Going for Another Encore, Washington Hardly Noticed Nicaraguans Stealing Show

Nicaragua rode a political roller coaster last week--from the brink of wider war, when the United States deployed combat troops to Honduras, to the threshold of peace, when the Sandinistas and the Contras signed a cease-fire agreement in the little border town of Sapoa. These two events, portending such different futures for Central America, spring from the same causes: the essential weakness of the Contras and the Sandinistas’ desperate need to staunch their economy’s hemorrhaging.

With their military fortunes receding and the Reagan Administration drawing to a close, the Contras’ dreams of overthrowing the Sandinistas have vanished. Even the patronage of Ronald Reagan has not been enough to guarantee Washington’s backing. Twice this year Congress has voted against additional aid, leaving the Contras demoralized at the fickleness of U.S. support.

The Hondurans have also become less hospitable toward the Contra army. They worry that the United States will eventually abandon the Contras, leaving Honduras alone to cope with “the disposal problem.” Honduras President Jose Azcona Hoyo’s main motive for signing the Central American peace accord last August was the hope that it would lead to the normalization of relations with Nicaragua and the repatriation of the Contras.

When fighting intensified along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border, the Reagan Administration saw an opportunity to reassure both Hondurans and Contras that Washington was unwavering in its commitment to the war against Nicaragua. The introduction of front-line U.S. combat forces was tangible proof that Washington would not abandon the fight.

The Nicaraguan “invasion” of Honduras was largely a fictional drama written in Washington. Like all good fiction, it was based on a kernel of truth. The Honduran-Nicaraguan border has been the main battleground in the Contra war, and Sandinista troops have regularly pursued Contras across it. These border incursions are comparable to the terrorist incidents that the United States used to justify escalation in Vietnam. In McGeorge Bundy’s phrase, they are like streetcars--another comes along every few minutes.

Although the 82nd Airborne dropped into Honduras for a brief visit, its main objective was to take Capitol Hill. The Administration hoped that the specter of a wider war would stampede Congress into funding its smaller one. The plot may be transparent and the acting unconvincing, but this drama played well enough in Congress on previous runs to justify an encore.

Before all the reviews were in, however, the Nicaraguans stole the show. The weaknesses that prompted the Reagan Administration to send troops to bolster the morale of its allies led the Contras to sign the cease-fire agreement. It was their last chance to go home. The Sandinistas signed because peace offers the only hope of rebuilding their shattered economy.

Beneath these pragmatic motives, one could also sense a common emotional bond between these two bitter enemies. Six years of war have left tens of thousands dead and made daily life a misery for survivors. It was time, said Contra leader Adolfo Calero, for brother to stop killing brother. At the signing ceremonies, both delegations sang the national anthem with fervor.

The Contras--originally organized, armed and directed by the United States--did not even inform Washington of their decision to sign the agreement until the last minute; then they ignored the Administration’s admonition against signing. Like the Central American presidents who agreed to a regional peace accord in August, the Contras seemed to recognize that their interests and those of the Reagan Administration were not necessarily the same.

The Administration’s reaction to the cease-fire was no less odious for being predictable. Lukewarm public support was combined with predictions of failure and, on background, condemnation. The pretense that U.S. policy was aimed at nothing more than helping the Contras secure their political rights dissolved over night. The real Reagan agenda remains what it has always been: to overthrow the government of Nicaragua by armed force. If the cease-fire agreement leads to permanent peace, it will be the death knell for Reagan’s desire to “win one back” from the communists.

Whether any Nicaraguans share this aim is apparently beside the point. Already on the Republican right there are cries that the Contras have sold out, that the cease-fire agreement is “another Munich” --a concession comparable to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Adolf Hitler. To these zealots the Contras were never more than cannon fodder for Reagan’s doctrine of global counterrevolution.

The Sandinistas and the Contras have decided to give peace a chance. The United States, having fueled their war for six years, owes them that opportunity. Washington has no right to fight the war to the last Nicaraguan, destroying their country in order to save it.