Middle Course Is Off Course in Panama : Unilaterally, Washington Has Upset Everyone but the General

“When you strike at a king, you must kill him.” So runs the adage. But in Panama the United States has chosen to forsake the two paths that might have brought a swift end to Gen. Manuel A. Noriega’s rule. Instead, we have chosen to pursue a middle course of incrementalism that has hurt the Panamanian people and badly tarnished U.S. prestige in Latin America.

Washington’s first set of punitive measures against Noriega, announced on March 3 after Panamanian President Eric A. Delvalle’s futile attempt to oust the military strongman, embodied America’s traditionally unilateral approach to Latin American affairs. Without consulting our allies in the region, the Reagan Administration froze about $50 million in Panamanian assets, withheld the $6.5-million monthly payment fee for the use of the Panama Canal and suspended trade preferences on Panama’s $96 million worth of imports into this country. The hope was that this pressure would force Noriega into exile while retaining the friendship of the Panamanian people and preventing the influence of third parties.

In so quickly choosing to act unilaterally the Administration missed a signal opportunity to solve the crisis along multilateral lines that not only would have removed Noriega but also might have helped to dispel the all-too-familiar image of highhanded U.S. interference in Latin American affairs. The American economic squeeze came at a time when former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez, former Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen and former Costa Rican President Daniel Oduber were negotiating with Noriega on a plan that would have guaranteed free elections in Panama and the general’s voluntary departure to exile. According to Perez, the agreement was to go into effect in March; Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez had agreed to offer Noriega asylum.

The Administration undercut this effort. Yet, having decided on unilateral economic pressure, Washington did not pursue its policy with the vigor necessary to ensure Noriega’s fall.

In the days and weeks following the announcement of American sanctions, Panama’s opposition and commercial leaders--with U.S. approval--shut down the business activity of their nation. Workers struck. Banks and stores were closed. None of these actions swayed Noriega. Then, instead of upping the pressure by instituting a full economic embargo early on, Washington balked--and in so doing gave Noriega time to recover.

The general clamped down hard on civilian opposition. He secured cash in the form of taxes paid to his government by U.S. companies with branches and subsidiaries in Panama. He also made use of Panamanian assets in the Latin American Export Bank. At the same time, he secured arms from Cuba and began to organize “people’s battalions”--armed groups of workers loyal to his rule. Meanwhile, the economic shutdown and the suppression of civil dissent began to sap the will of the anti-Noriega groups. Rather than a solution to the crisis, the U.S. sanctions were seen by an increasing number of Panamanians as an additional problem. After nine days, stores in Panama began to reopen.

Still, the Administration failed to see that it should quickly press its policy of economic pressure to its logical conclusion. Instead, Washington announced on April 8 that it would prohibit American companies--whether based in Panama or having Panamanian branches and subsidiaries--and individual American citizens from paying any taxes, fees or utility charges to the Panamanian government.

A full American economic embargo--which would also have included a ban on all exports and imports, a revocation of Panamanian landing rights in this country and a full ban on Americans traveling to Panama--has consistently been ruled out by the Administration. In the meantime, Panamanian opposition to U.S. policies has grown as the people’s suffering has deepened. In addition, other Latin American leaders are now worried about America’s unilateral behavior, wondering if such actions might befall their own countries someday should the United States deem it necessary.

What should the United States do now? We must quickly try to coordinate our actions with the efforts of such figures as Venezuela’s Perez, Costa Rica’s Oduber and the current Costa Rican president, Oscar Arias Sanchez, to end the crisis. But if it is too late for multilateral solutions--and it may well be--and if Noriega still refuses a peaceful transfer of power and exile from Panama, we have no choice but to impose a full economic embargo on Panama. If we do not now strike with conviction, there is every chance that anti-Noriega Panamanians may carry out a guerrilla attack against the Panama Canal in order to force American military intervention. Let us hope that it is not to late to avoid such a tragedy.