Inching Toward Peace in Central America : Cynicism and Impatience Loom as Threats to the Accord’s Viability

MANAGUA--Four months after the birth of the Central American peace accord, none of the predictions made by those interested in minimizing its importance have come to life. In fact, the efforts to project a pessimistic and negative image only wound up strengthening the efforts to defend the viability of the plan and to push for its consolidation.

The meeting of the five Central American presidents in Guatemala in August got off to a spectacular start, but the actual signing of the treaty after only two days came as a surprise to almost everyone. The momentum was maintained as Nicaragua proceeded to unilaterally implement various aspects of the accord at a pace that few had expected. Costa Rica’s President Oscar Arias Sanchez, the accord’s key architect, moved into the forefront as a mediator: between El Salvador’s Farabundo Marti Liberation Front and the Duarte government, to reestablish a direct dialogue between the two parties; with the government of Nicaragua, to facilitate the reopening of the opposition newspaper La Prensa, and in cease-fire talks among Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, the Contras and the government. In Madrid, representatives from the Guatemalan government and the guerrilla insurgency held official talks for the first time in 20 years. Several meetings of foreign ministers from Central and Latin America were held, according to the schedule approved at the August summit meeting, with positive and concrete results. And, of course, Oscar Arias was awarded this year’s Nobel Peace Prize.

To be sure, not all was triumph and glory. In a sense, the initial burst of enthusiasm overshadowed several negative developments. Conservative and oligarchic forces in the region had sensed early on that the accord could turn into an instrument that would threaten their interests. This position was shared by parties outside the region that believe in the viability of old-style U.S. hegemony in Central America. As the peace plan moved from drawing board to reality, it became clear that a counteroffensive couldn’t be postponed; the agreement was rapidly taking away initiative and maneuvering room from the right in Central America.

Perhaps the most dramatic sign of this counteroffensive has been the cruel resurrection of the death squads in El Salvador. The Oct. 26 assassination of the president of the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission, Herbert Anaya, was a warning of just how far the region’s de facto powers are willing to go. Today the range of maneuvers that can be used to sabotage the peace process is extremely broad.

The far right’s reaction has been made clear. But there are other, less extreme, sectors in the region opposed to challenges to the status quo and uninterested in adjusting to new models. Their best defense? To project a narrow and legalistic interpretation of the accords and a skeptical view regarding the possibilities for successful compliance. Still others will try to impose a double standard, zeroing in with microscopic detail on what happens in Nicaragua and turning a blind eye to deficiencies in the other four countries’ compliance.

In spite of these and other such efforts that may place obstacles in the road toward peace, there is little doubt that the process set in motion by the signing of the accord in Guatemala was the beginning of the end for the old order in Central America.

The real threat to the accord’s success is not the possibility of a return to the status quo; it is the possibility that the treaty’s content will be watered down, and that goals and expectations will be worn down, rather than built up to form the bases of a new order in Central America. The challenge is in accomplishing an “authentic, firm and long-lasting” peace, as the title of the treaty signed on Aug. 7 implies; the danger lies in being content with a cosmetic and superficial “peace,” which in the long run would be no peace at all.

To evaluate the initial steps taken in the region toward fulfilling the treaty’s requirements implies lining up behind one or another interpretation of the accord. Those who interpret it as a historic opportunity for the Central American people know that new and often unforeseen possibilities and problems will be encountered on the long road to peace. While the hour of judgment has not yet arrived, a few worrisome trends can be detected. Amnesty, dialogue and cease-fires are more than a matter of government decree. In order to contribute to the building of peace, as opposed to merely fulfilling a treaty commitment, each of these points demands the opening of new political spaces, the creation of new bodies and mechanisms for participation by the population and its representatives, the abandoning of old schemes and positions and, above all--indeed, as a prerequisite to all--guarantees for the physical integrity of the individuals who choose to take part.

In this sense no one can deny that the first warning cries have been sounded: Hundreds of Salvadoran political prisoners have expressed reluctance to leave their jail cells for fear of persecution on the outside; for similar reasons, Guatemalan refugees in Mexico and Salvadoran refugees in Honduras have refused to return to their homelands; death threats against many opposition leaders in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala have increased.

In spite of these alarms, the peace process continues to move forward. While Nicaragua clearly needs to yield more ground--and all signs indicate that it is so disposed--it is impossible to ignore the broad measures already adopted regarding amnesty, press freedom, dialogue, national reconciliation and a comprehensive cease-fire proposal. These demonstrate Managua’s intention to go beyond formal compliance and to use the accord reached in Guatemala City as a means to put an end to military conflicts in Central America.

Certainly achieving peace will be difficult, but it is a task that must not be sabotaged by premature criticism and unwarranted pessimism.