Why Does the Electorate Gives Us Incompetents at the Helm of State?

Within the past 18 months a number of trenchant essays, books, studies and speeches have come and gone, each asserting a measure of “decline” in this or that sector of our society.

Prof. Allan Bloom’s book deplored the moral neutering of university faculties. Dr. Lynn Cheney and Education Secretary William J. Bennett have exposed the disappearance of the foundation base of knowledge--as distinct from skills--from curricula in primary and secondary schools. And Prof. Paul Kennedy foreshadows our declining ability as a country to defend our interests overseas as a corollary to the declining strength of our economy.

In some of these pieces there are references, made terribly forlorn by their incompleteness, to the possibility of reversing these trends, namely because democracy in America has proved to be adaptable. The implication is that whenever sloth, greed, dishonesty or some other sin afflicts one of our institutions, it will be evident to other institutions that will in turn take corrective action. Bloom, Cheney, Bennett et al ., have brought these problems to our attention, and that will induce some ambitious problem solver(s) to tackle the problem and bring forth solutions. At least that’s the theory. I’m beginning to wonder.

What brings this to mind is the Iran-Contra affair and, specifically, the way it has come and almost gone, with scarcely any recognition of the fact that its occurrence represents a serious malfunction in our system of government--one that can, and very likely will, happen again and again unless corrective measures are taken. Recall the facts. An idea was conceived in the executive branch for the achievement of a foreign-policy goal. But in a departure from accepted practice, it was pursued without consultation with Congress, which could have provided a check on the wisdom of the idea. Why did this departure from practice occur? Was it a human failing or did the system fail?

Thus far, the formal proceedings of Congress and law-enforcement bodies would have us believe that the failure was human. Surely this is part of the answer, and as one who accepts responsibility for the mistakes that were made, I expect to suffer the consequences. But is that all there is to it? Surely not.

Is is not reasonable to at least ask a few basic questions about the state of the system? For example, why didn’t the President want to consult with Congress? He knew there was a risk of failure. Most politicians usually want someone around to share the blame. Why not this time? Truth be told, President Reagan has always believed it was a waste of time to consult with Congress. Why? What has changed in the past 30 years to create that animus?

It has to be more than the built-in adversarial relationship expressed in the control over the two houses by differing parties. That existed during most of the 1950s, and yet President Dwight D. Eisenhower always made it a practice to consult with Speaker Sam Rayburn and Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson. Perhaps part of the answer lies in the fact that in those days, if the two branches were able to agree, at least the congressional leadership could deliver the votes of their parties. That’s no longer true. Why? Does it have anything to do with the loss of influence over the campaign purse strings, which in turn has made it easier for party members to thumb their noses at the leadership?

My point is not to advocate one answer versus another to these questions, only to say that in them may lie our ability to renew a better working relationship and thus to help in part to prevent a recurrence of this tawdry episode.

Nor should a larger review focus on Congress alone. How could we arrive at such a parlous state of incompetence among executive branch foreign-policy officials, from the President to Cabinet officers to other appointed high and mid-level officials?

Viewed in the abstract, purely in the interest of avoiding a real calamity in the years ahead, it is fair to ask, “Why did the electorate give us these men and not better ones?”

What is it about the criteria we apply when voting that gives us such mediocrity? Is it our greater interest in the candidates’ competence in domestic matters? If so, why? Why is it that we carry on today, cavalier to the the fact that our banking system might well collapse tomorrow as a consequence of its over-exposure in worthless loans in Latin America? More’s the point, why has this matter--or a dozen other foreign issues of equal import--not even come up in the ongoing campaign? Could it be, in part, a reflection of the fact that our primary and secondary education system hasn’t taught us to worry about what happens overseas, that we remain basically isolationist even though such a stance is patently against our own interest? Every American’s welfare, as measured in jobs, markets and our very safety, is inextricably tied to what happens overseas. But we haven’t realized it yet. We have basked secure, first behind oceans, and then behind a shield of military superiority, under the naive illusion that our insulation from world events could endure. It has come to an end. And we must begin to insist that we have leaders who are competent to deal with the foreign agenda.

Back to the point, what matters at this stage is not the answers to the questions, but that the questions are at least asked. What has happened to the institutions that are charged with this responsibility? Why hasn’t Congress addressed these larger questions? And why hasn’t the press prodded Congress to do so?