Expulsion of U.S. Diplomat: Fair Play, Given His Offense

When U.S. Ambassador Richard Melton was ordered to leave Nicaragua, he said that the measure was too strong. It was the first time in Nicaragua’s history that an American ambassador had been expelled. It was a warning, national and international, that peace in Central America is endangered by attempts to destabilize Nicaragua.

It is important to remember the Reagan Administration’s skepticism and strong opposition to the Esquipulas agreements reached by the Central American presidents last August. Also, the Sapoa accords to end the war against Nicaragua, and the liberalizing measures adopted in Nicaragua, did not receive even the slightest positive recognition; they were brushed aside. For the United States, the Nicaraguan government’s acceptance of the democratic mechanisms that the opposition demanded last May was not enough. The goal was still to remove the Sandinista government.

The peace process, however, was irreversible, and the steps taken were beginning to consolidate a route to a political solution that committed both the government and the opposition. There was no turning back. The loss of the military option forced the Reagan Administration to accept, reluctantly, the Sapoa accords. At the same time, it denied the possibility of negotiating a solution, because this would imply recognizing the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan government.

Washington did not have an easy way out. A return to military action, breaking the truce, would have been viewed negatively at home and abroad. Above all, the military option carried the risk of the counterrevolutionary troops being defeated by the Sandinista army.

Meanwhile, despite the economic difficulties that the majority of Nicaraguan families were facing, opposition political parties--the so-called Group of 14--were not gathering popular support, despite rallies and street demonstrations.

In other words, U.S. policy toward Nicaragua faced the defeat of its three options: the military route, negotiations and the predicted strengthening of the internal opposition.

The appointment of Ambassador Melton last spring announced, in effect, the start of a search for a new way to defeat the Nicaraguan government. Perhaps the acceptance of Melton as ambassador was a serious mistake on the part of the Sandinistas, who were well aware of his anti-Sandinista views and his close ties to Elliott Abrams, the assistant secretary of state in charge of the Contra policy.

With only a few months left in office, and burdened by a sense of failure regarding U.S. policy toward Central America, the State Department felt obligated to adopt a short-term hard stance to improve its policy image for the coming electoral campaign. Melton was a key element of this strategy. On his arrival, the ambassador began to coordinate the opposition and provide support to views held by the Contra military leader, Col. Enrique Bermudez, who had been an officer in the old National Guard.

On June 9, talks between the Nicaraguan government and the Contras broke down; Bermudez was responsible.

On the previous day I personally witnessed statements made by the ambassador during a luncheon at the U.S. Embassy. Although negotiations were still under way, he proclaimed the innocence of Bermudez regarding the crimes committed by dictator Anastasio Somoza. Melton disregarded the fact that the institutional character of these crimes implicated all who held relevant positions within the dictatorship.

In a meeting in Esteli on July 3, at which the ambassador was present, opposition leaders suggested the creation of a “government of national salvation.” The president of COSEP, an organization that represents the private sector, predicted that a wave of strikes was going to paralyze the country and that a change of government was necessary. Critical issues were not discussed--only a program of direct action against the government, to be launched with absolute disregard for institutions or legitimacy.

Melton justified his presence at the meeting, saying that it was “one more of his government’s policy efforts to find a solution to the problem.” With his presence and his statements, the ambassador explicitly endorsed internal action to overthrow the government that had accredited him, thus violating the Vienna Convention.

At the same time, in Washington, Congress was discussing whether to renew the country’s aid to the Contras. The aggression against the government of Nicaragua was, therefore, both internal and external.

Given the opposition’s incapacity to withstand a political-ideological confrontation with the Sandinistas, a new battlefield based on provocation was introduced. In this the opposition had the encouragement of the Reagan Administration, the State Department and Ambassador Melton.

For the Nicaraguan government, a reaction was necessary. Whether the one chosen was the best, whether there could have been more adequate responses, is debatable. Nevertheless, the measures taken by the government express the need to reaffirm authority and the limits of an activity that can no longer be called political, but subversive. The measures were strong, but so was the provocation. Nicaragua refuses to bury the Sapoa, Esquipulas and Contadora accords, which cost so much to achieve and which paved the way for a guaranteed solution.

This may be explained further by looking at several matters that have had little attention from the U.S. media. In the first place, the United States has not responded in a reciprocal fashion to the important concessions that the Sandinista government has made in accordance with the Esquipulas plan. Second, the United States has not shown any good will toward the diverse offers presented by the Sandinista government in order to negotiate a political way out. Third, the U.S. Embassy has tried to use the economic crisis caused by the war, now in its seventh year, as a weapon to destabilize the Nicaraguan government. Finally, in the international sphere, the United States has shown no interest in joining its allies--in the European Community, the Nordic countries, the United Nations and elsewhere in Latin America--who have expressed their concern for the future of Central America by designing multilateral aid and cooperation projects to encourage development.

This combination of factors suggests that the Reagan Administration seeks to heighten the conflict in Central America in order to leave the next Administration with a situation in which a negotiated solution would be practically impossible and force would be the only resource left. The expulsion of Ambassador Melton constitutes, paradoxically, an appeal to the prudence and good sense that will be needed to find a solution before that stage is reached.