Pentagon Clears Vincennes’ Crew : Report Cites Navy Errors in Airliner Tragedy but Blames Actions by Iran

The crew of the U.S. cruiser Vincennes made crucial errors that led to the ship’s decision to shoot down an Iranian airliner July 3, but it cannot be held responsible because Iran’s behavior in the incident was “unconscionable,” the Pentagon declared Friday in releasing its investigative report on the disaster.

Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci, detailing the findings of a monthlong Navy probe into the U.S. missile attack that killed all 290 people aboard the plane, charged that Iran was mostly to blame because it allowed a civilian plane to fly near the ship while it was engaged in a firefight with Iranian patrol boats in the Persian Gulf.

The report also placed great weight on the fact that the plane did not respond to 12 broadcast warnings from the Vincennes.

‘Acted Reasonably’

“The principal responsibility of a commanding officer, . . . under the rules of engagement, is to protect his ship,” Carlucci told a news conference. “I believe that given the operating environment, Captain (Will C.) Rogers acted reasonably and did what his nation expected of him in the defense of his ship and crew.”

Carlucci said that based on the inquiry’s findings, there would be no disciplinary action against crew members who misidentified the airliner as a hostile Iranian fighter jet.

But in Congress, the report fueled renewed criticism about the Administration’s decision to maintain a beefed-up deployment of U.S. ships in the gulf.

“This report . . . reinforces me in my conviction that we placed our ships and military personnel in a nearly impossible position in the Persian Gulf,” said Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.). Particularly in light of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, “the original reason for which our presence in the gulf was increased will be behind us.”

The decision by Carlucci and Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to take no action against the Vincennes’ crew surprised many naval officers.

The panel of investigators, headed by Rear Adm. William M. Fogarty, had recommended a “letter of censure” for Lt. Cmdr. Scott E. Lustig, 34, a combat systems officer who was coordinating the ship’s anti-aircraft systems at the time of the incident.

Although the letter would not have been entered in Lustig’s personnel file and was therefore considered “non-punitive,” Carlucci said that “with all the publicity surrounding this incident, there is no such thing as a non-punitive letter.”

Data Misinterpreted

Crowe acknowledged that “mistakes were made on board Vincennes that day.” The report said that after the airliner took off from an Iranian civilian-military airfield in Bandar Abbas and began to cross the gulf, the ship’s crew misinterpreted computer data from its Aegis defense system on the craft’s altitude, speed and bearing.

Although the plane was flying slowly and climbing in a civilian air corridor, the crew concluded that it was flying at fighter-jet speed and descending for a possible attack on the ship. The mistaken readings prompted Rogers to judge the plane as a threat to the ship and order the launch of two Standard missiles that destroyed the aircraft, which was 9 miles away.

Fogarty, who directed a team of five naval officers in the investigation, concluded in the 53-page report that “stress” from the clash with the Iranian patrol boats, “task fixation and unconscious distortion of data may have played a major role in this incident.”

Among its recommendations, the panel urged the Navy to establish a “psychological profile” for Navy personnel who will man ships in volatile, civilian-populated areas such as the Persian Gulf. Other leading recommendations include improving the information display screens on the Aegis system and improved training.

Errors ‘Not Crucial’

But Carlucci discounted the significance of the crew’s litany of errors, saying that “singly . . . they were not crucial to the fateful decision.

“Even cumulatively, they do not appear to change the picture in a decisive way,” the defense secretary added.

Even if the Vincennes had not identified the aircraft as an Iranian F-14 fighter, Carlucci said, “under standard procedures . . . the plane would have remained designated as unidentified, assumed hostile and would have been treated as a potential threat by the captain and the crew.”

Carlucci and Crowe asserted that only Iran could have prevented the disaster.

“By any measure, it was unconscionable to ignore the repeated warnings of the United States and to permit an airliner to take off from a joint military-civilian airfield and fly directly into the midst of the ongoing surface action . . . which the Iranians themselves had initiated,” Carlucci said.

