Soviet Approach to Iran Outruns Complacent West

When the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, visited the Soviet Union last month, it was no mere diplomatic formality; it was a critical turning point in the long, often turbulent, history of Russo-Persian relations. This was underscored when he stopped in Baku, capital of Soviet Azerbaijan, and preached during the Friday prayer service at the city’s largest mosque. Not since the separation of that area from Persia in 1828 had such a senior Tehran official visited Baku.

If fully implemented, the agreements reached during Rafsanjani’s visit will organically link Iran’s economy to that of the Soviet Union, greatly increasing Soviet political leverage and Iran’s dependence. Why would Rafsanjani take such a path? And why was he given the red-carpet treatment, which the Soviets knew would displease both the West and the Arab world?

Contrary to the dominant Western view, strong pro-Soviet tendencies exist within Iran and its leadership. The Soviet Union has infiltrated Iran’s bureaucracy, the Revolutionary Guards and the intelligence services. Its proximity and its links with Iran’s minorities and opposition groups also give it the ability to reward and punish Iran and thereby manipulate Iranian behavior. And recent changes in Soviet rhetoric--if not in policy--have diminished Iran’s perception of threat from the Soviet Union and made it appear an attractive partner.

Indeed, after the cease-fire in the Persian Gulf war last August, the effort by Iran’s leadership to open up to the West met strong criticism in the Iranian press by proponents of better ties between the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries. Rafsanjani’s adoption of a pro-Soviet foreign policy and his professed admiration for Mikhail S. Gorbachev may be part of a domestic political bargain that will allow him to run for the presidency without serious opposition. His trip to Moscow, along with his earlier statement that Palestinians are entitled to kill Westerners in retaliation for Israeli actions, were tests posed by the radicals to see whether he has shed his pro-Western tendencies.

Iranian proponents of improved ties with the West have despaired that it will ever consider Iran’s grievances sympathetically. After the cease-fire, for example, many Iranians hoped that the West would chastise Iraq for the massive use of chemical weapons and would help achieve full implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolution that outlines steps for a negotiated peace. They were disappointed on both scores. Admittedly, the West had to contend with the continued holding of hostages in Lebanon, but its lack of response to Iranian expectations undermined pro-West elements in Iran and their ability to mitigate the hostage issue.

At the same time, the West deepened Iranian disillusionment by joining with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in attempting to exclude both Iran and Iran-based moujahedeen from arrangements for Afghanistan’s political future.

By contrast, since the cease-fire the Soviet Union has acknowledged past mistakes in its dealings with Iran and has vowed to remedy them. It has called for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian territory, and it has supported the 1975 Algiers Agreement as a basis for resolving the dispute over the Shatt al Arab waterway.

Moscow also has acknowledged that Iran is a pivotal country in the Middle East and should play an important role in regional politics. Indeed, the policy adopted by the West and its regional allies of excluding Iran from an Afghan settlement has created a common strategic interest between Tehran and Moscow. Also, the Soviets’ problems in the Caucasus and in Central Asia have increased Iran’s value. Given its extensive links with these areas, a friendly Iran can be helpful to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Iran’s improved access to these republics will help it to counter Saudi Arabia and its extensive Wahabi proselytizing in the region.

The Soviets have no doubt concluded that, for the foreseeable future, they stand no chance of replacing U.S. influence in the Gulf Arab states or in Egypt. Thus, gaining decisive influence with Iran would be worth the sacrifice of uncertain prospects with the Arabs--if in fact that would be the result. Improved Soviet-Iranian ties might simply induce the Gulf Arabs to improve their own relations with Moscow.

This pattern of developments refutes the view, popular in the West, that the Soviet Union and Iran are merely in a new “on” stage of their old off-and-on relationship. Or that Rafsanjani’s visit was a ploy to protect his political flank before pursuing a pro-Western policy. Significant elements in Iran, backed by Soviet support, will ensure that this does not happen.

Even worse, some Western commentators argue that, in the post-Cold War era, Iran is no longer important and can be ceded to the Soviets without loss. This is a short-sighted view of Iran’s intrinsic strategic importance in the region, with or without a cold war. By contrast, any serious, historical view calls for an end to the policy of drift and complacency. That does not mean engaging in a bidding contest with the Soviets for Iranian allegiance. But it does require serious efforts to put relations with Iran back on a more reasonable basis where, over time, it will see that it has some alternative to a deeper dependence on Moscow.