‘Chops,’ ‘Flying Voters’ Leave Their Marks

The voting procedure in the election today is fairly simple, but there are certain Korean touches.

The voter arrives at the assigned polling station and produces his or her national identity card. It bears name, photograph, a personal serial number, date of birth, address, thumbprint and, for men, a military service record.

Satisfied about the voter’s identity, an election official presents the registration book. Reaching into a pocket or purse, the voter withdraws a curious implement carried by all Koreans at all times, as is the identity card. It looks like a lipstick case and holds a rubber-tipped stamp bearing the voter’s name in Chinese characters, the personal “chop.”

The voter affixes an impression of the chop in red ink beside his or her name in the registration book, completing the process at the officials’ table. The voter is given a ballot, goes to the poll booth and marks a choice with another rubber stamp in red ink, folds the ballot and drops it in a ballot box.

Today, the ballot will carry the names of eight candidates, three of whom have dropped out.

There are two ways, according to experienced election watchers, that the system can be thwarted, even beyond the “ghost voters” and “flying voters” familiar in elections elsewhere, including the United States.

(A “ghost voter” is one who registers and votes under the name of a dead person or dead persons. A “flying voter” somehow registers and votes in more than one precinct.)

The first way is the relay system, which involves a chain of fraud. One voter gets his or her official ballot, carries it into the booth, then pockets it. Leaving the booth, the voter pretends to drop a ballot in the box or puts in a fake, leaving the polling place with the official ballot unmarked.

That ballot is turned over to a party aide running the illegal chain, and the voter receives a payoff. The aide marks the ballot and gives it to the next voter, who proceeds to the polling place, gets his or her unmarked ballot, pockets it in the secrecy of the booth, then casts the marked one. Money is paid for each unmarked ballot returned, which is proof that the marked one has been cast.

The second is the piano system, which is limited to the counting stations.

A vote tabulator for a cheating party hides a red-ink pad under the counting table. When handling a ballot marked for an opponent, he or she taps a finger on the pad and smudges the ballot. The ballot is then pronounced invalid because it has been marked twice, or on the line between two candidates. The system takes its name from the counter’s busy fingers.