Fortress Noriega Must Fall From Within

Dumping dictators is tough.

In a recent study commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency, the authors found that practically no authoritarian leaders since 1945 have taken early retirement. Most have been ousted from power by coups and revolutions, or they died in office. And in nearly every case study by the CIA, political instability usually preceded and almost always followed attempts to dislodge the dictator.

It is surprising, therefore, that United States officials today express frustration at how hard it appears to be to oust Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega or dismay over the domestic, political and economic instability in Panama that results every time pressure is increased.

Noriega has been under growing pressure from the United States to resign as commander of the Panama Defense Forces, a position he has held since 1983. His military power base coupled with the dossiers he has been able to compile on would-be rivals during his 10 years as chief of Panama’s intelligence service have made him the de facto ruler of the country.

The campaign to oust Noriega started in June, 1987, following revelations by a close associate that the general had been involved in the assassination of political opponents, electoral fraud and drug trafficking.

The United States has employed a broad spectrum of tactics, including State Department pronouncements and congressional resolutions asking the general to step down, suspension of economic and military aid, economic sanctions, military threats, diplomatic ostracism and covert political action. None have worked. And while they may yet result in Noriega’s ouster, in the short run they have also stiffened his and the army’s resolve to resist U.S. intervention, caused numerous Latin American leaders to express concern about the real motives behind U.S. actions, discredited Panama’s nominal political leaders who are now seen as powerless American lackeys, provided Cuba with an opportunity to send aid and military advisers into a region of real strategic importance to the United States, and made the lives of most Panamanians miserable.

Short of invading Panama, Washington may have no other options left--and a good deal more political instability ahead about which to be concerned.

This state of affairs leads me to wonder whether it was wise for the Reagan Administration to use the tactics it has to try to oust Noriega.

There is no question that the general’s actions, politics and ethics are repugnant. But it was bad business for the CIA to become involved with him in the 1970s, as Seymour Hersh has reported. And it was a poor decision on the part of President Jimmy Carter, who badly needed the cooperation of Panama’s leaders in providing sanctuary for the ailing and deposed Shah of Iran, to restrain the Justice Department from presenting the evidence that would have probably led to Noriega’s indictment in 1980 for illegal arms dealing.

It is incomprehensible, however, that, based on Pentagon and CIA advice, the Reagan Administration waited until just 10 months ago--despite evidence that for most of this decade Noriega was not only profiting substantially from the drug trade but also apparently selling U.S. secrets to Fidel Castro--to take the actions it has.

What would have worked better?

In February of this year, Noriega was indicted by grand juries in Florida for drug trafficking and racketeering. He is the first leader of a country allied with the United States to be charged with such criminal acts. Noriega should have been indicted much earlier. Perhaps letting justice take its course will prove to be the most potent--and least counter-productive--weapon of all, for even the Panamanian military must eventually conclude that its honor is increasingly tarnished by supporting someone who, if ever brought to this country to face trial, stood a good chance of being convicted as a criminal.

Indeed, if past experience is any guide, dictators are usually only ousted by pressure from within. Consequently, American interests may be best served both by avoiding dependence on dictators in the first place and the temptation to think that we alone can engineer the ouster of those whom we no longer wish to tolerate.