In the Gulf, Little Cause for Optimism : Even With a Cease-Fire, Iran and Iraq Will Have Plenty to Fight Over

Iran’s acceptance of a cease-fire in its war with Iraq was a promising development, but the mediators face formidable difficulties in securing the cease-fire and negotiating a stable settlement.

The terms of the cease-fire present the first set of problems. U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar’s plan calls on the belligerents to reach a cease-fire-in-place followed by a withdrawal to “international boundaries.” But the location of those boundaries is disputed in two places. Iraq claims jurisdiction over the whole Shatt al-Arab, the waterway through which the Tigris and Euphrates rivers drain into the Persian Gulf. Just east of that strategic waterway, both countries claim a populated territory about the size of Rhode Island. Both regimes are stubborn enough to make this matter a sticking point.

There are also procedural disagreements. Iraq wants direct talks, while Iran originally insisted on a U.N. intermediary.

To satisfy Iran, the U.N. plan establishes a commission to determine which party is guilty of starting the war. But, first, both sides will have to agree on the composition of this panel. The U.N. plan would have it work parallel with the peace negotiations. But the Iranians will want the commission to move faster than the negotiators; the Iraqis have the opposite priorities. If the panel concludes that Iraq was responsible for starting the war, Baghdad may walk out of the negotiations; if the report hedges on the question, Tehran can be expected to do the same. If the talks drag on too long, Iraq may revert to seeking a military solution.

If the U.N. panel does find Iraq guilty, Iran will probably demand huge reparations. Since Iraq could not afford--and would never agree--to pay billions of dollars, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would be asked to do so. These oil-producing states would be reluctant and not easily able to meet this demand. Their incomes have been declining (this year, for the first time, Saudi Arabia must borrow abroad in order to balance its budget), their expenditures are rising, and Iraq already owes them more than $30 billion that will never be repaid.

Furthermore, Iran claims that many of its Iraqi prisoners support the Islamic revolution and do not want to go home. Iraq demands that all prisoners be returned. A similar argument delayed an armistice in the Korean War for many months.

Both sides will be extremely suspicious of the mediators. Iraq believes that its Arab allies will force on it major concessions to end the war at any price; Iran’s fundamentalist regime is paranoid about satanic foreign plots to strangle the revolution.

In the end, despite the ideological aspects, this came down to a war between two nationalisms.

The two regimes at least have good reason to distrust each other. Each thinks that its enemy wants to set the stage for a renewed conflict on more favorable terms. For years to come, Iran and Iraq will dedicate most of their military and political power to countering each other. Iran, in particular, will want to replace what it lost in the war and boost its armed forces with high-technology planes and tanks. Both sides also will seek missiles and chemical weapons, and suppliers in Europe and Asia are eager to sell. The greater the arms race, the more that elements on both sides will expect a new round of fighting. An arms buildup fueled by the fear of war may prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Even if Iran’s ambitions are somewhat moderated, it will pose a greater threat to the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf states than it does now. The United States will have to react accordingly.

Surprisingly, the main note of optimism about the war’s end comes from Israel, whose leaders now conclude that the belligerents are too exhausted and preoccupied with each other to heat up the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said, “I don’t think they will rush into battle again once that terrible war ends.” Foreign Minister Shimon Peres added, “An end of the war would reduce the threat from fundamentalism and Khomeinism in the region.”

Another development benefiting much of the West is the downward pressure on oil prices. Both Iran and Iraq would like to expand oil production to increase revenues. This will take some time, but will eventually make it even more difficult for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to sustain even current relatively low prices.

The main point, of course, is that ending the war would save many lives and much suffering. But it will be much harder to succeed than the current wave of optimism suggests. Perhaps one should have more respect, then, for the much-ridiculed diplomats whose job it will be to perform this near-miracle.