Perestroika and the Party: Gorbachev’s Daunting Task

Last spring, perestroika, the Soviet Union’s restructuring, encountered mounting difficulties. Fundamental economic reform was not making any headway; ethnic conflicts were fast becoming aggravated. The economic situation for the masses was worsening. The press was publishing sharply critical reports, but even the policy of glasnost was meeting increasing resistance. People began to say, “It’s more interesting to read in the Soviet Union than to live in it.” Finally, the declared unity of Soviet society evaporated, as the polemics between two newspapers, Soviet Russia and Pravda, showed.

All those circumstances were reflected in choosing the 5,000 delegates for the Communist Party conference last month. For the first time in many decades, the delegate elections were marked by sharp political struggle and involved actual platforms. The conference received not only many thousands of the traditional complaints, but also thousands of concrete proposals. In a word, expectations were high.

Have they been vindicated? Yes, in part. The conference conducted big, important and interesting work. If, during the years of stagnation, people almost stopped reading papers during party congresses, they now formed long lines at newsstands.

Undeniably, the conference’s most important document was General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s opening report. It was a fundamental document that set out in very condensed form (there was no space for examples and explanations) many suggestions and policies that went much further than anything that Gorbachev himself had said or written before.

Each reader can find in the report grounds for satisfaction or concern--depending on his position and profession. The proposal on price reform, for instance, would bring anxiety to many; Gorbachev’s insistence on radical reduction of the party apparatus and liquidation of its economic branches would have a mixed reception in other quarters. I was personally satisfied by Gorbachev’s declaration on the need to reconsider the traditionalist views in the party on the events of the ‘30s and ‘70s. Healthy self-criticism in the party is not denigration, but a long-overdue process of cleansing.

However, Gorbachev’s report also contained parts it was difficult to agree with, as well as parts that remained unclear.

We all see shifts in the economy, the changes in the system of priorities, the cancellation of obsolete projects and instructions. Many experiments are under way, the cooperative movement gathers momentum, individual enterprise develops. Private farming is winning acceptance in the countryside, while urban dwellers manage a growing number of vegetable plots and even have opportunities to buy houses in villages and cultivate adjoining plots. Previous limits on individual crafts are being removed, and at the same time big agricultural conglomerates are being encouraged.

But all these new forms of economic activity embrace not more than 10% of the national economy so far, while the remaining 90% still operates in the old fashion and produces low-quality commodities. We now have a clearer idea of the reasons behind this economic stagnation but we still lack a comprehensive, well-thought-out program of economic development.

In the last three years, Soviet national income grew very slowly, and acceleration in the economy still remains a slogan. Gorbachev talked about real wages growing by 4.6% in two years, but now one can say with confidence that, for the majority of workers and civil servants, take-home income has slumped.

The country sustained colossal damage because of the Chernobyl catastrophe. The foreign trade turnover shrank in the last two years by 10%, and if a Soviet woman must now buy two pairs of bad Soviet shoes instead of one good Italian pair, she would in no way feel that her real income has increased. A huge amount of money is siphoned off by moonshiners, retail trade lags behind its targets and, while nominal wages have grown in the country, pay-outs are frequently postponed in many cities. Affordable goods are disappearing from stores and there are nationwide shortages of not just meat and milk but even sugar.

One of the conference’s major decisions concerned the separation of the party and administrative functions and boosting the power of the local soviets, or governing and administrative councils, in their territories. Yet many delegates found it hard to understand how the system would function in provinces, cities and districts where, in accordance with Gorbachev’s proposal, the local party’s first secretary would head the renovated soviet. It seemed that, for the first time in 65 years, some delegates to a party conference openly objected to the party leader’s proposals; he, in turn, attempted to answer them calmly.

The conference polemics revealed both divergent opinions on certain problems and distinct currents inside the party. To simplify somewhat, there are three different political groups in the party:

--Determined enemies of perestroika , rigid conservatives who are working to arrest any movement forward by the party and the country. These people are leaders of many government and party agencies, ministers, Central Committee functionaries in economic departments and some cultural figures. They still wield colossal power and influence, but their policy during the conference was not to make any statements and even not to answer any criticism. These people still have no intention of surrendering without a fight, and their voices are still to be heard.

--Those who understand the need for radical renovation, the utter impossibility of living and working in the old way, but who would like to effect all pressing changes with the traditional methods, through administrative command, without any glasnost or democracy. They openly expressed their disapproval of the “too independent” press. They are afraid of the increasingly active young generation, object to popular activism, overhauling of the ideological stereotypes and criticism of the party’s past as undermining, in their opinion, the authority of the party.

These people fight corruption and abuse of power but they are totally incapable of holding a free discussion even within the limits of what Gorbachev described as “socialist pluralism.” They are inflexible, accustomed to giving commands, not reasons why. Many of the regional party leaders who spoke at the conference could be classed among this group, but the most graphic example was Yegor K. Ligachev, a secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Politburo, who in his long speech illustrated both his puritanical views and his narrow-mindedness.

--Those who call for further progress in restructuring, for wider criticism and self-criticism in the party, for greater glasnost and democracy in the country, for new developments in economic, domestic and foreign policies.

The leader of this group, as we saw, is Gorbachev himself; some of the intellectuals represented at the conference also belonged to this group. Their views were expressed most vividly by such speakers as actor Mikhail Ulyanov and writer Grigory Y. Baklanov. These people represent the future for the policy of perestroika. But they will never win without support from Gorbachev, Alexander N. Yakovlev and other influential politicians and statesmen. Undoubtedly there will be many sharp clashes in the future struggle between these party groups

On the whole, the conference demonstrated a boost in Gorbachev’s popularity and influence. But both in the course of the conference and in its resolutions, distinct traces of compromise are visible. This compromise permitted Gorbachev to make another step forward, but not as fast and not as far as is necessary for the party and the country.

One result of the compromise, I think, was the conference’s failure to make any changes in the composition of the Central Committee, despite the presence of 60 to 70 of its 300-plus members who had lost positions that enabled them to sit on Central Committee plenums. Meanwhile each step in perestroika must be followed by corresponding changes in the party’s cadres.

The conference decisions must now be implemented in practical measures. A huge amount of work lies ahead for us-- reducing the government and party apparatus, widening public access to information, strengthening the soviets and effecting economic reforms. The chances for success have increased, but the dangers have also grown.