Showdown for Nicaragua : Sandinistas Risk Much in Compliance With Peace Plan

The significance of Nicaragua’s recent steps toward compliance with the Central American peace accord can be measured along four dimensions:

--the degree to which it has compiled with the letter and spirit of the agreement known as Esquipulas II;

--the extent to which the steps taken are irreversible;

--the costliness of the policies in terms of the domestic political support of the Sandinista government;

--and in comparisons between Nicaraguan compliance and that of the other four signatory countries.

Letter and spirit. The genius of the compromise that led to Esquipulas II was to recognize as legitimate each of the governments, and to call on them to deal only with those opposition groups that had legitimized themselves by laying down their arms and joining the political process. To encourage this, the governments faced with armed opposition were to proclaim an amnesty, negotiate a cease-fire and guarantee rights of speech, press and assembly to civic opposition groups. Although the governments were under no formal agreement to negotiate with insurgents who maintained their arms, the spirit of Esquipulas suggested that the reconciliation commission in each country include members reflecting the views of the armed groups.

By holding only indirect talks with the Contras initially, the Sandinistas fully complied with the letter of Esquipulas II. More significant was Nicaragua’s appointment of Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo as the chair of its National Reconciliation Commission and as the intermediary in the indirect talks. With that move, the government also complied with the spirit of Esquipulas by giving prominence to its leading domestic opponent sympathetic to the goals of the armed opposition.

Now, having begun direct talks with the Contras, the Sandinistas have done as much as any other country in the region to engage the armed opposition in the existing political process.

Reversibility . In principle, any legal step taken by a government can be reversed by a future legal action. States of emergency and suspensions of constitutional guarantees have been proclaimed and rescinded routinely in Central America; they were certainly justified by the war conditions prevailing in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

Nicaragua’s restoration of constitutional guarantees, even as war continues, is significant because it potentially empowers domestic opposition groups. An arbitrary later revocation would be costly in terms of domestic and international public opinion.

Political costs . The Sandinistas did not come to power through peaceful means, but as the result of an armed insurrection against a corrupt dictatorship that had not hesitated to bomb civil populations in its attempt to hold on to power. The special people’s tribunals set up immediately afterward were openly intended to take revenge for the years of repression visited on the Sandinistas and their supporters in the civilian population. The tribunals’ role was highly political and they were condemned by many international human-rights groups for inadequate protection of accused individuals’ rights.

The elimination of the tribunals has high political significance for the most loyal supporters of the Sandinistas. Opposition groups have long criticized the tendency of the Sandinistas to merge state and party functions as if they were one and the same. Now the government has signaled that there will be one system of justice for all Nicaraguans, one not necessarily dominated by the party. Both those committed to Sandinista dominance and those more legitimately concerned about abuse of political openings for subversive purposes are troubled by elimination of the tribunals. This should be a source of encouragement to the opposition.

Comparison with other countries . As the two countries involved in full-scale war, El Salvador and Nicaragua are presumably facing the greatest risk in allowing political openings that strengthen the opposition, armed and unarmed. The opposition that was banned in Nicaragua and is now partially restored is closely, and in some cases directly, linked to the armed opposition. There is a lot of opposition press and television in El Salvador, but it is nearly all opposition from the right, not from those who might give voice to the guerrillas. No equivalent of La Prensa has operated in El Salvador since the early 1980s, when many of the editors and correspondents of such media were killed or driven into exile.

El Salvador’s amnesty has been more far-reaching than Nicaragua’s and a boon to the right wing. It has had the consequence--not intended by Esquipulas II--of solidifying President Jose Napoleon Duarte’s relations with the military by closing the books on past human-rights abuses. There have been thousands of civilian deaths attributable to death squads directed by the military, and many people believe that at least a symbolic prosecution is essential to the reconciliation of the left with democratic politics in El Salvador.

Nicaragua’s compliance with Esquipulas II is not complete, but it is noteworthy. The steps that it has taken may not win the compliance prize, but Nicaragua is in line with the effort made by most of its neighbors and far ahead of some. Now, in voting on Contra aid, Congress must decide whether reward or punishment is the appropriate response from the United States.