South Africa: Major Prospects and Pitfalls

New doors open for South Africa. Stabilization of southern Africa is relieving tension in the area, and a summit meeting between leaders of southern African states and South Africa is a strong possibility. New agreements may be reached.

Glasnost and perestroika have changed the tone of the African National Congress. The option of violence yields to the option of negotiation and a willingness to compromise. Spokesmen for the African National Congress are making careful statements of agreement that all factions of the population must be represented at the negotiation table. And in a widely circulated document, the ANC has even speculated about a state economic policy that moves away from classical Marxism.

President Pieter W. Botha is on his last legs. He is expected to hand over the reins to Frederick W. de Klerk, leader of the National Party, within the next few months.

A De Klerk government is still to be defined. He has not made any important policy speech; it is not good political practice to announce a blueprint before becoming president. More, an election will be held in September. Elections in South Africa are traditionally not the time to make important announcements.

There are, however, positive things to say about a De Klerk presidency:

He is a pragmatic, realistic, open-minded politician, strongly inclined toward reform politics. His style and tempo will definitely accelerate progress.

He is a strong negotiator who plans intensive contact with the different groups in South Africa to discover areas of compromise or agreement.

He has committed to political reform rather than mere continuation, realizing that leaps, not small steps, are essential.

De Klerk recognizes that there is pressure within his own party and his power base concerning four critical issues:

1) The abolition of all racial laws.

2) Race groupings (White, Colored, Indian and Black) as political classifications in a future constitution are not a feasible solution. Pressure groups within his own party have openly stated that forced race-group classification and race- group participation in political institutions are obstacles in the way of solutions.

3) That discussion with the ANC is essential; a compromise must be found between struggle politics and system politics.

4) There is strong pressure within his party for the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and suspension of the state of emergency.

De Klerk’s attributes as a person and the pressure groups within his own political party, plus international pressure, mean dramatic things could happen in South Africa.

There are, however, personal and political realities that cloud the picture.

De Klerk, unfortunately, still firmly believes that race groups are the basis of political realignment. If he persists in this belief, there can be no important negotiation with opposition forces.

His National Party lacks credibility. Historically, the NP is the party of apartheid.

The slow approach to reform is no longer credible because it fails to get the entire political system moving.

In the coming election, the new Democratic Party could become the official opposition. Now, 24% of the white electorate supports the DP; this may increase to 30%.

The power of the new party is based on three strong messages:

-- Emphatic rejection of the racial basis for South African politics, replaced by a geographical federation built on one man, one vote--a democracy of political parties, not race groups.

-- Judicial reform. Legal systems, for instance, must not permit detention without a hearing and human rights must be reinstated.

-- A willingness to negotiate on grounds of principles. The DP mobilizes white and black and has already started to negotiate intensively with struggle groups.

As an independent political communicator, I have had discussions with Afrikaners in both the DP and the NP, focusing on the following arguments:

1) The current racial policy is unacceptable for an overwhelming majority of moderates. It is structured on a basis counter to modern society and will lead to increasingly destructive international isolation. It is also unaffordable, producing duplication, confusion and conflict of functions. Politically, it paralyzes government administration and results in uncontrollable government spending.

2) It does not offer any protection for whites. On the contrary, we whites become a target for revolt and aggression. 3) It is morally indefensible.

4) It is not a model for settlement. This policy causes negotiation to reach a dead end, leading to greater international opprobrium.

Within six years, I believe, these arguments will have reached the majority of whites.

This breakthrough, however, depends on how groups will be protected in the future. The striving for a non-racial system--political, social, educational and economic--must take group protection into account . The fear of domination by any one group is very strong in South Africa, a nation of many colors and tribal groups.

A sound policy would protect minority groups with a charter of individual human rights adjudicated by the Supreme Court. Constitutional recognition of cultural rights for minority groups--language, religion, social life is essential. So is proportional representation; each party has representation in government structures proportionate to the number of votes it received.

Therefore, compromises by the whites must include:

-- Rejection of race as a building block for the constitution of a non-racial democracy and rejection of all discrimination laws.

-- A redesign of the free-market mechanism, linked to inclusion of the black population in economic possession and activity.

Compromises by blacks must include:

-- Renunciation of violence and acceptance of a transitional stage. It will take a decade for an orderly transition to a new society.

-- Acceptance of a kind of dualism. There will be a white camp and a black camp for a long time to come--a white social life and a black social life, white politics and black politics. I want to ask the black community to accept this dualism until political integration has been realized.

Finally, I believe sanctions do not advance prospects for South Africa. Sanctions may allow the outside world to signal outrage and declining tolerance of apartheid. But hastening the end of apartheid is not only a moral imperative, it is a strategic necessity.

Strategically, the most important argument against sanctions is that they undermine the most important nonviolent weapon black people have at their disposal--the labor force. Blacks constitute 65% of the economically active population and an increasing proportion of the skilled national work force. By the year 2000, nearly 80% of the nation’s college students will be black. By the same year, blacks will account for 44% of private spending. Nothing should be done to retard this steady accumulation of economic power. But sanctions slow the shift of economic power toward black people. This is the single most important strategic objection to economic sanctions.

There is also a moral objection. If, for example, South Africa was no longer able to export coal, thousands of people, most of them black, would be out of work. South Africa already has a rate of unemployment estimated at about 25%.

The aim of sanctions is beneficial political change. Economic sanctions have clearly not achieved that objective. To the contrary, they have slowed reform and hardened attitudes within South Africa.

For the outside world to perpetuate the myth that it can end apartheid is to prolong the agony, offering South Africans empty promises. As long as this illusion persists, it strengthens one of the greatest obstacles to effective black action--the belief that black people are powerless and must therefore rely on others to bring about change on their behalf. The outside world cannot end apartheid; it does no service to black South Africa by pretending that it can.