Leading Without a Free Hand

Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s anxiously awaited speech on the 70th anniversary of Communist power did not live up to expectations. The talk read as if written by a committee and was a curiously conservative document for a man who is trying to make radical changes in the Soviet system.

All in all, expert observers are left with the impression that Gorbachev’s reform movement has encountered serious opposition within the Politburo and Central Committee, and that he feels compelled to proceed more cautiously while trying to build a consensus for change. So far he appears only to have pulled back on the pace of change, not on the basics of what he is trying to do.

In the Soviet Union, history is politics. The rigidly controlled economic system that Gorbachev is trying to reform was established by Josef Stalin, the bloody old dictator. Thus, it is necessary to discredit Stalin if his outmoded and ultimately disastrous system of centralized economic decision-making is to be dismantled. The fate of Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost , or greater openness, similarly hangs on the discrediting of the intellectual straitjacket imposed by Stalin.

Gorbachev’s speech was, in this context, a disappointing compromise. He condemned Stalin’s “enormous and unforgiveable crimes” but had nothing to say about the millions of people who perished. He acknowledged that “excesses” were committed in the course of Stalin’s forced collectivization of agriculture and crash program of industrialization but defended the programs themselves. A commission is being appointed to explore the dark chapters of the Stalinist past and rehabilitate the reputations of innocent victims.

Although Gorbachev didn’t go as far as many had hoped, he probably went far enough to guarantee that Stalin’s legacy of economic controls and cultural repression can continue to be challenged, and contrary ideas promoted.

The Soviet leader vowed to pursue perestroika , or program of social and economic reconstruction, in the face of growing opposition from “conservative forces.” In the next breath, however, Gorbachev criticized those who are “overly zealous and impatient” and want to “accomplish everything at one go.” Thus he didn’t retreat on the fundamentals of his proposed reforms. But his hedging on the pace of change is unlikely to strengthen the backbones of middle-level bureaucrats and managers who need high-level support if they are to buck the defenders of the status quo.

The unfolding drama in the Soviet Union is of more than idle interest to the West. The Kremlin’s handling of arms control and other foreign policy issues will be affected by the ebb and flow of the domestic battle over ideology, freedom of discussion and economic priorities. The Reagan Administration got a striking demonstration in the Kremlin’s off-again, on-again posture toward an early summit; many Western experts suspect the confusion reflected the problems Gorbachev was having inside the Central Committee.

In his speech Monday, Gorbachev’s overall tone on relations with the West was decidedly positive. Viktor Karpov, a high-ranking official of the Foreign Ministry, followed up within hours with a flat prediction that Gorbachev and President Reagan will sign an accord cutting strategic offensive weapons by 50% at a Moscow summit in the first half of 1988.

Whether that really happens depends on many factors. One is a meeting of the minds on verification. Another is resolution of the dispute over whether restraints on “Star Wars” must be part of such an agreement. Most important of all is the question of whether Gorbachev’s negotiating authority will be undermined by his colleagues on the Politburo. For if anything came through loud and clear from Moscow this week, it was that the Soviet leader does not have a free hand.