Ike’s Arms-Control Advice Has Value for INF Debate

Never mind that the number of weapons involved is infinitesimal in relation to the total arsenal, it is the symbol that is important regarding the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Just how difficult it is to persuade any nation, at any time, to destroy usable weapons can be seen in one fact: The INF treaty is only the second in history to require the mutual destruction of existing weaponry. The other was the Washington treaty of 1921, which required the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan to reduce their battleship fleets. Few remember it today, because there was no follow-up. INF could suffer the same fate, and it surely will be soon forgotten if the process of arms reduction does not continue at the Moscow summit meeting.

What would a President like Dwight D. Eisenhower have said of the INF? One can only speculate, of course, but, since he was the first President to command nuclear-armed missiles, he had a lot to say about the subject. His comments ought to be considered as part of the current debate over arms reduction.

To understand Ike’s views, it is necessary to understand his strategic thought. He believed that the advent of the atomic age dictated a fundamental change in military objectives: The aim was no longer to be able to destroy the opposing armies, but to be able to inflict unacceptable damage on cities.

Eisenhower thought that an adequate deterrent consisted of a believable threat that one or two bombs would go off over Moscow. Anything much beyond that was waste. “There is nothing those boys in the Kremlin want so badly that they would risk Red Square to get it,” he told me.

When Eisenhower entered office in 1953, the Joint Chiefs told him that they would destroy Moscow’s ability to wage war if they could hit 70 targets in the Soviet Union. In 1957 the chiefs said that they wanted to destroy 700 targets.

“What is going to be done with this tremendous number of enormous weapons?” Ike asked when the chiefs told him that they wanted to build 400 missiles to add to the B-52 fleet. “We are certainly providing for elaborate reserves, and making very pessimistic estimates as to what can get to the target.”

The President, according to his science adviser, “remarked in obvious disgust, ‘Why don’t we go completely crazy and plan on a force of 10,000?’ ”

Eisenhower asked the Joint Chiefs to think about what they were proposing. Setting off so many atomic bombs over the Soviet Union would also certainly destroy the United States through radioactivity. Further, he said, “Suppose we do destroy the Soviets. What then? There would be this vast area of devastation, with no transportation, no food, no medical supplies and millions of sick and starving people, and I ask you, what would the civilized world do?”

Ike often said that the communist plan was to force America into an arms race that would lead us to bankruptcy. Some American conservatives have turned that on its head; they argue that we can bankrupt the Soviets by forcing them to keep up the arms race. He thought it better to build homes and hospitals and schools than bombs and missiles, whether here or in the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower spent much of his second term searching for a formula that could lead to a nuclear-test-ban treaty. He came close to achieving it, but the U-2 incident destroyed the Paris summit meeting of 1960 and no treaty was signed.

Nevertheless, he clearly stated his views on the need for arms control--not only in his farewell address when he warned about the military-industrial complex but also in private musings and correspondence.

“Let us not forget that the armed services are to defend a way of life, not merely land, property or lives,” he wrote a childhood friend in reference to the cost of the arms race.

At a Cabinet meeting he commented on Democratic charges that he had neglected to build up the nuclear strike force: “After a certain point there is no use in having more, no matter what quantity. If we have all we need to create the devastation we know we can create, what the hell is the use of more?”

Ike’s comment that is most applicable to the INF treaty and the coming summit came in 1959, when he was advised to reject any plan that allowed Soviet inspection teams on American soil because “it would reveal detailed information on our deployments.” The President replied, “I do not see much hope for a world engaged in an all-out military buildup, military technology and tremendous attempts at secrecy.”

We had to try to reach agreement, Eisenhower insisted, if only because “in the long run no country can advance intellectually and in terms of its culture and well-being if it has to devote everything to military buildup.”

In that spirit, it seems clear to me, Eisenhower would have endorsed the INF treaty and urged the Senate to ratify it, and encouraged President Reagan to seek further reductions during the Moscow summit.