Covert Plan for Panama May Be Wrong Message to Send the Opposition

The Reagan Administration and Congress are once again pointing fingers at each other over news leaks. The battle this time centers on who disclosed a new presidential “finding” authorizing covert support of the Panamanian opposition to Gen. Manuel A. Noriega. Lost in the cross fire is any meaningful debate about the wisdom of the secret plan.

In many ways, the most recent presidential decision is a reflection of a well-intentioned but unilateral approach that has characterized our policy toward Panama over the last 12 months. It is the latest in a series of sudden and erratic policy shifts that collectively have emboldened Noriega, weakened Panama’s democratic opposition and undercut efforts by U.S. groups and neighboring countries to facilitate a transition to democracy.

The latest political crisis in Panama was triggered June 7, 1987, when Col. Roberto Diaz Herrera, who had been retired only days before as second in command of the Panamanian Defense Forces, accused Noriega of ordering the murder of an opposition activist, rigging the 1984 presidential elections and enriching himself from corruption and narcotics trafficking.

Three days later, the National Civic Crusade--a coalition of business, civic and labor groups--was formed to coordinate the anti-Noriega movement. The crusade actually grew out of a nascent group that was modeled after the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections, or NAMFREL, the successful Philippine election monitoring organization. A month earlier, the Washington-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs had invited three Panamanian leaders to learn about the NAMFREL experience as part of an international observer mission to the legislative elections in the Philippines.

Responding to the opposition movement in Panama, and with bipartisan support from Capitol Hill, the Reagan Administration quickly entered the fray. Perhaps too quickly. The United States inadvertently appeared to co-opt the democratic opposition, creating the erroneous impression that the anti-Noriega effort was not home grown but rather an American import. Moreover, the opposition itself, while led and supported by courageous Panamanians, was lulled into believing that the United States would, in the words of one analyst, “pull its chestnuts out of the fire” to oust Noriega. As a result, the internal opposition did not develop into a formidable force as did the opposition in the Philippines where a dictator was expelled as the result of popular discontent.

The U.S. approach not only smothered the infant opposition movement in its crib, but also stiff-armed other concerned nations in the region. Noriega, for his part, was able to rally nationalistic sentiment behind his fight against the “gringos.”

When this heavy-handed policy failed, the Administration abruptly reversed course and began negotiating directly with the Panamanian strongman. The opposition justifiably felt betrayed when reports surfaced of a U.S. deal allowing Noriega to eventually remain in Panama along with his hand-picked president, who would get to keep his post until after Panama’s 1989 presidential elections.

If recent reports are accurate--and the Administration has yet to deny them--the White House has now come full circle in its campaign to oust Noriega. But the covert operation may only compound the problems for Panama’s democratic opposition. As one Noriega opponent put it: “Anything we do will look like it was taken from the Administration’s covert action plan.”

Referring to news of possible U.S. funding of Panamanian military dissidents, this same civic leader noted that “even in the worst moments of repression we have always supported nonviolent democratic change; now it appears as if we are all part of the same effort.”

Panama’s political opposition may not be the only casualty of the new covert plan. Private U.S. organizations such as National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the National Endowment for Democracy have provided timely support for Panamanian democrats. While using federal funds, these independent organizations have provided assistance openly to promote a transition to democratic rule in Panama. As is the case with Panama’s internal opposition, these activities may now be compromised along with any future efforts to apply pressure on Noriega by leaders of the Central American countries.

Covert activity can, at times, be a necessary instrument of foreign policy. However, the Administration and Congress should examine the consequences of such an approach in Panama. Will it serve to further discredit the regime or isolate America and its friends in Panama who are struggling for a return to democratic rule? The debate in this country should focus on the message we are sending Panama and the region and not on the messenger who delivered the story to the media.