An ‘Exchange Rate’ for Conventional Cuts

Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s announcement of substantial unilateral armed-forces reductions in Central Europe has put the Atlantic Alliance on the political defensive. For the Soviet leader, the planned cutback has already paid off in increased West German reluctance to modernize NATO’s short-range tactical nuclear missiles, fed by German leaders’ perception that their public now views Gorbachev as the leader of the struggle to reduce political and military tensions in Europe.

As the Red Army begins to withdraw six tank divisions, plus an additional 3,000 tanks from Eastern Europe, many Europeans will begin to ask why Washington can’t suggest any substantive measures that NATO could take to preserve the momentum toward a more stable continent.

The alliance’s political and military leaders are sensibly concerned to preserve an effective NATO conventional capability.

So what military steps could NATO take outside the framework of negotiations to protect its political image among the populations it is meant to defend?

I suggest that the United States propose the following initiative to its NATO allies: Washington should withdraw 72 of its F-111 fighter-bombers from Britain and return them to bases in the States. Likewise, the German air force should withdraw 72 of its Tornado fighter-bombers from West Germany, and base them in Britain. These redeployments could unfold incrementally, synchronized with the planned reductions in Soviet forces. They should be accompanied by somber ceremonies that convey their full political and military significance. They have the potential for good political theater.

This proposal meets four important criteria: It is militarily impressive, so no one in the East or the West can claim it is trivial; it is reversible; it establishes no precedent that could come back to haunt NATO in future negotiations, and it symbolically enhances NATO solidarity.

Soviet strategists emphasize the tremendous combat power of NATO’s tactical air forces. Thus, a reduction in permanently present, forward-based aircraft--especially those most capable of surprise attacks deep into Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union--is quite meaningful. Moreover, because both the F-111 and the Tornado are potent nuclear delivery systems, a reduction in the number that can quickly be thrown into action against the Soviet homeland should be doubly impressive to the Soviets.

A reduction in forward-deployed aircraft of this kind is also militarily meaningful to the new left-wing European security elites. These politicians, analysts and activists are keenly fearful that crisis instability arises when powerful, offensive air forces are based in close proximity to each other, because each has a powerful incentive in crisis to attack the other preemptively. The redeployment of 72 Tornados to Britain is militarily stabilizing in their terms. The measure also would soothe those West Germans annoyed by the large number of training sorties flown over their country each year.

This action is reversible if the Soviets fail to complete their planned withdrawals, or if they later introduce new military forces. In a crisis, the return of these aircraft to their former bases would be a marginal increment in the already planned large U.S. aerial reinforcement of Europe. Thus, the true cost of NATO’s power of conventional resistance is low. No base structure and no weapons would be destroyed. Because many Tornados would remain in Germany, and many F-111s would remain in Britain, any special support facilities associated with these aircraft would also remain.

This action would establish no tacit precedent that could harm NATO’s interests in future negotiations. At worst, the Soviets could infer that our unofficial exchange rate is one armored division withdrawn, dismantled and destroyed, for 12 U.S. fighter aircraft withdrawn from Europe, and 12 German fighters withdrawn from West Germany. At this rate the Soviets could offer to eliminate all of their remaining 24 heavy divisions in Eastern Europe in exchange for the redeployment of 288 U.S. fighters from Europe, and 288 German fighters from West Germany to other allied countries in Europe. This would still leave many U.S. aircraft in Europe and many German aircraft in West Germany; hardly a bad bargain for NATO.

Finally, this proposal would enhance alliance solidarity. A large-scale redeployment of German military aircraft to England would pointedly signify the equal status of West Germany in the ranks of the Western democracies. The British and the Germans still have vivid memories of the terrible war that ended 44 years ago, in which their air forces inflicted tremendous pain on each other. The consensual deployment of powerful attack aircraft from the air force of the vanquished to the airspace of the victor would be a potent symbol of NATO’s determination to protect Europe’s “long peace” through alliance solidarity and prudent military preparedness.