Should We Take in the Contras? : Beware of Impulsive Action That Affects Other Refugees

In the back of many people’s minds is an assumption that when and if Nicaragua’s Contras give up their armed struggle, they will come to the United States.

There is reason for this assumption. Take as a point of comparison the resettlement of Indochinese after the Vietnam War. Or the resettlement of Cubans following Castro’s takeover. Or, moving even closer to the case at hand, the safe haven afforded Anastasio Somoza’s followers after the Sandinistas came to power in 1979.

The assumption has even more basis when one considers these elements: the interest that the United States has taken in the Contras for the last seven years; the likelihood that Nicaragua will not grant amnesty to a portion of the Contras; the probability that Costa Rica and Honduras will urge the United States to take the Contras, and the presence of tens of thousands of Nicaraguans already in this country, legally and illegally, including Contra leaders and their families living in Miami.

To many people, the question is not whether the Contras will come here but when and how. Yet a formal decision to resettle the Contras would raise a number of difficult issues:

- What effect would that have on the status of upwards of 100,000 Nicaraguans estimated to be in the United States, most of them illegally? Can we assume that they would be allowed to remain, even in the event of a political settlement in Nicaragua?

- If so, would the United States continue to view the nearly 500,000 Salvadorans in this country as deportable illegal aliens? Given the similarity of their circumstances, would we see the same political divisiveness that resulted from inequitable treatment by the U.S. government of Haitian and Cuban boat people in 1980?

- Who and how many would be resettled--all of the Contras or just the leadership? The numbers of armed Contras are small, between 10,000 and 12,000. Estimates of the number who would not likely be covered by an amnesty granted by the Nicaraguan government range from 300 to 2,000. This implies that most of the rank-and-file will be able to return home, although a substantial portion of the leadership may not qualify for amnesty. But will we resettle only the leadership? What about those who are not combatants but are so opposed to the Sandinista regime that they want to leave, or are already refugees in the region and won’t go back? What about the families of the Contras or of others opposed to the Sandinista regime?

- What legal mechanisms would apply? If the Refugee Act of 1980 is used to resettle Contras but not other Central Americans, will this not be evidence that it serves ideological rather than humanitarian purposes? Only 400 Central American refugees have been admitted to the United States during the past year. If the Contras are paroled into the country under Executive authority, why is this priority given to the Contras but not to other people of concern to the United States, such as the Khmer at the Thai-Kampuchean border?

These questions and others will require answers that ought to be formulated now rather than after we commit to the Contras’ resettlement. If we have learned anything from resettling Cubans and Indochinese, it is that special admissions programs after the end of a conflict have long-term domestic and foreign-policy consequences.

Considering these broader, longer-term implications, it is important to avoid making our decisions about when, how and whom to resettle in a crisis atmosphere. It is not too early for the Executive Branch and the Congress to be consulting on these matters.

A final point: Central American countries, while they have produced tens of thousands of refugees and displaced persons, have a good record in terms of providing safe haven to people who have fled their homes. Central American nations have repeatedly reaffirmed their intention to maintain that generosity even as solutions to the refugees’ problems are sought. Both the Contadora and Arias peace plans have provisions for dealing with refugees.

Given this commitment, there is no reason to believe that Contras who have laid down their arms will be unable to find at least temporary safe haven in the region. This affords time for neighboring countries, the rest of Latin America (including Mexico), the United States, Canada and Europe to address the broader problem of the more than 1 million Central American refugees and displaced persons. Working with the Central American countries can also provide the United States with a greater ability to target its assistance--including resettlement--on those who are most in need of such help, whether they be Contras and their families, Contra sympathizers or simply refugees.