Conclave Opened Way for Gorbachev Initiatives

Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s success at the recent Communist Party conference, particularly the proposed presidential system that would place him at the head of a powerful government as well as the Communist Party, strengthens his pursuit of a key goal: dispelling the West’s perception that the Soviet Union poses a military threat.

Although Gorbachev convened the conference to deal with domestic affairs, U.S. government and private experts on Soviet affairs agree that his enhanced prestige should allow him to continue pushing his foreign policy programs, perhaps at an accelerated pace--and even to embark on dramatically new initiatives.

The dramatic progress last week toward a settlement in Angola, and the widespread expectation that Moscow will announce a unilateral troop cut in Eastern Europe soon, reflect new moves toward Gorbachev’s goal of creating “a more benign international environment” in which he can pursue his domestic economic and political reforms, a senior government official said.

South Africa, Angola and Cuba announced that a framework agreement had been reached for the withdrawal of both South African and Cuban troops from Angola and independence for Namibia. The negotiations were mediated by the United States and facilitated by the Soviets, who transported the 50,000 Cuban troops to Africa and who arm them and the Angolan forces.

Won Support at Conference

“Gorbachev used the improved relations of the Soviet Union with the world at the party conference to win support for what he wanted internally,” according to Harry Gelman of the RAND Corp. of Santa Monica. Gelman is a former CIA senior analyst of Soviet affairs.

“He’ll want more foreign policy successes which he can take credit for,” Gelman added. Such successes would imply that he is saving money and other resources abroad for use at home, he said.

“(Gorbachev’s) grab for presidential power represents a tremendous breakthrough,” said a Soviet-born analyst, “one that is unparalleled since (Josef) Stalin’s days. If he gets it all, he will be more in command than ever before, more flexible, better able to monitor the military and defense spending, freer to act independent of the Politburo’s defense council, maybe even without the approval of the Politburo.”

“He has talked openly at the conference about keeping us (the West) off balance,” said Prof. Myron Rush, a veteran Soviet analyst at Cornell University. “We have to look for new proposals. Some are surely coming, such as unilateral cuts in conventional arms in Europe.”

Question of U.S. Response

Some new Soviet moves, like efforts to reduce strategic arms, could improve U.S.-Soviet relations. But it is not clear whether the Reagan Administration, in its waning months, will be willing or able to respond substantively to any new Soviet proposals. Experts are split on whether the Soviets will risk “wasting” new offers on this Administration or will wait for its successor.

Some Soviet moves would be a mixed blessing, like the deep cuts in Soviet troops in Hungary that the State Department says could be announced soon. While marginally reducing the forces facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and promising greater freedom for East European nations, such a move would put considerable public pressure on the Western alliance to also reduce its arms, even though the Soviets will retain an edge of at least 2 to 1 in tanks and artillery after any pullback from Hungary.

And some moves may be directly hostile to U.S. interests. At the conference, Gorbachev spoke of “restructuring relations in the Asia-Pacific region,” and some U.S. officials anticipate continued Soviet meddling in the Philippines as the United States faces difficult negotiations to extend its leases on military bases there, new efforts to promote nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific and intensified wooing of China in an effort to halt, or even reverse, its tilt to the West.

Praise from Chinese

Gorbachev has already achieved an indication of success. Chinese Premier Li Peng praised his internal reform programs immediately after the party conference in Moscow and spoke about a possible Sino-Soviet summit--which the Kremlin has long sought--if differences over Cambodia can be resolved.

Beijing once had three conditions for significantly improving relations with Moscow: withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, reduction of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border and an end to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

Only Cambodia remains an issue, it now appears, and Vietnam has promised to withdraw half of its forces by the end of this year, presumably under pressure from Moscow, which wants to reduce foreign aid to Hanoi as well as improve relations with Beijing.

“In Afghanistan, Gorbachev thinks he can salvage a lot, make it a victory for regional statesmanship rather than a defeat,” according to Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a senior national security adviser in the Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford administrations who is now with the Brookings Institution in Washington.

Afghanistan as ‘Buffer’

“He wants to make Afghanistan into a buffer against the United States in Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalism in Iran,” Sonnenfeldt added. Such efforts may soon appear to contradict the spirit, if not the letter, of the withdrawal agreement.

Gorbachev’s recent interest in the U.N.’s peacekeeping potential may also receive greater attention in the wake of the conference. Creation of a U.N.-sponsored naval force in the Persian Gulf could provide Moscow with a long-sought opportunity to have a larger role in that oil-rich region under an international umbrella. Even Soviet soldiers, as part of the “thin blue line” of U.N. peacekeeping forces on the ground--in the Middle East or elsewhere--would give the Soviets increased influence in areas now dominated by the West.

At the conference, Gorbachev spoke of the need to broaden economic relations with capitalist and developing nations. Several experts predict new Soviet efforts to win Western credits and trade concessions.

West German Credits

“The Soviets recently won a big line of credit from the West Germans, and maybe they will want some from us,” said the RAND Corp.’s Gelman. “More likely, however, Gorbachev will want the next administration in Washington to make some change” in U.S. laws that tie trade and credit terms to Soviet emigration practices.

One area in which little Soviet activity can be expected is Central America, several experts agreed.

“They’ve won in Nicaragua,” said Gelman, “and now they have to ease us into accepting it, to reconcile the United States to the fact that a settlement will have to be made on the basis of a regime friendly to them rather than us.”