Let the Contras Find a Haven Rebuilding Peace in Nicaragua, Not Living in the U.S.

In the wake of the Central American presidents’ plan for demobilizing the Nicaraguan resistance, three Contra commanders were granted political asylum in the United States and four more requested it. The speed with which the applications were filed and approved points to the possibility of a serious and misguided policy change--that those Contras who do not trust the Sandinista regime will be given haven here as refugees.

The Bush Administration has never suggested a refugee program for the Contra forces, but the pressures that could lead there are beginning to build.

Much of the Contra organization feels betrayed by the Honduras accords, which call for demobilization and repatriation of their military force by December. The Contras feel doubly stung by the agreement of the opposition inside Nicaragua to settle the cause at next February’s elections. U.S. conservatives are fuming about perfidy in the State Department and the inevitability of rigged elections. Miami’s sizable Nicaraguan community, in part the product of Ronald Reagan’s generous asylum policy, is a natural magnet.

The refugee option has always hovered about the edges of the Nicaraguan debate, the presumed fallback if the day of reckoning ever came. It flows from the causes of Cuba and Vietnam, where we similarly empowered surrogate armies. When they were defeated, we mounted aggressive refugee resettlement programs for them and their families. A substantial portion of the Cuban and South Vietnamese populations at the time are now in this country, a refugee flow that has had serious policy implications.

The fact that Cuba and Vietnam have been among the slowest nations in the communist world to change is not unrelated to this exodus. Unwittingly, and with the best intentions, our refugee policy has provided a means for these nations to export the critical mass of people most likely to challenge the system from within and spark political and economic reform.

This is exactly what we don’t want in Nicaragua. If it has not been clear before, the Central American presidents’ agreement, along with the one between the Sandinistas and domestic opposition parties, sends an unequivocal message: The Sandinistas will not be eliminated outright. The battlefield is now politics.

Our policy must be to promote political pluralism and the right to free speech, press and elections. Because the resistance encompasses the very people most likely to fight for these conditions, repatriation of the Contras is crucial. Offering the option of coming here would remove a potential source of internal pressure, making it easier for the Sandinistas to maintain their closed system.

The reference point should not be Cuba and Vietnam. It should be Poland.

When Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law eight years ago, a surge of refugees seemed inevitable. Although many Poles wished to leave and expected that the United States would welcome them, we did not establish a special program. In fact, we rejected many applicants, despite sustained pressure from the Polish-American and other political constituencies to open our arms.

In the intervening years, the Solidarity movement grew, until its strength finally cracked 40 years of Communist domination. Is it conceivable that this would have happened if we had offered an alternative future in this country to large numbers of Poles who opposed Communist rule? No, because these stunning changes could not have occurred without a sizable, committed internal opposition pushing for change.

This is not to say that we should press all those who oppose dictatorships to remain in their countries and fight for change. The Castro regime imprisoned and tortured its enemies; the North Vietnamese sentenced theirs to brutal re-education camps and, often, to death. Our first duty should always be to protect life and safety, particularly for those who fought loyally for our ideas, regardless of the longer-term geopolitical implications.

But where there is some middle ground, some assurance that basic human rights will be observed, our policy should be to resist and discourage the refugee option.

Nicaragua offers such a middle ground. The agreement it signed provides that demobilization and repatriation be carried out under the auspices of an international verification commission formed by the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The commission’s duties include “monitoring the full exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms of those repatriated. . . . “ Its mandate extends to establishing offices and follow-up visits, so people can report noncompliance.

This mechanism is unique and rather extraordinary. It provides a sound basis for the United States and most of the Contra troops and their families--an estimated 50,000 people--to have confidence that they can safely return to Nicaragua if the agreement’s protections are upheld. The refugee-status fallback would be required, then, only in cases where unusual circumstances pertain.

But the Contras and their leaders will need to be convinced. In this and other respects, we retain considerable influence if we throw our weight behind the presidents’ agreement and become a partner in making it work. Crucial to that is the Contras’ return to their homeland and contributing to its future, politically and economically.

If there’s any doubt as to the wisdom of rejecting the refugee option, remember Poland.