Something’s Got to Give in El Salvador’s Deadlock

Were it not for the fact that his illness is a personal tragedy, Jose Napoleon Duarte’s diminished capacity to govern and his imminent withdrawal from politics and the presidency of El Salvador could be viewed as a symptom of U.S. policy failure, not simply the end of a long political career. The health of Duarte, of his Christian Democratic Party and, in the last analysis, of the whole U.S.-sponsored and -financed package of “democracy in El Salvador” are all in a similar situation: failing, with poor prospects for recovery. After nearly eight years of trying and billions of dollars in aid, the United States seems no closer to its goals of eliminating the guerrillas or civilizing the extreme right than it was in 1981.

The signs of the Reagan Administration’s lack of success are plain to see. Last spring the right-wing Arena party won a large majority of the country’s mayoralties, and its likely candidate for president next year, Alfredo Cristiani, is by far the favorite. While Arena will undoubtedly try to push its eminence grise , former Army Maj. Roberto D’Aubuisson, under a political rug until then, it can’t escape its association with death squads and other far-right extremists.

Murders, threats and violence in general are on the increase again, as is talk of a coup--either by the army against the government, or by a military faction, or tanda , against the one now in command. Extremist elements, both on active duty and recently retired, are calling for a “Guatemalan” strategy in the war against the insurgents--a scorched-earth campaign to flush out guerrillas and civilian supporters from rural areas and make them uninhabitable--and arrests, killings and deportations on a mass scale.

The reasoning is that, while there undoubtedly would be a cost to pay in regard to relations with the United States, aid and international reputation, a “final solution”to the guerrilla problem would be eventually welcomed in the United States, and abuses or excesses ultimately forgiven.

The FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) guerrillas, for their part, are confident of their military strength, which is intact despite the army’s best efforts. They also are encouraged by the deterioration of the political situation, which can only favor them.

The FMLN is banking on several future events to strengthen its cause. First, the rebels are looking forward to Ronald Reagan’s departure from the White House. They believe that, just as Reagan’s victory in 1980 encouraged the Central American right, the loss of its No. 1 friend in Washington will have a demoralizing effect on the Salvadoran army.

Second, the insurgent alliance--the FMLN and its political partner, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR)--has succeeded so far in taking advantage of a political opening that has taken place, at least in the capital of the country. Long-time FDR leaders Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora are in San Salvador, participating fully in politics. They have been involved in electoral campaigns--if not in the elections themselves--and frequently address rallies, appear on radio and television and make statements to the press.

Now the FMLN apparently has dropped its opposition to the FDR moderates’ participation in next year’s national elections. Ungo was reported this week to be considering a run for the presidency under the banner of a new leftist coalition. The revolutionaries seem to be aware of the fact that they have more to gain by appearing to play the electoral game than opposing it.

Eight years ago a U.S. presidential election and inauguration coincided with an intensification of the conflict and the violence in El Salvador: The FDR leadership was collectively murdered in the heart of the capital on Nov. 30, 1980, and the FMLN unleashed its unsuccessful “final offensive” on Jan. 10, 1981. Once again as Election Day in the United States approaches, the climate of conflict in El Salvador heats up. By early next year, if the FMLN-FDR alliance is able to use the election campaign for its own purposes and appears effective, the armed forces may feel compelled to cancel the voting rather than lose control of a quasi-revolutionary situation. Then the new American President might have to choose between supporting the “Guatemalan solution” advocated by the Salvadoran army and allowing the FMLN to gain the upper hand--perhaps irreversibly.

The guerrillas face their own dilemma. They know that they cannot defeat the army militarily and that a political victory would still not make the army disappear. Two armies facing each other, neither able to win and neither willing to lose, are the stuff of stalemates, and such standoffs generally lead to negotiated settlements.

Nothing of the sort is even remotely possible in El Salvador for now, unless some other party--one or several Latin American nations, or President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica, or, most important, Democrats in the U.S. Congress--gets involved. It might be time for that, and it might work, now that everybody is negotiating everything everywhere else.