With Peace, a Hope That Hard Times Are Over : Honduras Paid Dearly for Being the U.S. Proxy in Nicaragua’s War

The cease-fire agreement between the Sandinistas and the Contras in the Nicaraguan border town of Sapoa represents a watershed for Central America. The accord also promises to bring immediate relief to war-weary Nicaragua and to Honduras, where the insurgent army is based.

For the first time in seven years the Hondurans and the Nicaraguans will be able to concentrate on tackling serious domestic ills. For Nicaragua, the Sandinistas hope that the interruption in the fighting will allow them to concentrate on getting beans and rice to an increasingly restive people. Honduras hopes that the peace talks will allow them to redirect their attention toward their faltering economy and away from Washington’s chronic demands that they do more to help the Contras.

Since the hostilities began in 1981 Honduras has been an integral part of the war against the Sandinista government. Washington has put up the money, Honduras the territory.

Honduran authorities originally believed that they could reap great dividends without paying a price. In effect, they rented their long border with Nicaragua in return for financial concessions from Washington. Honduras was pulled from its backwater status and suddenly elevated to the rank of strategic ally of the world’s most powerful nation. Generous doles from the U.S. Treasury brought prosperity, at least to a few. The Honduran air force became the first in the region to be equipped with supersonic jet fighters. Tegucigalpa became part of the must-see tour for U.S. dignitaries in Central America. And President Jose Azcona Hoyo was honored with an official visit to the White House.

Honduran officials largely ignored the costs of harboring the Contras until the Esquipulas II peace agreement was signed last August. It stipulated that Nicaragua was to open up its political system and Honduras was to close down Contra bases. The Sandinistas’ tentative steps toward compliance contrasted with complete inaction by Honduran authorities. Meanwhile, diplomatic and internal pressure intensified on Honduras to meet its obligations under Esquipulas II. Washington also turned up the heat. After U.S. aid to the Contras was suspended by a balky Congress in February, the Administration dispatched its heaviest hitters to persuade the Honduran military to take over the Central Intelligence Agency’s Contra supply operations. U.S. officials indicated that the law now obliged them to cease their logistical support for the Contra operation. The Hondurans reportedly were told that they didn’t have to be as fastidious.

Because of the Contra presence, tension with the Sandinista military remained high. The Reagan Administration long hoped to persuade the Honduran military to join more willingly in the fray against Managua. The Honduran military, for its part, insisted that the Contras at least do the fighting. On three occasions, however, when the Contras were getting their noses bloodied, the Hondurans were blackmailed into coming to their aid. With each “rescue,” popular indignation grew.

Exactly two years ago Congress abruptly suspended aid to the Contras. The White House reacted by announcing that Honduras had been invaded. At the time, President Azcona was vacationing, yet, to the dismay of U.S. diplomats, he did not consider the crisis worthy of his return to the capital. U.S. aid to the Contras was subsequently restored.

In December, 1986, Honduran soldiers were ferried by U.S. helicopters to an area of hostilities between the Sandinistas and the Contras. The Honduran military reluctantly took up positions between the two.

During last week’s emergency, four U.S. combat battalions parachuted into Honduras in response to another alleged invasion. Although two bombing raids were carried out by the Honduran air force, the high command resisted blandishments from the U.S. Embassy to hit Sandinista military targets deeper inside Nicaragua. Michael O’Brien, the embassy’s spokesman, said that the Contras had been saved from a “fatal blow.”

The Sapoa agreement was achieved not because President Reagan ordered 3,150 U.S. troops to Honduras. Rather, it represents acknowledgement by both sides that the killing must stop. Tens of thousands of Nicaraguan lives have already been taken. The threat to the Sandinistas is not now, nor has it ever been, the Contras. Sapoa, moreover, would never have occurred had Congress not acted in February to stop funding the Contra war effort.

The dialogue and subsequent agreement with the Contras reflects the acknowledgement that the revolution was essentially about improving peoples’ lives through programs of reform, food and work. The Sandinistas were not losing the war against the Contras; they were losing the war of gallo pinto (rice and beans). The war precludes taking even minimal steps to confront the myriad economic and social problems afflicting Nicaragua.

The Sapoa agreement is being celebrated in Tegucigalpa. It will, one hopes, remove the threat of war that has cast a long shadow over the entire country. More important, it means that Washington will no longer be looking past Honduras to the Contras. The U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa will again represent a diplomatic presence for the people of Honduras, not the headquarters for plotting the next step against the Nicaraguan government.

For both Nicaragua and Honduras, Sapoa represents a dramatic “time out” in the long war. If it holds, Honduras will be able to reassert sovereignty over its border. If Nicaragua agrees to make the necessary political changes, steps will soon be taken to disarm and facilitate resettlement of the Contra army that has caused both countries so much hardship. Normal diplomacy and trade can be restored. More important, both countries can begin to tackle the real issues of life in the heart of Central America--the struggle for land, work and dignity.