Sandinistas Flatten Opposition; Wise Reply Is Contra Aid

The Sandinistas’ latest crackdown against the unarmed internal opposition and their expulsion of the U.S. ambassador are not new examples of their “bad timing” or propensity to “shoot themselves in the foot.”

They know exactly what they are doing. Confronted with growing resistance to their rule and, more immediately, with today’s celebration of the ninth anniversary of their revolution, they either had to democratize or try to destroy their opponents. They chose the latter course. As a result, the resumption of military aid to the Contras is once again receiving serious consideration in Washington.

When Congress voted last February to end military aid to the rebels in order to “give peace a chance,” all signs pointed toward further consolidation of the Sandinista regime. Congress had all but abandoned the Contras by depriving them of military aid just as they were to begin negotiating with the Sandinistas, as required under the Central American peace plan. The Sandinistas continued to receive significant amounts of military assistance from the Soviet Union.

The Sandinistas’ negotiating strategy seemed obvious. If they could engage the armed resistance in drawn-out negotiations while making only minor and reversible concessions to comply with the peace plan’s provisions for democracy, the Contras would eventually have to capitulate or disband. Extended negotiations would also enable the Sandinistas to outlive the Reagan Administration and further consolidate their power. They were not worried about President Reagan’s successor; in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair they were certain that the next U.S. President would be a Democrat who would oppose a resumption of military aid to the rebels.

The Central American peace plan did indeed weaken the Contras. When it was announced last August, the rebels were doing better than ever. Approximately 14,000 were inside Nicaragua, and, by launching hundreds of attacks each month, they had begun to put the Sandinistas on the defensive. But after the U.S. aid cutoff, shortages of food, supplies and weapons forced thousands of Contras to retreat to their Honduran sanctuaries.

On the other hand, the peace plan simultaneously strengthened the unarmed opposition inside Nicaragua to a degree that neither the Sandinistas nor the supporters of Contra aid had anticipated. In partial compliance with the peace plan, which placed strong emphasis on the need to democratize, the Sandinistas allowed the newspaper La Prensa to reopen, several private radio stations to resume broadcasting and opposition groups and parties to organize and demonstrate, within limits defined by the regime. As the opposition took full advantage of its new political “space,” the Sandinistas became increasingly alarmed by the opposition’s growing legitimacy and support, as well as by the multiple signs of popular discontent with Sandinista rule.

But perhaps the biggest surprise was the behavior of the seriously weakened Contras. Instead of surrendering to Sandinista demands, they used the negotiations to press for a full implementation of both the letter and the spirit of the peace plan’s democratic provisions. The Sandinistas, however, rejected the rebels’ demands for a radical political restructuring that would threaten their monopoly of power, and instead promised to implement selected democratic reforms at an unspecified date if the Contras disarmed and asked for amnesty. Last month the negotiations, which had reached an impasse, broke down.

The recent Sandinista crackdown proves the Contras right. The much-touted democratic opening in Nicaragua was reversible. La Prensa and the radio stations have been shut down, demonstrations by the unarmed opposition are again prohibited, and more than 30 of its leaders have been jailed. Furthermore, the democracies of Latin America and Europe have done little or nothing to press the Sandinistas to democratize. This was the role that Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez, the author of the peace plan, expected them to play if Washington stopped supporting the armed resistance yet the Sandinistas failed to democratize.

What now? First, the United States should talk with the Latin American and European democracies and encourage them to support the unarmed democratic resistance inside Nicaragua, as Washington has been doing, and to press for a resumption of negotiations under the auspices of the peace plan. At the same time, the United States should encourage the Soviets to make good on their announced intention to de-escalate Third World conflicts by ending their arms shipments to the Sandinistas, as Washington has done with the Contras. If there is no prompt and positive response to these initiatives, the United States has a moral responsibility to restore military aid to the Contras and maintain it until meaningful political changes are made that will enable the long-suffering Nicaraguan people to remove unwanted rulers with ballots instead of bullets.