Bad Scene in South Texas

Critics of the U.S. government’s refugee policies have long complained that they are haphazard and blatantly political. But rarely have the shortcomings been illustrated as dramatically as they are today in south Texas, where U.S. immigration officials are struggling to stem a rising tide of would-be refugees from Nicaragua.

Immigration and Naturalization Service officials are trying to make a series of changes in the way their agency handles Nicaraguans who seek political asylum in this country. All are aimed at discouraging the refugees whose requests for asylum the INS considers spurious because they are based more on economics than on politics. South Texas is bearing the brunt of the refugee influx because ports of entry along its border are close to Central America, so the change in approach will include beefing up personnel in the area. More Border Patrol agents will be assigned to deter illegal entries while on-scene State Department officials will speed the process by helping INS hearing officers assess the validity of asylum claims filed by Nicaraguans. The would-be refugees whose initial applications are rejected will still be able to appeal through the courts. But, in a significant change from past practice, they will have to stay in south Texas while the appeals are adjudicated. Where they will stay is in tents pitched on the grounds of an existing detention center near Brownsville.

The effort by the INS to speed up asylum appeals is commendable, but other aspects of the policy changes are of dubious value. For example, INS officials hope that the prospects of living in a tent for months or even years will discourage many would-be refugees from trying to get into the United States. But attorneys will challenge that approach in court as soon as they can, and it may well be ruled illegal. It is also unlikely to work for long if the smugglers who help refugees get from Nicaragua to the U.S. border bypass south Texas and concentrate their human cargo on other ports of entry like El Paso and San Ysidro. The new get-tough approach is no help to local governments affected by immigrants--not just poor border towns in south Texas but faraway cities like Los Angeles and Miami as well. Historically, immigrants congregate where their predecessors settled, straining local resources like schools and public hospitals, and Nicaraguans are no exception.

Washington’s approach to refugee problems in south Texas reflects a crisis-management mentality rather than thoughtful long-term planning, but the INS alone is not responsible. Congress has rarely been consistent or coherent in outlining the refugee policies that the INS must enforce. For example, no one on Capitol Hill or in the White House seems to be giving much thought to what the government should do with 10,000 or so Contras and their families now that the war against the Sandinistas is winding down. A sound Contra resettlement policy might lay a foundation for a better overall refugee policy.

The most distasteful aspect of the new Nicaraguan refugee policy is its hypocrisy. The influxof Nicaraguans might never have threatened to get out of hand if former U.S. Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III, during one of the Reagan Administration’s periodic outbursts against the Sandinistas, had not announced that he was making it easier for Nicaraguans to enter the United States as refugees. By changing policy now, INS officials are making an about-face. Federal officials could more easily deal with Nicaraguan refugees --and, for that matter, the many refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala--by granting them extended-voluntary-departure status under existing immigration laws. But, in the long-term, Congress must come to grips with precisely whata refugee is under U.S. law--whether he comes from Central America or the Soviet Bloc--andhow requests for asylum here can be handled consistently, yet humanely.