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Even Before the Games, Korea Has Won Its Gold : Its Challenge Now Is to Bolster Democracy, and in That Contest U.S. Must Give a Hand

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<i> Alan D. Romberg is a senior fellow for Asia at the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations</i>

The Olympic pageantry about to unfold in Seoul will bring to South Korea, its citizens hope, the type of international attention and respect that the games brought to Japan in 1964.

Those who have not been to Seoul before will be impressed with the economic and social dynamism of that world-class city. And even if student radicals provoke clashes with the authorities, visitors will sense the genuinely democratic political process now strongly at work in that country.

Those who have not closely followed developments in Korea can be forgiven, however, for not recalling that both the games and the fundamental stability in the Republic of Korea were at risk as recently as 15 months ago. That this fact is now obscure to most Americans is testimony to the resilience of Koreans and their ability to create success out of near-disaster.

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Many people suspected that President Chun Doo Hwan would seek to maintain power behind the scenes even as he fulfilled his pledge to step down this year after one term in office. And that seemed to be what he was doing when, in April, 1987, he reversed an earlier decision to allow constitutional change and insisted instead on maintaining the indirect presidential election system that gave him and his ruling Democratic Justice Party the upper hand. Any change, he said, must wait until after the Olympics so as not to disturb the atmosphere for the games.

Chun evidently believed that the Korean people’s strong desire for a successful Olympics would work in his favor, tempering their unhappiness with his decision. He miscalculated. Student protest demonstrations in mid-June were supported by the broad masses of the Korean people, raising the prospect of continuing clashes over several months between rock-throwing students and tear gas-wielding police--or even armed forces. The authorities could probably have maintained ultimate control. But social harmony in Korea would have been deeply affected and the negative images broadcast nightly to a world television audience would have threatened eventual cancellation of the games.

On June 29, 1987, Chun’s hand-picked successor, Roh Tae Woo, transformed the South Korean political scene overnight. In a dramatic surprise announcement, Roh proposed a series of reforms, including acceptance of the demonstrators’ key demand for direct presidential elections. In this effort the military, which has dominated Korean politics for almost three decades but has increasingly indicated a desire to retreat from that role unless confronted with a total breakdown of social order, gave him crucial support.

Roh won the presidential election in December with a plurality of under 37%. Still, that gave him a victory margin of more than 2 million votes over a divided opposition in what was considered by most Koreans to have been a basically fair, if imperfect, contest. Last May the Democratic Justice Party failed to win a majority of seats in the National Assembly. But this has not led to stalemate, as feared. Instead, President Roh has seized this first-ever loss of parliamentary control by the ruling party to work with the opposition in a spirit of mutual compromise absent from traditional Korean politics.

Moreover, Roh has deftly handled growing student demands for a more forthcoming approach to Korean reunification. On July 7 he announced a new policy designed to draw North Korea into the world, rather than trying to shut it out. This has not quelled student protests, and, in any case, the prospects for quick progress with the north are uncertain. But the major outside players--Washington, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow--all agree that it is essential to entice Pyongyang to abandon its self-imposed isolation and militancy. And the opposition political parties and the South Korean people generally support Roh’s approach and oppose the student demonstrators.

Despite these gains, the political road ahead in South Korea will not be smooth. The personal and political antagonisms built up over decades have not disappeared. Deep yearnings for reunification contend with a real threat from the north. Politically sensitive investigations--into alleged corruption of the Chun Doo Hwan regime, the Kwangju incident of May, 1980, in which 200 or more people were killed by the armed forces, and charges of fraud in the recent elections--have been launched by the National Assembly.

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Nonetheless, South Korean politicians understand that future success at the polls will be denied those who rely on the extremes of militarism or radicalism or even on narrow-minded partisan one-upmanship. Rather, victory will depend on the degree to which parties are seento represent the people’s aspirations for democracy and rapprochement with the north as well as their desire for stability, security and prosperity. Skillful handling of all these delicate questions by Seoul will be essential. But so will support and cooperation from Korea’s friends.

For the United States, this means forthright but respectful handling of inevitable and growing trade frictions.

It means cooperation with the National Assembly probe into any U.S. role in the Kwangju incident.

And it means sensitive and creative responses to emerging demands in the military area--for example, with respect to relocation of the U.S. military headquarters in a prime area of the rapidly expanding capital and turning over operational control of U.S. and Korean ground forces from an American to a Korean.

Moreover, despite North Korea’s bombing of a South Korean airliner in late 1987, the United States should supplement Seoul’s policy of drawing Pyongyang out. While it should not draw down its deterrent forces in South Korea anytime soon, Washington should scale back at least the largest of its military exercises to create a better atmosphere for north-south dialogue. It should restore permission for its diplomats to talk with North Koreans. It should allow North Korean visitors to this country. And it should even permit non-strategic trade with Pyongyang.

Wishing Korea well is just not enough.

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