U.S. Philippine Bases: Which Side Blackmails?

American and Philippine negotiators have resumed talks on the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement, after a breakdown over how much the United States should pay over the next three years. Overshadowing the compensation issue, however, is a larger one, not formally on the current agenda, of the renewal or non-renewal of the agreement itself when it expires in 1991.

Many believe that the facilities, particularly Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, are of vital importance to U.S. security interests. Some Americans see Filipino efforts to boost the compensation as part of a worldwide pattern of blackmail involving American bases overseas.

For Filipinos with a sense of history, on the other hand, the situation bears a disturbing similarity to 1946. Then, the Philippines, newly independent and economically prostrate after 3 1/2 years of war and enemy occupation, was required by the terms of the U.S. Philippine Rehabilitation Act to change its constitution so as to give American investors equal rights with Filipinos in the exploitation of Philippine natural resources. Otherwise, war damage payments, again and again promised by the Americans to their loyal allies in the fight against the Japanese, would be limited to claims of $500 or less.

Filipino leaders did change their constitution, in the process expelling from Congress six oppositionists and thus helping to precipitate the communist-led Hukbalahap rebellion in the 1950s.

As it was 42 years ago, the Philippines is again in desperate economic straits, after 20 years of “occupation” by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies--who had the economic, military and political support of the United States. Roughly 40% of Philippine export earnings and 40% of the government budget go to servicing foreign debts incurred by Marcos. Sympathetic noises come from the United States--and abundant advice on how to deal with the current communist-led insurgency. But really effective assistance, in the areas of debt relief, recovery of the Marcos “loot” and the so-called “Mini-Marshall Plan” is dangled out of reach while the bases negotiations continue.

And again there is a constitutional issue: The new constitution opposes in principle the presence of nuclear weapons in Philippine territory.

Opposition to the bases has long been an issue of the Philippines left, which sees the American presence as an obstacle to its own goals. What is remarkable in recent months is the way opposition has spread, particularly among the middle class, and the emotional tone this opposition has taken. Some seem to be saying that the time has come for the Philippines to assert sovereignty and self-determination, to “slay the father-image.” They resent the constant American “concern” verging on interference in security and similar matters, and sense that this will be inevitable as long as the bases are here. Others see the bases as “magnets” for a nuclear attack in the event of a major war, and argue that they are mainly a projection of U.S. power and contribute little to Philippine security.

The Philippine Senate, which must approve any extension of the bases agreement beyond 1991, has already indicated its position by passing a bill categorically forbidding any basing of nuclear weapons in the Philippines. The bill is waiting action by the House of Representatives.

On the other hand, President Corazon Aquino is under intense pressure both from the United States and from her own military to support a long-term renewal of the bases agreement. But she is desperately trying to keep her long-term options open, probably in the hope of keeping out of the line of fire while getting as good a compensation package as possible for the next three years. Given the growing anti-bases sentiment, there have been major political costs for Aquino in taking this noncommittal stance. But hard bargaining by the U.S. negotiators has so far prevented the realization of the economic relief which she badly needs. Thus she risks seeming to have sold her soul and gotten nothing in exchange.

In this delicate situation, the recent remarks of U.S. Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kans.), to the effect that the Philippines is engaged in blackmail and that the United States should be prepared to “play hardball,” probably strengthened the anti-bases sentiment.

It is unfortunate that positions have become so polarized, both within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the United States; there is need for calm and careful reasoning on all sides.

Careful thinking may in fact suggest that the United States and the Philippines should gradually part ways, through a phased withdrawal from the bases, while they can still part as friends. Even on the U.S. National Security Council, I am told, there are some who believe the United States could do without its bases in the Philippines, but could never tolerate Soviet bases here where they would control the sea lanes to Japan. In other words, the United States could live with a neutral, stable and democratic Philippines, but not with a hostile one. And American arm-twisting could well lead to a strengthening of the left and, down the road, to a Philippines hostile to the United States.

On the other hand, Filipinos could well take the position that true sovereignty involves the right and power effectively to say no to the bases agreement, in pursuit of their best interest as they see them. Once that right and power were assured, they might well decide on the basis of those same interests--economic, political and military--to say yes.