Officers Feared Noriega Might Abandon Them

Concern among high-ranking officers in Panama’s army that their chief, Gen. Manuel A. Noriega, was abandoning them to legal prosecution and the wrath of a disgusted populace helped sink a 4-month, U.S.-backed effort to ease Noriega out of office, Panamanian and U.S. sources say.

Agitation within Noriega’s officer corps also forced Noriega to cut short a vacation visit to the Dominican Republic on Jan. 9, after only a day abroad, and rush back to Panama to reassure the officers that he was not relinquishing power. The quick return was the first open sign that Noriega’s position as head of the Panama Defense Forces had been jeopardized by eight months of political crisis in his country.

The breakdown of U.S. negotiations points up the difficulties of separating Noriega from his close-knit and beleaguered organization. It has set off a round of controversy that has deepened divisions in Panama and severely heightened tension between Panama City and Washington.

Two U.S. federal grand juries have charged Noriega with drug smuggling, racketeering and money-laundering. A Senate hearing is now looking into alleged Noriega links to drug traffickers, corruption in Panama and the general’s relations with U.S. intelligence officials and the White House.

Noriega responded by recalling diplomats and military students from the United States, by supporting a demand for the removal of U.S. troops from the Panama Canal and by tightening his control on his country’s news media.

Seeking Military Support

He is also moving to shore up his support among his middle-ranking military officers, who some observers believe are growing uncomfortable with the general’s command.

“When Noriega backed off from any negotiated settlement, things began to go haywire,” a Western diplomat here said. “It will take some doing to get things on track again.”

The effort to get Noriega to agree to step down was spearheaded by Jose I. Blandon, a former associate of the general. When the effort collapsed, Blandon began making public charges against Noriega. He testified before a grand jury in Miami last month, and this week he is appearing at congressional hearings in Washington.

On Wednesday, Blandon told a Senate hearing that his proposals came to nothing because of Noriega’s use of the Panamanian military as a tool to commit crimes.

“Noriega the man could come to an agreement,” Blandon said, “but Noriega the head of a criminal organization could not.”

In a telephone interview last week with a Panamanian newspaper, Blandon listed 10 military officers under Noriega’s command that he said were connected with drug smuggling.

In September, Noriega himself had secretly dispatched Blandon--who then was Panama’s consul general in New York--to Washington to seek a negotiated settlement of Panama’s political turmoil. Blandon talked not only with exiled Panamanian opponents of Noriega but also with officials of the Reagan Administration. Noriega told U.S. diplomats in Panama City that Blandon was authorized to speak on his behalf.

Blandon produced a plan that called for Noriega to step down this April, for reform of the electoral laws and for military officers to retire from politics and give up their side businesses, legal and otherwise. Blandon told The Times in early January that implicit in the plan was the dropping of federal indictments against Noriega pending at the time.

Another plan, one that would have permitted Noriega to stay in power until the Panamanian presidential elections scheduled for 1989, was offered in November by retired Adm. Daniel J. Murphy, who was Vice President George Bush’s chief of staff until 1985.

Details of such plans began to circulate widely in Panama around Christmas. Officers close to Noriega were not reassured by promises that they would not face prosecution abroad or in Panama for either political or common crimes.

“There is fear of an ‘Argentine solution,’ ” said a Panamanian politician in contact with the military, referring to human rights prosecutions of military officials that followed Argentina’s return to democracy in 1984.

On Dec. 29, Washington sent Richard L. Armitage, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, to Panama City to meet secretly with Noriega. Armitage suggested that Noriega consider Blandon’s plan as a way to defuse Panama’S political turmoil.

But by then Noriega had cooled to such proposals. It was never made clear just how serious he was about stepping down. In any case, he came away from the Armitage meeting saying that the United States was not pressing him to leave. He had already told diplomats and Panamanian officials that Blandon was acting on his own.

On Jan. 9, Noriega traveled to the Dominican Republic. Associates said the trip was scheduled to last five days. One of Noriega’s daughters married a wealthy Dominican last year, and Noriega was visiting her and her in-laws.

When word spread that Noriega had left the country, demonstrators took to the streets of Panama City to celebrate. Soldiers quelled the rallies with tear gas and birdshot, and arrested about 34 protesters.

Officers of the Panama Defense Forces worried that despite Noriega’s disavowal of the Blandon plan, he had fled to the Dominican Republic. They sent Col. Bernardo Barrera, the head of the army’s intelligence department and a brother-in-law of Noriega, to the Caribbean nation with instructions to bring the general back.

Noriega returned Jan. 10 and said his departure had been a “trick” to see what his opponents and the United States might do in his absence. That evening he assured his staff and other high-ranking officers that he would not step down.

“Another 48 hours and Noriega might have been finished,” said Ruben Dario Paredes, who preceded Noriega as head of the Panamanian military. Paredes has been actively trying to drive a wedge between Noriega and his officers by broadcasting messages that they had nothing to fear if Noriega were ousted.

For the past month, Noriega has been busily lobbying his officers and soldiers. He tells them that the legal assaults from the United States are part of an attempt to break the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties and retake the strategic waterway, which is scheduled to fall under full Panamanian control by the year 2000.

Noriega called Blandon a traitor and fired him Jan. 14. Lately he has been telling his troops that Paredes is a washed-up outsider trying to re-establish his power in the military. In a speech Monday in which Noriega supported a call by his officers for the expulsion of U.S. troops from Panama, he was careful to remind middle-ranking officers that they would be in charge when the canal passes to Panamanian authority.

Despite the nervousness in the armed forces, there appears to be no move at present to oust him. One reason, according to diplomatic observers: Noriega has placed his closest confidants in key military positions.

Among them are Col. Marcos A. Justines, chief of staff; Maj. Nivaldo Madrinan, head of the National Department of Investigation, Panama’s version of the FBI; Col. Leonides Macias, head of the police in Panama City; Col. Bernardo Barrera, intelligence chief; Col. Alberto Purcell, deputy chief of staff, and his brother, Col. Lorenzo Purcell, head of the air force.