Keeping Germany, and Europe, in Balance

If history tells us anything about itself, it is that in spite of passing leaders, political movements and fashions, its concerns remain remarkably unchanged. This is especially true in Europe where the presence of nuclear weapons and changed political systems, nothwithstanding, the structure of politics still is dictated by geography, demography and political order.

Over the past 200 years, three continental powers--France, Germany and Russia--both upheld and upset the balance of power. Napoleon upset it in order to establish French hegemony or, perhaps more correctly, his own. Bismarck helped establish a united Germany and in the process helped correct the balance. Kaiser Wilhelm II, operating from a different world view than the pragmatic chancellor, once again upset it with his ill-conceived imperialisticambitions. The balance was only partly restored by a Russian Revolution that, once successful, dedicated itself to nothing less than world revolution. Germany once again moved to destroy the balance, following Adolf Hitler in his attempt to establish a racially pure, Nazi hegemony over Europe.

The dismemberment of Germany after World War II severely reduced its potential as a military threat, but did not change Soviet aspirations in Eastern Europe, nor did it change West Germany’s awareness of the importance of its eastern borders. This is not to suggest that the Federal Republic entertains imperialistic aspirations, but rather that it is concerned with the kind of European balance of power that would affect it the most. Therefore, its eastern frontier once again becomes vitally important, both in terms of potentially unstable Soviet satellites and the Soviet Union itself.

Under Konrad Adenauer, the first democratic chancellor since 1933, West Germany moved toward a Western orientation. It became an increasingly pivotal member of the North Atlantic Alliance as well as a model democracy in Central Europe, acting as a buffer to Bolshevik and Stalinist regimes on its eastern borders. However, after 40 years of looking westward, a new sort of dynamic has emerged.

West Germany’s economic and industrial prosperity has dictated a search for new markets, and the East looms large. In addition, the proportionately large military burden carried by West Germany and its front-line role in case of a Soviet attack sharpen a desire on the part of West German leaders to free themselves from the 1945 obligations and to act independently. This is especially true now that Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev has promised reductions in Warsaw Pact arms and troops. It is perhaps only natural that Bonn is pursuing Ostpolitik , at least as a way to create greater economic openings to Eastern Europe, which in turn means taking advantage of potentially greater independence in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In order to achieve this, West Germany must improve relations with the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev is courting West Germany even as we offer more efficient missiles to place on West German soil. It is important to note, however, that the issues in Europe are not merely military. They are principally political; they require a long-range assessment and approach, not to mention perhaps a sober reevaluation. Washington must reassess its European policy precisely because that policy has been so successful in the past.

European policy means a German policy, a policy linked to a West Germany that is both independent and related to U.S.-Soviet relations. We must be in tune and in step with the political mood of West Germany.

The United States must consult seriously with whatever German government emerges out of next year’s parliamentary elections and coordinate with it on U.S.-European interests. The 1992 European Economic Community conclave promises to produce a European ascendancy led by West Germany and France. This development must be closely linked to policies and relations between Washington and Western Europe--and also Washington and Bonn.

A U.S. policy must closely monitor West Germany’s eastern moves and must work closely with the Federal Republic to make sure that the vulnerable shell of NATO survives and is revitalized, not just through improved weaponry and a U.S.-German nuclear umbrella, but through political means. That is, the United States can actively discourage calls from the zealous German left for neutrality and an end to U.S. influence in Europe. The support of the moderates like Chancellor Helmut Kohl becomes effective if Washington will hold off its pursuit of the modernization of nuclear weapons on German soil, especially in light of the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces. Conventional forces must be strengthened, while at the same time Washington must avoid at any cost giving in to calls for U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe. West German-East European economic ties can be encouraged, recognizing Germany’s pivotal role in maintaining the balance in Eastern Europe, particularly if reforms are instituted in the satellite countries.

If President Bush is looking for a reasoned and lasting foreign initiative, he could do worse than strengthening American-German-European ties and creating a policy toward that end as the centerpiece of his foreign policy. The Administration should embark on such efforts before the old eastern dynamic of West German policy takes on a natural and unrestrained momentum.