Risks Both Sides Assumed Give Hope to Nicaragua Pact

There is an eerie familiarity to the pattern. Last August, Central American leaders signed a peace accord and heralded it as a new declaration of independence. The Reagan Administration was surprised; it welcomed the plan officially but in private was skeptical and opposed. The Administration had the same response when the Nicaraguan government and its resistance signed a second significant landmark in the region’s march toward peace Wednesday.

Although the accord signed in August requested the United States to stop military aid to the Contras, President Reagan disregarded the request, insisting that the Sandinistas would negotiate seriously only if Congress provided continued military aid. He was wrong. At great risk, Congress responded to the Central Americans by not responding to the President. Since August, it has rejected military aid while providing sufficient humanitarian aid to indicate that it was not prepared to wholly abandon the Contras. This gave the Contras an incentive to negotiate seriously, and it provided face-saving space for the Sandinistas to make some hard decisions.

The division in Congress thus had a salutary effect. Central America exerted positive influence on legislators in Washington, which in turn reinforced Central America’s progress toward peace. Although many believe that the United States calls the shots in Central America, the agreement signed Wednesday in Sapoa is proof that Nicaraguans can shape their country’s destiny if they can treat each other with respect.

Yet there is much in the Sapoa accord that offers hope. It represents the first time that the Nicaraguan government and the resistance sent high-level delegations to negotiate face-to-face in Nicaragua. In a nation that has always been ravaged by armed struggle because the government and its opposition could never negotiate the terms for political change, Sapoa is a historic breakthrough. For the first time, both sides acknowledged one another’s legitimacy and showed a willingness to compromise that is rare in Nicaragua’s history.

The agreement is important less for what was accomplished than for the risks that each side was willing to assume. Contra leaders agreed to withdraw their forces to specified enclaves where they will be vulnerable and their true strength can be ascertained. They agreed to reject any military aid, although the Reagan Administration was close to obtaining some, and they will receive humanitarian aid only through “neutral organizations,” although the Administration had rejected this idea when it was proposed by congressional Democrats.

Most important, the resistance defined a more realistic negotiating agenda by accepting the constitution and President Daniel Ortega’s incumbency until 1990. The next round of negotiations should therefore focus on ways to guarantee the full participation of all Nicaraguans in elections for local offices and the Central American Parliament.

For its part, the Nicaraguan government reversed many of its previous positions. In accepting the Contras and permitting them to keep their weapons during negotiations, the Sandinista leadership made itself more vulnerable to internal divisions. The government “guaranteed unrestricted freedom of expression,” accepted a gradual but unconditional amnesty, invited the Contra leadership to Managua for talks on political issues and not just a cease-fire, and it accepted an ongoing role by the Organization of American States and Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo to verify this and other agreements.

In its response to the region’s peace initiatives, the Reagan Administration has stressed problems with the various accords, but it has done nothing to help improve them or even to negotiate U.S. interests directly. The statement by Secretary of State George P. Shultz that the Soviet Union should now stop military aid to the Nicaraguan government is astonishing not only because the Sapoa agreement omits this point, but also because the Administration has been unwilling to negotiate it.

Most of the Contras’ political leaders fled Nicaragua after the war began in 1982. It is possible that the Administration fears that the outcome of negotiations will permit these leaders to return to a country that has less political space and is poorer, more militarized and dependent on the Soviet Union that it was before they left. It would be embarrassing for the Administration to credit the Contra war with such an outcome, but it would be tragic to continue the war without the prospect of a better alternative. In separating themselves from the Administration’s strategy, the Contras demonstrated both their nationalism and their independence; this undoubtedly helped them to reach agreement.

Both sides have agreed to a follow-up meeting in Managua on April 6. Both will try to rally their supporters for that meeting, but the real test of success will be whether each side shows respect for the other. If both pass that test, the path toward peace will be that much shorter.