Raising Stakes of African Adventurism

Now that the United States has succeeded in arranging a truce between South Africa, Cuba and Angola, there is likely to be a renewed focus on the Soviet role in the negotiations.

Many will argue that Moscow’s cooperation in the talks, combined with a more accommodating posture in Afghanistan and Cambodia, indicate that Soviet “new thinking” has finally been applied to foreign policy. Such “new thinking” includes a downgrading of the importance of the Third World to Moscow and a lessened commitment to Third World allies. In light of this, it will be tempting to advocate that Washington demilitarize its approach to the Third World and focus on more cooperative efforts with the Soviet Union to end regional conflicts.

While there’s much to be said for this view, the Angolan talks do not bear it out. The breakthrough in Angola came about not so much through American cooperation with the Soviet Union, but through a forceful resistance of Soviet goals. Moscow, on the other hand, achieved all that it did by increasing its commitment to Angola, not by lessening it.

The talks mediated by the United States succeeded in establishing a cease-fire in Angola and Namibia. In Angola, the Soviet and Cuban-backed government had been fighting against the American and South African-backed rebels of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA, since 1975. In Namibia, also known as Southwest Africa, rebels supported by Angola fought to achieve independence in a territory that South Africa governed in defiance of U.N. resolutions. As part of the agreement, South Africa would grant independence to Namibia and Cuban forces would leave Angola. Although much has to be worked out before the agreement is final, that this much has been achieved is a major accomplishment.

The agreement did, in part, represent a departure for the Soviet Union. Moscow was clearly trying to reduce its involvement. Soviet diplomats played a key role in pressuring Cuba and Angola to be flexible and declared that their conciliatory posture was due to an effort to lessen, as part of Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” their participation in Third World conflicts.

What is important, however, is not that the Soviet Union is cooperating with the United States in ending the conflict, but the reasons why Moscow is doing so now. The answer is that the Soviets, as well as the other warring parties, have come to the collective conclusion that they could not dictate a military victory and that continued fighting would produce an increasingly costly stalemate.

While it is regrettable that the United States had to indirectly associate itself with South Africa, it is undeniable that both countries’ aid to UNITA pushed Moscow to seek a settlement. This became especially clear following a major defeat of the Angolan and Cuban forces by a combined South African-UNITA force in October, 1987. The defeat convinced Moscow that a military solution was unreachable, making a diplomatic settlement more attractive.

Moscow’s desire to settle the conflict was, however, contingent on receiving honorable terms--both for itself and for its Cuban and Angolan allies. In particular, an agreement that called for Cuban withdrawal from Angola without first securing Namibian independence would be seen as an abandonment of an ally. Especially in light of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Moscow would not want to be perceived as an unreliable patron pursuing a general geopolitical retreat.

Just as it had been persuaded to seek a diplomatic settlement, the Soviet Union and its allies applied the same pressure on South Africa. Under Gorbachev, assistance to Angola increased to $1 million in military equipment in 1987. Moreover, the Cuban contingent was raised from 40,000 to 57,000 men and Soviet combat advisers went down to the brigade level. These steps proved devastatingly effective when the Cubans badly bloodied South African forces in fighting on June 27. The realization that continued fighting would be fruitless set the stage for the productive talks.

The willingness of the Soviet Union to become involved in Third World conflicts has lessened, but this is largely because the United States and others have raised the costs of Soviet adventurism. That Moscow will not engage in wars it has no chance of winning is not so much “new thinking” but “smart thinking” in response to a new Western assertiveness. Moreover, even within the parameters of declining interest in Third World conflicts, Angola demonstrated that Moscow will do what is necessary to meet the reasonable goals of its clients. By all means the United States should cooperate with the Soviet Union where our interests coincide. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that such cooperation can take the place of the threat or use of military force.