As an Abortive Remedy, New Pill Is No Easy Choice

The French abortion pill RU-486, after a tumultuous birthing ordeal, is now available in France and China. However, other countries and many women will soon be confronted with deciding the morality of utilizing this recent technological advance.

The October announcement of the pill’s distribution created an international upheaval because of adversarial camps: the essentialists and the developmentalists. Essentialists view the essence of human life in terms of genetics. The killing of any Homo sapiens --from conception on--is considered murder. Hence, John C. Willke, president of the National Right to Life Committee, opposes RU-486 because it is “chemical warfare on the unborn.”

Developmentalists see human life as emerging from the conceptus and not identical with it. The question is at what point does the developing human cross the threshold of constitutionally protected human life. In this camp various views exist:

--The U.S. Supreme Court, in its 1973 Roe vs. Wade decision legalizing abortion, admittedly did not “resolve the difficult question of when life begins.” However, the court based its decision on the government’s “important and legitimate interest in potential life,” which assumes crucial relevance at “viability,” the point at which the fetus can survive outside the womb (currently, 23 to 24 weeks’ gestation).

--More than 90% of abortions are performed by the 10th week of fetal life. A first-trimester abortion is relatively safe, much safer than a full-term delivery.

--German bioethicist Hans-Martin Sass believes that the fetus possesses no unique moral standing until the 54th day of gestation, the point at which the first identifiable stationary neurons form the cortical plate. At this point there is primitive “brain life,” a development inversely analogous to the widely accepted idea of “brain death,” according to Sass.

--A large majority of Americans approve of the IUD as a means of birth control. It is an instrument that prevents the embryo from attaching itself to the uterine wall four to six days after fertilization. Thus, many believe that within the first week, the developing human has not yet crossed the threshold of human life that should afford it legal protection.

But has an embryo that is 35 days old--the medical limit for use of RU-486--crossed the threshold? Developmentalists say no. A five-week embryo lacks theuniquely human capacities that, for example, characterize the reader of this commentary. That is to say that the embryo possesses no reasoning powers, developed senses or even self-awareness; and its development toward possession of such capacities is still, as we appropriately say, embryonic. For at least these reasons, most Americans accept a developmental view of human life’s preciousness and thus the ethical permissibility of aborting embryos and early fetuses.

However, the intrinsic moral status of a human life may not be the only consideration in determining how that life should be treated. For instance, a patient in a permanent coma has little or no value to himself or herself, but that post-personal patient is treated with respect because of the memory, association and meaning the body still represents. Similarly, a five-week fetus may not yet possess a unique claim to life, but this nearly half-inch “pre-person”--an ill-defined head folded toward the umbilical stalk with rounded buds for arms and legs--is due special consideration. It is, after all, a visual, early stage of uniquely personal life.

The analogy between coma patient and fetus can be carried one step further: Just as loved ones may accept the ethical permissibility of terminating life support for the comatose relative but not want to withdraw treatment themselves, just so a woman may desire an abortion but not want to perform it herself. The fact that a woman using the RU-486 drug induces her own abortion, and may view the embryo she aborted, could cause such disquiet that some would not choose this measure.

Although developmentalists do not see a five-week embryo itself as possessing great moral worth, it is significantly different from the one-celled organism it was 35 days earlier. The abortion of a human being--even a tiny one--is far different from a measure that prevents the conception of the being in the first place. And this difference is sufficient to maintain the designation of RU-486 as an abortive remedy rather than, as some have suggested, a periodic birth control pill.

Birth control pills, understandably, are taken with little thought of procreative capacities being unfulfilled. If similarly scant thought is given to an abortive measure, the fabric of respect for individual human life may well develop frayed edges. An appropriate abortion is undertaken with deep regret, as the lesser of two evils.