window of opportunity to end the Persian Gulf war. This opportunity should be explored, and Iran should be put to the test. If it failed the test, other pressures could always be applied. But today’s opportunity, if not seized, may not be available again for a long time.