Iran Future as a Pawn or a Gulf Power

Mikhail S. Gorbachev received a letter from the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in January, 1989. Khomeini’s message was to call communism “rotten,” advising Gorbachev to “eradicate” it from the “face of history,” and inviting the Soviet president to convert to Islam.

Had George Bush received such a letter, he would surely have responded negatively. Gorbachev, however, promptly sent his foreign minister to Iran, a good will gesture to prepare for good relationships.

Parliament Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani later went to Moscow. The reception accorded him by Gorbachev and the agreements that followed signal a significant, surprising improvement in Iran-Soviet relations. Observers had generally assumed--based on Iranian behavior over the last 10 years--that Iran’s historical fear of the Soviet Union and the antipathy of fundamentalist Islam to atheist communism would discourage Tehran from turning toward the Soviets.

Less surprising was Moscow’s enthusiastic embrace of the Iranian desire to improve relations. The Soviets have persistently sought influence in Iran, a place they consider uniquely important. Moscow perceives its large, oil-rich neighbor as the strategic prize in the Persian Gulf, where the West has vital interests. Given the Soviet Union’s large Muslim population near the Iranian border--including many Tajiks, people of Iranian descent who speak an Iranian language--events in Iran often have important domestic consequences for Moscow.

That worldly atheist, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, sat like a suitor at Khomeini’s feet in the mosque early this year, offering Soviet assistance and even declaring that Moscow saw merit in Khomeini’s message to Gorbachev. It may have been personally humiliating for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze but he put on a brave face and his efforts paid off in the Rafsanjani visit.

Gorbachev’s approaches to Iran indicate that despite important domestic changes in policy, the Soviet desires to exploit targets of opportunity and to seek unilateral advantage remain strong. Moscow has moved to exploit Iran’s international isolation--following the Salman Rushdie affair--rather than work with the West to moderate Iranian behavior. Moscow could have insisted, for example, that Iran would receive no arms unless it ended support for international terrorism and used its influence to gain the release of Western hostages in Lebanon.

Iran’s new eagerness to improve relations with Moscow stems from strategic and economic weakness. Its most important foreign policy preoccupation is a relatively vulnerable strategic position in the Persian Gulf. Iran believes it must dominate the region, as it did under the shah. The Iraqis devastated the Iranians toward the end of the war, capturing as much as half of the Iranian tanks, armor and artillery. Iraqi successes forced Iran to accept a cease-fire that Khomeini compared to drinking a “poisoned chalice.” Iraq is now militarily dominant, with 45 battle-tested divisions against Iran’s 12, with even larger ratios of strength in tanks and aircraft. Tehran is looking for ways to overcome strategic inferiority and gain a degree of protection against Iraq.

The state of the Iranian economy is in no better condition than its military. The war cost Iran more than $150 billion in lost oil revenues, ruined facilities and losses in non-oil sectors: 30% of the Iranian work force is unemployed; industrial output is at one-third its prewar capacity, and the inflation rate is 35%. Meanwhile, Iran’s population grows rapidly--by more than 35% since 1979--and now stands at 53 million.

The West, the Soviets--or both--can help Iran’s military and economic problems. Immediately after acceptance of the cease-fire with Iraq last summer, Iran was seeking improved relations with Western nations and the Soviet Union. The Iranian president and Khomeini’s successor, Ali Khamenei, was preparing for a greater Western presence in Iran when he declared last September: “We must make use of the knowledge and expertise and resoures of the foreigner. The enemy foreigner will break his ankle if he wants to come here. But the one who is a friend, the one who chooses to be the right foreigner, well, let him come and work here.”

The Rushdie fury, however, derailed Iran’s return to better relations with the West. Rushdie’s novel became a conflict over principles between the West and Iran, between commitments to free expression and Islamic orthodoxy’s disavowal of blasphemy. Encouraged by radicals who saw a threat to their positions from any improved ties with the West, Khomeini raged against “The Satanic Verses.” That the book contained a sharp barb against Khomeini--he made a cameo appearance as a phantasmagoric would-be prophet opposed to history, progress and civil liberty--did not help. Western defense of Rushdie’s right to publish and criticism of the Ayatollah’s death sentence against the author were perceived by fundamentalists as Western support for the contents of the book.

Unlike Western Europeans, the Soviets did not reduce diplomatic presence in Iran because of the Rushdie affair. Instead they began to court the Tehran regime. Given its need for outside support and its outrage at the West, Iran responded. Rafsanjani agreed to visit Moscow, in part to protect himself against radicals who suspected him of favoring ties with the West.

The Soviets appear to have scored a diplomatic triumph in Iran. Their success, however, will have no long-term consequences for Western interest unless the two countries develop increasing military ties (Moscow has already promised to help modernize Iran’s defenses).

Iran, however, is unlikely to agree to growing military relationships with the Soviets unless it has some countervailing ties with the West. Iranian leaders know that the Soviet Union can be their greatest threat; no other nation has a comparable historic desire to dominate Iran.

If Iran came to depend largely on Moscow for arms and military training, it might find itself sliding down the same slope that undid Afghanistan in the 1950s and 1960s. Having moved to embrace the Soviets, without ties to the West, Afghanistan ultimately found itself unable to escape Moscow’s grasp in the 1970s.

Strategic and domestic political factors push Iran to seek balance in East-West relations. The improvement with Moscow is quite likely to be followed by the pursuit of better relations with the West--although not necessarily with the United States. Having played the Soviet card, Rafsanjani and Khamenei may more safely move toward improving Western relations; now the radicals cannot so easily charge them with selling out. Iranian religious leaders are generally xenophobic and favor a policy of equal distance from--or equal proximity to--the Soviets and the West. They probably hope that improved relations with Moscow will increase Western anxiety and result in greater Western willingness to help Iran.

If Iran does move toward more normal relations with the West, the United States should welcome that development. It does not serve Western interests for Moscow to become the dominant external influence in Iran. The Persian Gulf continues to be vital and its relative importance will increase as dependence on the region’s oil grows. Iran is a key state in the region. There is no current strategic conflict of interest between Iran and the West. A further weakened Iran would not increase stability but would increase Iraqi preeminence in the Gulf and make Iran more vulnerable to Soviet influence.

Europe and Asia are the next likely targets of Iranian diplomacy. The United States should encourage any such overtures. Refusal to deal with Iran only plays into Moscow’s hand. When Iran’s relations with Europe and Asia improve, then U.S. allies can pressure Tehran to meet American conditions for improved ties.

Khomeini’s death finally opens the possibility for significant change. His was an era of passion and promises of a brave new world. Now that he is gone, Iranians are likely longing for more mundane ways to solve their real problems. The West, including the United States, can help more than the Soviets can, but Iran must make that possible.