A Disturbing Backdrop for Conventional Arms Talks

A member of the West German Parliament, visiting in Los Angeles recently, was asked by American luncheon companions to comment on complaints in this country that the European allies are not carrying a large enough share of the burden for their own defense. His response was blunt.

“I am tired of hearing that if West Germany doesn’t do this or that, the United States will withdraw its troops,” he said. If America wants to withdraw its forces, it should go ahead and do so.

Other West Germans at the meeting, sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, hastened to say that the Bundestag member does not reflect the Bonn government’s views on defense issues.

Just last month, however, participants in a NATO seminar in Munich heard similar words from Rupert Scholz, the West German defense minister.

Objecting sharply to U.S. “reproaches” on burden-sharing, he said that they could result in “indignation against the American ally” and a rethinking of German commitments to the alliance.

The growing U.S.-German frictions form a disturbing backdrop to preparations for a crucial new round of East-West talks aimed at deep cuts in conventional, non-nuclear forces in Europe.

There is a broad and growing weariness in West Germany with what is seen as an outmoded U.S. predominance in German affairs.

It is reflected in public demands for a reduction or even an elimination of low-level practice flights by NATO warplanes after recent crashes in which German civilians were killed.

It is also reflected in trade frictions and high-level resentment at overt U.S. pressures on Bonn to crack down on West German companies that provided materials and know-how for a chemical-warfare facility in Libya.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl is a staunch ally who welcomes the fresh breezes from Moscow but believes that a stable and peaceful Europe will require a strong American military presence into the indefinite future.

Probably most West Germans still support NATO membership, but the foundations of that support are visibly eroding. Recent polls indicate that 75% of the West German public believes that the military threat has ended, up to 80% want all nuclear weapons removed from Europe and a large minority now favors a withdrawal of U.S. troops.

This mood, coinciding with budgetary pressures in Washington, will make it hard for the alliance to maintain the unity that is badly needed in the conventional-arms talks.

President Bush must get a handle on the huge U.S. budget deficit. The impression is growing that he will accept, albeit reluctantly, the necessity of large cuts in projected defense outlays.

The American military commitment to Europe--where more than 340,000 U.S. troops are stationed--will inevitably come under review. However, significant reductions would be risky unless the Soviets are willing to make even deeper cuts in their numerically superior forces.

Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev announced plans in December for a unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops, plus cuts of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 guns and 800 combat aircraft in Eastern Europe and western parts of the Soviet Union.

Allied governments, although delighted by the promised cuts, have jointly observed that even after the unilateral reductions occur the Warsaw Pact will have more than a 2-1 advantage in weapons most suited for an assault on Western Europe.

Thus, if a negotiated reduction of U.S. troops is to take place, the Soviets must make deeper cuts than we do. Gorbachev had appeared to agree, but the latest pronouncements from Moscow reflect the Soviet military’s stand that asymmetries favoring the Soviet side are already offset by asymmetries in the Western favor.

Gorbachev’s interests in force reductions seems real, however. Just the other day he told his people that cutbacks in military spending are essential to solving Soviet economic problems.

There is ample evidence that the Soviet military believes that Gorbachev indeed intends to make deep cuts--and is uneasy over the prospect.

Thus the way may be open for negotiated reductions that will allow Bush to safely reduce U.S. outlays for European defense.

The Kremlin, however, may be sorely tempted to stonewall in the expectation that the West will make reductions anyway.

Congress and the Bush Administration itself may not be able to wait for successful negotiations before reducing U.S. military outlays in Europe. West Germany, especially, is in no mood to take up the slack.

It seems, then, that the best hope lies not in Western steadfastness, which may not exist, but in the domestic economic pressures on Gorbachev to get on with shifting resources away from the Soviet military.

Those pressures are real. We might luck out. But relying too much on another country’s altruism is a chancy business--especially when you consider that the survival of Gorbachev and his policies is far from a sure thing.