A Frustrated Hussein Must Be Taken at Face Value

The tendency among many in Washington and Jerusalem has been to dismiss as primarily tactical the recent steps of Jordan’s King Hussein, in which he has disengaged his kingdom from the West Bank.

The Hashemite king has been interpreted as having yielded to the Palestine Liberation Organization a role that he knows it would not be able to perform. Hussein is further said to be hoping that the PLO’s failure to bring about an end to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, combined with the increasing difficulties experienced by the residents of the area, will eventually force them to turn back to him with the request that he revive the “Jordanian option” for resolving the Palestinian-Israel dispute.

Yet this “common wisdom” does not hold water. Hussein is well aware of the dynamics of the Israeli political process and must have known that his dramatic about-face may deliver a victory to the Likud Bloc in Israel’s general elections this November. The Labor Party and its leader, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, have centered their program on a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict through an agreement with Jordan. Hussein’s disengagement makes Labor ever more vulnerable to Likud’s argument that the king was never a partner for peace and that Labor is therefore pursuing an irrelevant option.

The Palestinians also are unlikely to turn back to Hussein, even if the PLO fails to produce an end to the occupation. But even if they did, a Likud government could be in power. There would no longer be a partner in Jerusalem with whom the Jordanian option could be negotiated.

So Hussein’s statement should be taken at face value. His move constitutes a strategic withdrawal from the West Bank and the diplomatic process aimed at determining the area’s fate.

The Jordanian withdrawal seems to have been the result of the king’s growingfrustration with all of the parties involved:

With the Palestinians: Hussein became increasingly discontented by the fact that he was paying a large part of the bill for the social services provided to the residents of the West Bank, while the latter lost no opportunity to point out their unwillingness to return to the Hashemite rule and to have the king represent them in future negotiations. In effect, Hussein is saying: “no representation without taxation”--if you insist that the PLO represent you, let the organization assume the responsibilities and pay the bill.

With the PLO: Hussein became increasingly frustrated by the inability or unwillingness of the organization and its leader, Yasser Arafat, to adopt the requisite pragmatism required for progress in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli dispute under Jordan’s orchestration. In effect the king is now telling the PLO: “I was the only party with whom the Israelis were willing to negotiate peace. But you did not provide me with sufficient room for maneuvering to negotiate on your behalf. If you think you can do a better job on your own--fine, I’m no longer an obstacle.”

With the Arab states: Jordan’s king grew increasingly angry at the Arab states’ hypocrisy--manifested in their public commitment to the Palestinian uprising, to the PLO as the Palestinians’ sole legitimate representative and to the creation of an independent Palestinian state--while privately expressing to Hussein their disinterest in the establishment of such a state and urging him to help constrain the PLO. Hussein is thus telling the Arab states that they cannot have it both ways.

With the Israelis: Israel has been unwilling to enter negotiations in the framework of an international peace conference, which Hussein regarded as a minimum protection against the anticipated Arab accusation that he was conspiring to negotiate a separate peace. In particular, the king is now telling Peres: “You have proven totally unable to persuade your fellow Israelis to adopt either the negotiating framework upon which we agreed during our meeting of April 11, 1987, or the proposals more recently advanced by Secretary of State George P. Shultz. So I am withdrawing from the game; let’s see your colleagues fair better with the PLO.”

With the Soviet Union: Hussein has become disillusioned with Moscow’s inability to exploit the opening he created for its return to the Mideast political process. In particular, he became frustrated by the Soviets’ failure to engage the Reagan Administration in serious discussions regarding the precise modalities of the proposed international conference and the prerequisites they must meet to become partners to the endeavor.

With the United States: Hussein has become increasingly angry at the inability of the Administration and the unwillingness of Congress to provide him with requisite arms and assistance. In particular, he became frustrated by Washington’s insistence on tying such arms transfers to his performance in the peace process. In a sense, he has now told the United States: “Stop judging me by my performance in the peace process; I am no longer a participant. You must decide whether or not to support me on the basis of Jordan’s importance to the United States.”

Hussein’s recent moves to dissociate the East Bank from the West Bank is of fundamental strategic significance. The Middle East peace prospect has been placed in a state of lull; the “Jordanian option” has been killed while the “Palestinian option” has yet to emerge.