With His Latest Purge, Gorbachev Buys Some Time but Little Democratization

Once again, Mikhail S. Gorbachev has taken not only those outside but those inside the Soviet Union by surprise.

His purge last Tuesday of the “dead souls” in the Central Committee, second in importance only to the Politburo, was a brilliant political move. Theoretically members of the Central Committee can only be replaced at a party congress, which meets every five years. But Gorbachev did not want to wait until 1991 to rid himself of some of his conservative opponents. Instead he pressured one-quarter of the Central Committee membership to “voluntarily” submit their resignations. According to their jointly signed statement, they felt they should resign because of “their age or the state of their health.” That would be like George Bush accepting the voluntary resignation of one-quarter of the House of Representatives, all of whom by coincidence happen to be Democrats. Who would believe they would resign voluntarily?

But this political victory for Gorbachev has come at a cost, calling into question his campaign for glasnost and democratization. Is Gorbachev being honest and following official procedures? No one really believes these resignations were voluntary or for the stated reasons of age and health. After all, many of those who resigned were in their 50s and 60s. And 12 who were removed did not resign; it was explained that members of this latter group “are seriously ill” and so they could not attend the meeting to sign the voluntary statement about their health.

Equally surprising, none of those who had lost the March 26 election for membership in the new Congress of People’s Deputies were removed from the Central Committee. The initial expectation was that they would be the major targets of any purge.

So why did Gorbachev let them stay, as well as those who survived the election but continue to be his most dangerous critics? In particular, why is it that the leaders of the Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev and Minsk party organizations (all election losers) plus Yegor K. Ligachev, Viktor M. Chebrikov and Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky (election winners but also among Gorbachev’s most severe critics on the Politburo) were unaffected by this latest purge? It may well be that they will all be the next to go. But the best answer is that Gorbachev may not yet be strong enough to challenge these party stalwarts. Another explanation is that before he decided to launch such a battle, Gorbachev felt he had to improve the voting odds in the Central Committee, which he did by ridding himself of the “dead souls.”

It may also be that the whole election process has complicated Gorbachev’s political struggle. Since Ligachev, Chebrikov, and Shcherbitsky all won election to the Congress of People’s Deputies, it would be awkward if Gorbachev then removed them from office. Admittedly, none of them had to run against an opponent. But then neither did Gorbachev.

While Gorbachev’s political victory may not have been as complete as he might have wanted, the odds are that this purge allows him more time to deal with what he himself has admitted is a deteriorating economy.

There were harsh words at the Central Committee meeting about how perestroika has failed. Indeed, many of the party officials who were defeated in the March elections, especially those from Leningrad, blamed the failure of perestroika for their own defeat. That, of course, is a not-so-subtle way of attacking Gorbachev himself. But what can Gorbachev do? As he noted, the workers are not working and the bureaucrats are not supporting his reform. In the meantime, the national budget deficit is increasing and wages are rising twice as fast as productivity, resulting in inflation and more shortages of goods.

Nor will the resignations help Gorbachev cope with the increasing unrest in the minority republics. The calls for redress of what are seen as past grievances and forced Russification are growing. In some cases the call for secession has led to violence. Yet the sending in of Soviet troops and the use of toxic gas and other forms of wanton brutality have done nothing to calm tensions.

It may be that Gorbachev’s victory on Tuesday, as incomplete as it was, will nonetheless serve an important purpose. Admittedly, his purge may not have done much to inspire confidence in glasnost . Yet the renewed display of Gorbachev’s strength should convince others, both the bureaucrats and the Soviet people, that they had better give more than lip service to what Gorbachev is trying to do. Ultimately that is what Gorbachev needs.

Certainly, political victories and letters of resignation help. But making more food and consumer goods available, and the production of those items within the Soviet system, will ultimately decide Gorbachev’s fate.