‘Certainly Not Our Job’

Asked whether air controllers at Bandar Abbas would have known of the small boat attacks by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Carlucci said, “It is certainly not our job to make sure that the Iranian military communicates with Bandar Abbas airport.”

The investigators’ findings are expected to intensify opposition in Congress to any U.S. compensation payments to the families of the victims of the attack. The Reagan Administration has said that it favors paying some compensation as an act of compassion, without accepting blame, but key lawmakers have threatened to block such action.

In a finding that disappointed many critics of the Navy’s recent shipbuilding projects, the Fogarty probe found little fault with the Vincennes’ $570-million Aegis combat system, designed to identify and track dozens of targets at once.

While the clarity of the computer’s visual displays could be improved, “the Aegis combat system was working exceptionally well on July 3,” the report said. “No anomalies were noted in data analysis or from operator statements.”

‘Sense of Inexorability’

Carlucci, reviewing the disaster’s chronology in detail, pointed to what he called “a sense of inexorability” in the events that led up to the firing of the missiles.

“There are . . . things that can’t be replicated in a simulator” during training exercises, “the number of voices coming at you over the earphones being one, or the actual environment in which they were operating,” he said. “It’s important to bear in mind that this ship was engaged in combat operations.”

One lawmaker warned that while the report’s findings appear to exonerate Rogers and his crew, they raise serious questions about the Navy’s ability to operate in other Third World conflicts.

“Swift decisions under stressful conditions without much practical experience is what the Navy is all about,” said House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.). “The type of engagement faced by the Vincennes should not be viewed as atypical and exceptional. It may tell us a great deal of what we need to prepare for in future confrontations.”

Chain of Events Recounted

According to the report, the Vincennes and the warship Elmer Montgomery were patrolling in the gulf near the Strait of Hormuz on the morning of July 3 when the Montgomery saw seven Iranian gunboats speeding toward a Pakistani commercial vessel, apparently intending to attack it.

The Vincennes sent out a helicopter to observe the boats, and when the Iranian crews turned their guns on the chopper, the Vincennes opened fire.

Minutes after the clash began, Iran Air Flight 655 lifted off from Bandar Abbas at 9:47 a.m.

For the next 3 minutes and 45 seconds, one team in the Vincennes’ command center worked frantically to sink the Iranian boats while another tried to identify the unknown aircraft and track several others.

Misreading Data

Misreading the data on the plane’s speed, bearing and transponder signals, the aircraft monitoring team concluded that the unidentified plane could be an Iranian fighter jet preparing to attack, the report said.

About that time, the crew was receiving reports of metal hitting the ship’s sides--apparently bullets from the boats--and was executing a sharp turn to get a clear shot from one of its guns.

“Things were falling” off shelves in the combat information center, “lights were flickering, and in the background, guns were booming,” Carlucci said.

Rogers’ attention was focused principally on the unfolding firefight with the Iranian speedboats, and the skipper assigned Lustig to coordinate information on the aircraft, the investigators reported. In interviews, Rogers told investigators that he had “great faith” in Lustig and his colleagues.

As the plane moved closer, those in the information center reported hearing a crew member say over their earphones that the plane had been identified as an F-14.

‘Possible ComAir’

But one officer, sitting behind Rogers, jumped up and cautioned, “possible ComAir,” short for commercial aircraft. Rogers raised his hand in acknowledgment, the report said.

For three minutes, the crew issued, over military and emergency distress channels, warnings to the craft to identify itself and turn away.

After the aircraft did not respond and was a little more than 9 miles off the Vincennes’ rail--almost within view--Rogers decided that he could wait no longer and turned the key to release two Standard missiles.

At 10:03 a.m., the missiles struck the airliner, obliterating it. The ship continued to fire at the Iranian boats, sinking two and damaging a third.

“Captain Rogers’ action in delaying the engagement . . . until it was well within 15 nautical miles demonstrated an appreciation for the seriousness of the consequences of his actions and was balanced with his responsibility to defend his ship,” the investigators concluded.