Building New Anti-Satellite Weapons Could Shoot Down National Security

In a dramatic new step toward military glasnost , the Soviet Union permitted a group of Americans to tour the top-secret laser research station at Sary Shagan this month. Far from the dangerous beam-weapon threat to U.S. satellites that the Pentagon had long touted, the visit revealed an antiquated laser far too weak to be a threat. Demolishing the myth of a “laser gap,” the visit should help slow a Pentagon drive to build new anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. And that is good news; such weapons are a can of worms best left unopened.

Orbiting spacecraft have become essential to U.S. national security. Military forces rely on them for intelligence on potential adversaries, for early warning of attack, for communications, command, navigation and other indispensable tasks.

Yet rather than working toward an agreement to limit threats to these satellites, the Defense Department is pushing for immediate ASAT development--a move that would inevitably spur the Soviets to build advanced ASATs of their own, dramatically increasing the threat to our critical spacecraft.

This ASAT program is ostensibly separate from the still-unrealistic Strategic Defense Initiative against missiles. While many of the technologies are the same--from homing rockets to giant lasers--the problem of shooting down a few satellites in predictable orbits is infinitely simpler to resolve.

In part, Defense Department ASAT desires are a response to an existing Soviet space weapon, separate from the Sary Shagan laser. For six years, the Soviet Union has unilaterally refrained from testing its primitive ASAT, but U.S. ASAT tests would impel the Soviets to develop far more threatening ASATs than they have today. Reigniting this cycle of action and response is a formula for an unending arms race, turning the depths of space into yet another potential battleground.

That would be a disaster for the United States. While dependence on satellites in future confrontations will vary, our military forces are likely to be far more space-dependent than the Soviets’. The Soviet Union is a land power; most potential arenas of conflict are near its borders. The United States is an oceanic power with global responsibilities, making space support essential. U.S. forces around the world would be crippled if the satellites they rely on were destroyed.

We need to know. Even in the age of glasnost, Soviet society remains far less open than our own. The Soviets can learn most of what they need to know from technical journals, congressional hearings and the U.S. media. For the United States, satellites are essential to keep tabs on Soviet developments--not to mention activities in such countries as Libya and Iran. Without secure spacecraft, we would be virtually blind and deaf.

Worse, quick-strike threats to both sides’ spacecraft could be dangerously destabilizing in crisis. Sudden destruction of a critical early-warning or communications satellite would inevitably heighten the danger of a confrontation spiraling out of control. As Brent Scowcroft concluded before becoming President Bush’s national security adviser, “all scenarios involving the use of ASATs . . . increase the risks of accident, misperception and inadvertent escalation.”

An ASAT system is certain to be expensive, draining funds from other crucial programs. The Pentagon plans to spend more than $1 billion on ASAT development over the next five years; experience shows that deployment would cost billions more. Once the program is underway, momentum to continue will inevitably build--good money after bad.

Fortunately, it is not too late for an ASAT agreement to avoid these costs and dangers. The Soviet ASAT is a dog--slow, unreliable, capable of only low-altitude attack, susceptible to countermeasures and untested since 1982. Our ASAT technology is better but the planned systems are not yet tested or deployed.

Now is the time to deal; preventing either side from building a robust ASAT capability will be easier than limiting one already developed. As the tour of Sary Shagan indicates, the Soviets are eager to negotiate, having unilaterally ceased testing and having proposed an ASAT test ban, combined with dismantlement of their existing system.

We should grab that deal--with some haggling over specifics. An ASAT ban is in U.S. interest. Rejecting a ban in favor of an aggressive ASAT program could chill the warming of U.S.-Soviet relations. And in today’s multipolar world, it is worth remembering that virtually every nation on earth has called for agreements to head off an arms race in space.

Current and evolving intelligence capabilities can readily verify an ASAT test ban, particularly when combined with on-site inspections and other cooperative measures. The cold, black background of space makes monitoring of many types of ASAT activities comparatively easy.

There are those who resist a ban and argue that any agreement would leave some “residual” ASAT capabilities. That is perfectly true, but such left-over threats--from Soviet space shuttles, for example--are minor compared to the devastating space weapons the Soviets could build in the absence of agreement.

Others argue for an American ASAT to deter use of the Soviet system. But the Soviets have offered to dismantle their ASAT. If we fear that a few might be hidden away, we can protect U.S. satellites at affordable cost. Satellite-survivability measures are essential with or without agreement. Combined with an ASAT test ban to prevent development of more threatening space weapons, they would ensure that a Soviet ASAT attack would fail--the best kind of deterrence.

Deterrence without an ASAT agreement is unlikely to work. With Moscow’s lower dependence on space, cheaper satellites and huge rocket replacement inventory, Soviet leaders would have comparatively little to fear from a tit-for-tat space shoot-out.

Other ASAT supporters say we need to be able to shoot down threatening Soviet satellites. Soviet ship-tracking satellites do pose a limited threat to U.S. surface fleets--though efforts to detect submarines from space have yet to prove themselves, and probably never will. But the Soviets have other, more effective means of tracking U.S. ships and the tracking satellites can be stymied by electronic countermeasures plus other tactics already developed and proven in naval exercises. In a crisis, these non-destructive measures would be far less provocative than using an ASAT weapon.

More important, the naval threat posed by Soviet satellites pales in comparison with advantages the U.S. Navy derives from its own spacecraft--all of which could be threatened if an ASAT race is renewed. That goes double for the other U.S. military services, which face even less threat from Soviet satellites.

Two paths lie open: To build a U.S. ASAT weapon will inexorably lead to new Soviet ASATs; soon even the outermost reaches of space will offer no sanctuary. But if we deal now, and prudently protect U.S. satellites against residual ASAT threats, we can continue to rely on the enormous benefits of secure spacecraft. The intelligence choice, then, is the intelligent one.