Nicaragua Needs Monitors, Not Meddlers, in Election

Battle lines for Nicaragua’s February elections are beginning to take shape. Critical to the credibility of the outcome is an internationally supported monitoring effort now quietly under way.

The Sandinistas, who have governed since the revolution that overthrew the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza 10 years ago, have seen their early successes in reforming health, education and land-tenure systems undermined by the U.S.-backed Contra war, a U.S. trade embargo and managerial inexperience.

Seven opposition parties challenged the Sandinistas in the 1984 elections, but the refusal of the most conservative parties to participate led Washington to dismiss the effort as a sham--despite what many European observers regarded as a relatively open election.

Now some conservative parties have formed an alliance with liberal, Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, Socialist and Communist parties. The 14 parties in the Union of National Opposition (UNO) have put forward Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and Virgilio Godoy as presidential and vice presidential candidates.

Chamorro, publisher of the opposition newspaper La Prensa, though symbolically important to the ticket, lacks political savvy and suffers from poor health. Godoy is a former labor minister under the Sandinistas who now heads the Liberal Independent Party. He is considered a serious politician but has been called arrogant and abrasive, qualities that may inhibit his effectiveness in such a diverse and sometimes shaky coalition.

To attain the goals of internal reconciliation and peace, the elections not only have to be free and fair but must be perceived as such at home and abroad--especially in Washington. The precedent-setting monitoring effort is key to the reality and perception. The Sandinistas themselves have taken the initiative, encouraging the active participation of international observers, including the European Parliament, the Center for Democracy in Washington, Boston-based Hemisphere Initiatives and the Carter Center in Atlanta. But the most thorough work will be done by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations.

With the elections set for Feb. 25, both the United Nations and the OAS have set up monitoring offices throughout Nicaragua. Their staffs will increase, growing to nearly 300 professionals in the final weeks of the campaign. U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar has named former U.S. Atty. Gen. Elliot Richardson as his special representative.

Recent Nicaragua opinion polls show that 40% of the electorate is undecided. The UNO coalition group believes the country’s economic crisis should translate into opposition votes. UNO candidates will blame the cutoff of U.S. aid, and the war itself, on the Sandinista’s revolutionary policies. UNO strategy is to present itself as the coalition that can open the floodgates of aid from the north, while hammering away at what it sees as incompetence and bureaucratic privileges among Sandinista officials.

These are powerful arguments. Why has the Nicaraguan government been so willing to submit itself to such scrutiny?

First, the Sandinistas believe they can win free and fair elections despite the deep economic crisis. Historically, opposition parties have been divided and, with few exceptions, have no national grass-roots organization. In contrast, the Sandinistas have a strong nationwide party organization. Many opposition leaders are identified with the eight-year Contra war and are tied to U.S. policies and interests--a factor that stirs nationalism and anger in many Nicaraguans.

The Sandinistas trust that their major social reforms will influence the way people vote. Independent polls in July substantiated that belief. The Sandinistas held a 3-2 margin over the opposition. That margin has increased in the wake of the new peace agreement reached by the Central American presidents in August.

Second, the government seems serious about holding free and fair elections. A variety of electoral reforms instituted by the Sandinistas after negotiations with the opposition has led many organizations--the United Nations, the OAS, Hemisphere Initiatives and the Congressional Research Service--to conclude that Nicaraguan election laws compare favorably with those of other Latin American countries.

Third, international legitimacy is crucial for the Nicaraguan government to gain much-needed economic support.

With the Contras no longer a viable force for overthrowing the Sandinistas, Washington has shifted its efforts to the internal opposition--$3.5 million has already been appropriated by Congress for indirect support of the opposition, including voter registration, party building, poll-watching and get-out-the-vote drives. The Bush Administration now seeks an additional $9 million and is leaning on foreign political parties to funnel money to the Chamorro campaign. The party of Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu has wisely said no.

Covert assistance has yet to be ruled out. According to one published account, the CIA is channeling some $5 million to sway the elections. U.S. attempts to influence the results contrast sharply with donations from Western Europe and Canada to defray the original $25-million cost of staging the elections.

Foreign contributions are illegal in the United States, but the Sandinistas compromised with the opposition and the law allows such funds if 50% goes to the Supreme Electoral Council to finance overall election expenses. Washington’s unfortunate record in organizing and funding the Contra war will make many Nicaraguans suspicious of any U.S. role in the election. The Sandinistas will emphasize U.S. intervention, perhaps at the political expense of those it seeks to help.

The Bush Administration and Congress could best aid the process by throwing full moral and financial support behind neutral and respected international monitoring agencies.

While it is too early to predict the outcome of an election nearly five months away, the reality of monitoring is a major deterrent to fraud and misbehavior by either side. Further, it will be critical in persuading the Sandinistas to yield power gracefully if they lose, and the opposition to accept the legitimacy of the electoral process if the Sandinistas win.