Cold War’s Thaw Is Felt in Salvador

Last week’s talks in Mexico City between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN insurgency are undoubtedly the most important, substantive contact the two sides have had in a decade of civil war. The new regional context (peace in Nicaragua, the end of the Contra affair) as well as the domestic situation in El Salvador (the right-wing Arena victory in the presidential election) ensured that the Mexico City encounter would be of an entirely different nature from previous meetings. Although no concrete results emerged, a sufficient number of procedural agreements and convergences guarantee that the talks will go on, and that both parties mean business--or at least feel obliged to act as if they did.

There are reasons on both sides that explain this shift, but the more far-reaching and substantive changes seemed to have occurred in the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front camp. The rebels are apparently in the midst of a profound revision of their thinking, adapting their strategy to today’s new regional, international and ideological conditions. If brought to fruition, these changes could have a long-lasting impact.

The first transformation of the guerrillas’ views has to do with an initial appraisal of what the end of the Cold War means for Latin America. It is clear to many in the rebel leadership that new opportunities have opened in the dramatic drop in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, together with the fading American perception of the Soviets as a threat to U.S. national security in areas such as Latin America. In the rebels’ perspective, U.S. opposition to revolutionary movements in the hemisphere, or intervention in its civil wars, is much less likely to happen if it cannot be couched in Cold War, anti-Soviet terms. Consequently, the rebels see the possibility of some form of peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Latin American left.

In particular, if El Salvador can no longer be considered a bulwark against a now-nonexistent threat, then the United States can no longer justify spending billions of dollars to prop up a corrupt and violent government there. And so, the rebels believe, Washington is bound to reach some understanding with the FMLN. Whatever concessions must be made to achieve this end are worthwhile in the rebels’ view, since without such an agreement, the type of economic, social and political change that they claim to seek is impossible.

As a further result of the rapprochement between the superpowers, it will become increasingly difficult to sustain isolated regional conflicts. As armed disputes in Afghanistan, Southern Africa, Cambodia and, more relevantly, Nicaragua are being channeled into the political arena, the Salvadoran blood bath stands out as an unacceptable aberration.

The Central American presidents’ last meeting, which transformed the contest for power in Nicaragua from an armed one into a political-electoral one, also increased the pressure on the parties to the Salvadoran conflict. The FMLN leaders have apparently reached the conclusion that under these new regional and international conditions, they can either choose to shift their emphasis from a military solution to a political one, or have circumstances do it for them.

The insurgents have in fact altered their stance on what negotiations should be about and what they can be expected to deliver. The change was perhaps already implicit in their peace proposal put forward before the March election. But it was most clearly expressed in a statement made to the press last Friday by Joaquin Villalobos, who is generally considered to be the most militaristic of the rebel commanders. As quoted by Excelsior, the Mexican daily, Villalobos said, “The FMLN is not demanding shares or quotas of power, but rather space and guarantees to compete for power.” The shift from power-sharing to seeking a level playing field on which everybody competes for power constitutes a major change in the rebels’ strategy.

According to the rebel leadership, this change in their view of the war is due above all to the right-wing Arena’s victory in this year’s presidential election. As the traditional Salvadoran right displaced the centrist Christian Democratic party from the government, it polarized the country’s politics; it also created a vacuum in the center. The FMLN has tried to rush in, preempting the demoralized and divided Christian Democrats. As the government moves to the right, or even to the extreme right, the rebels are attempting to occupy the center. Whether they will succeed is another matter, but this is clearly the rationale for many of their new concessions and flexibility. The tactical and propaganda points they scored during last week’s talks with President Alfredo Cristiani’s representatives indicate that the strategy is not altogether unsound.

The civil war in El Salvador is not near its end. But for the first time, one of the two sides has come up with persuasive arguments--sincere or not--explaining why peace holds more advantage than war. For the first time in years, the insurgents are united in their negotiating tactics and have a coherent strategy for dealing with their Salvadoran adversaries. If they can also articulate sensible policy toward the United States, along the lines outlined above, perhaps one can begin to be optimistic about the future of a so-far tragic land.