Korea Party Backs Roh on ’79 Military Moves

The ruling Democratic Justice Party on Wednesday defended its presidential candidate, Roh Tae Woo, against charges by opposition leader Kim Young Sam that Roh was a “prime mover” in a December, 1979, military mutiny.

In a press conference called to counter the accusation, ruling party Assemblyman Yoo Hak Seong said it was he, then an assistant defense minister, who gave the order for combat troops to move into Seoul during the arrest of Chung Seung Hwa, who was then army chief of staff, by his junior officers. The action occurred in the turbulent period after the assassination of President Park Chung Hee.

Yoo admitted that the arrest, carried out by army investigators headed by now-President Chun Doo Hwan, was made without the prior consent of the acting president, but he denied that it constituted a mutiny.

The political controversy erupted in the wake of Kim’s surprise announcement Monday that Chung had joined his opposition Reunification Democratic Party as an adviser.

At a press conference later that day, Kim, his party’s presidential candidate, called Roh “a prime mover” of what he called a mutiny. “As a division commander in the front line,” Kim charged, “Roh Tae Woo turned his guns on Seoul. If at that time (North Korean President) Kim Il Sung had invaded South Korea, we would have had a big disaster.”

Plans Campaign Issue

Then, in a speech to a group of professors Tuesday night, Kim declared that he would make Roh’s role in the Dec. 12, 1979, incident a major campaign issue, suggesting that Chung would detail the events for the voters.

The Chung appointment also drew fire Wednesday from Kim’s opposition rival for the presidency, Kim Dae Jung, who charged that the former army chief, while serving as martial-law commander between the time of Park’s assassination and his own arrest, had “threatened that he and the military would never tolerate my resumption of political life. . . . It is a great irony that a man who claimed to be the advocate of the non-interference of the military in politics should be the first to be involved in politics.”

Chung’s appointment thus brought to the political spotlight not only the murky December, 1979, incident, which Roh’s party had anticipated would be used against his candidacy, but also the role of Chung himself. The arrest and subsequent conviction of Chung on charges related to the assassination solidified Chun Doo Hwan’s hold on military power here, which led to the coup d’etat that gave him the presidency the following year.

The ruling party selected Yoo, now chairman of its National Policy Coordination Committee, to give its version of the events.

Says 6 Generals Decided

As Yoo put it, Roh, who was then commander of the 9th Infantry Division, did not give the order to move elements of the division to Seoul to take part in the battle in central Seoul that accompanied Chung’s arrest. “I did so,” Yoo said, “because I was the senior officer in the group” of generals who thought Chung should be removed because they suspected he might have been involved in the assassination.

Yoo told reporters that he and five other generals--all now members of the government or the ruling party, including Chun and Roh--made the decision to arrest Chung. When the army chief and loyalist forces resisted, Yoo said, he gave the order to bring combat troops into Seoul.

President Park was assassinated Oct. 26, 1979, by Kim Jae Kyu, the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, as Park dined with other officials at a Korean CIA compound. Chung, the army commander, was in an adjacent building at the time.

“Mr. Chung, then the martial-law commander, was next door to the room where the head of state was shot to death. . . ,” Yoo said. “We could not but call on him to cooperate with us investigating the incident, but he refused and altered investigation documents with his strong influence, leaving much room for suspicion.”

Reports at the time and later said Chung was lured to the compound by the KCIA chief. No evidence has ever been released tying him directly to the assassination.

In December, six weeks after the assassination, Yoo said, “six generals (including Chun and Roh) were determined to persuade Chung not to commit any more suspicious acts and resign. . . . It was natural for him to undergo investigation, but he would not cooperate with investigators and intentionally delayed legal procedures for the assassins.”

Yoo said he and the others mobilized 4,000 to 5,000 troops to overpower the soldiers loyal to Chung. There were protracted gun battles, and the insurgent officers seized key military positions throughout the city. The number of casualties was never disclosed.

President Chun, then head of the military commission investigating the assassination, was designated to seek permission of Acting President Choi Kyu Hah for the arrest, Yoo told reporters, but it was not granted until after the clashes.

In the opinion of Kim Young Sam and other opposition leaders, by acting without a presidential order, the generals committed mutiny and grounded Chun’s subsequent presidency and Roh’s candidacy in illegitimacy. The opposition makes similar charges concerning the military’s bloody repression of anti-government demonstrations that blew up into insurrection in the southwestern city of Kwangju in May, 1980.

American officials here were furious about the movement of the troops, who were under joint U.S. and United Nations command.

After his arrest, Chung, who was then a four-star general, was tried and convicted by a court-martial on charges of conspiracy in the assassination. He was demoted to the rank of private and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment but was released within a year. The assassin, Kim Jae Kyu, was executed.