Knock Down the Stumbling Blocks to START

There are only two problems now blocking the way to the resumption of the strategic-arms-reduction talks in Geneva, but they are so complicated that any optimism is premature.

The first problem is the American refusal, stated by chief negotiator Max M. Kampelman, to link these talks seeking a 50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons to the space-defense problem. In effect, this means that the American side wants to discuss a START agreement without tying it to the 1972 anti-ballisticmissile treaty.

Yet Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev and President Reagan agreed at the Washington summit, and then reiterated in Moscow, that the drafting of a START treaty should include an agreement pledging the sides to continue compliance with the ABM treaty.

“Effective measures to limit (ABM) systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,” that treaty reads. This means that extension of the ABM system into space would stimulate a buildup in strategic offensive weapons. To ignore the existence of a linkage between strategic arms reductions and the observance of the ABM treaty is to deliberately block the drafting of a START agreement in Geneva.

Soviet experts believe that the ABM treaty must be preserved in its original interpretation, which prohibits the deployment of weapon systems in space. Otherwise it would be senseless to negotiate the curbing of strategic offensive weapons on Earth.

The other stumbling block is the issue of long-range cruise missiles based on submarines and surface ships. A limit should be imposed on them to prevent their uncontrolled buildup after the signing of a START treaty.

The United States is planning to bring the total of sea-launched cruise missiles deployed to nearly 4,000, including almost 800 that will be nuclear-tipped. Clearly it is no problem equipping all cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. And under a START treaty it is conceivable that the United States could scrap 6,000 warheads on land-based missiles while secretly deploying 4,000 warheads or more on sea-launched cruise missiles. So what’s the use of negotiating a START treaty?

It’s no wonder that Gorbachev and Reagan, in a joint statement issued in Washington, agreed that the two sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles to be launched by submarine. Such an agreement must be effectively verified, and this is where the main problem arises: The Americans say that effective verification is impossible.

The Soviets, however, believe verification to be possible. It may be on-site inspection--that is, on ships carrying cruise missiles. Speaking at the recent Communist Party conference, Gorbachev said that the Soviets were prepared to go far in the field of verification, including allowing U.S. inspectors on board Soviet ships. A short while ago this was unthinkable. Strange though it may seem, the United States is against such mutual inspections.

The presence of nuclear warheads on missiles can also be monitored by detectors. The Soviet Union has such detectors, and it has invited the United States to test them together. But Washington is against this, too.

These differences show that some elements in U.S. policy do not yet meet the challenges of the new military and political situation, which demands a search for compromises and points of contact. The Soviet side is prepared to engage in such a search in Geneva.