We Must Not Abandon Our Aid to the Contras : Ortega Gets Backed Into a Corner, but Democracy Is Still a Long Way Off

The dramatic turnaround by Daniel Ortega at the weekend meeting of Central American presidents does not mean that he can now be trusted to democratize Nicaragua. It means only that he had no other way to achieve his main goal of destroying the Contras. To ensure full implementation of the Central American peace plan, the United States must continue to aid the Nicaraguan armed resistance.

Ortega initially had hoped to avoid negotiating with the Contras and lifting the state of emergency. Direct negotiations would enhance the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan rebels. Allowing freedom of the press and of association might generate a momentum for further democratization that could undermine Sandinista control.

The Nicaraguan president instead proposed a 30-day extension of the deadline for compliance with the peace plan. This would have moved the evaluation of Nicaragua’s compliance--or lack of it--beyond early February, when Congress will vote on further aid for the Contras. Ortega’s strategy would have given the edge to congressional opponents of aid. With Contra aid defeated, the Sandinistas could finally consolidate their militarized one-party Marxist system.

Before the weekend meeting in San Jose, the conventional wisdom was that the presidents of the Central American democracies would avoid criticizing Nicaragua’s non-compliance with the peace plan. Instead, they would take the easy way out and join Ortega in converting the peace process into “another Contadora,” characterized by endless meetings that set neither deadlines nor penalties for non-compliance. To the surprise of many, however, the presidents of El Salvador and Honduras insisted on immediate Nicaraguan compliance with the peace plan, and refused to extend the deadline yet again.

Presidents Jose Napoleon Duarte and Jose Azcona Hoyo did not take this position because the United States told them to. They held firm because the end of U.S. support for the Contras and the resulting consolidation of Sandinista control over Nicaragua would gravely threaten their fledgling democracies: The Sandinistas would continue to “export revolution,” and the effort to “contain” them would give the military Establishments in El Salvador and Honduras too much power over democratically elected civilian rulers.

The strong stand that was taken by the Salvadoran and Honduran presidents enabled the Costa Rican and Guatemalan presidents, both advocates of “active neutrality,” to form a united front of Central American democracies against Sandinista efforts to evade compliance with the peace plan. The Sandinistas then had two choices. They could withdraw from the peace process or accede to the pressures for direct negotiations and a lifting of the state of emergency.

The first option was purely theoretical. The stance of the other Central American presidents ensured that if the Sandinistas withdrew, a congressional vote in favor of the Contras was assured. This the Sandinistas could not tolerate. There are now 12,000 to 16,000 rebels fighting inside Nicaragua, operating in more than half the country’s territory. Since October they have scored several dramatic military victories. Perhaps most alarming to the Sandinistas, the Contras’ support inside Nicaragua is growing, and cooperation between the armed resistance and the unarmed internal opposition is rapidly increasing. This explains the Sandinistas’ arrest last week of several democratic opposition leaders who had met with Contra leaders in Guatemala.

Having no alternative but to agree to make concessions, the Sandinistas will now stall for time in the hope that Congress will refuse to vote additional Contra aid in order to “give peace a chance” once again. Congress should not be fooled. A cutoff in Contra aid would undermine the negotiating strength of the Nicaraguan resistance. It would also sabotage the rebels’ efforts to include the unarmed democratic opposition in the cease-fire negotiations.

Neither outcome would serve the interests of the United States or its democratic friends in Central America. The Contras must be able to press for a cease-fire that is not tantamount to surrender but, rather, enables them to make a successful transition from a military to a political force. This is also why it is important to facilitate and encourage cooperation between the armed and unarmed opposition. Ultimately democracy will come to Nicaragua only ifthe opposition is strong enough to successfully challenge the Sandinistas at the polls. Now is not the time to show trust in the Sandinistas by abandoning the Contras. The Sandinistas are not misunderstood and beleaguered democrats. They are committed Marxists who rule by force and make concessions to those who show strength, not weakness. The best way for Congress to give peace a chance is to give democracy a chance. The best way to do that is to continue to support the Contras and their democratic allies.