Facing Reality in the Killing Fields : Cambodia: Americans cannot support a solution leading to a Khmer Rouge return. But a ‘feel good’ position is not the answer.

The moral outrage currently being expressed against the Khmer Rouge--and the calls for total U.S. disassociation from them--are understandable and a useful corrective to the “ultra-pragmatic” line of accommodation to that genocidal force being preached by Singapore and others. If one assumes that there is no further role for diplomacy, at least for Americans, then taking the high moral ground without consideration of the consequences is probably right.

Even though this summer’s Paris Conference on Cambodia failed to bring immediate relief, the possibility of an eventual political solution remains, and with it the need to keep working to bring peace, stability, independence and prosperity to the long-suffering Cambodian people.

Bringing the Khmer Rouge into the government and the defense establishment of Cambodia risks resumed genocide. But ignoring the reality of Khmer Rouge military power and refusing them any role in a settlement would consign the Cambodians to an indefinite future of further bloodshed.

No one suggests that Pol Pot or the others in the Khmer Rouge leadership responsible for past atrocities be included in any way. But the armed might of the Khmer Rouge is a fact, and even if efforts to co-opt them in the process of peaceful adjustment ultimately fail, one should at least try.

At the Paris conference, the French made a constructive effort to do just that. According to their plan, Prince Norodom Sihanouk would be the only resistance leader joining Hun Sen in the interim “government” of Cambodia to run the country on a day-to-day basis. But all four factions, including the Khmer Rouge and former Prime Minister Son Sann’s Khmer People’s National Liberation Front, would participate in a supra-governmental “authority” that would be responsible for organizing and conducting subsequent elections leading to a new, permanent government.

There were several problems with the French proposal. Among them it gave Hun Sen, as premier, too much power and Sihanouk, as president, too little. And it was not entirely clear what powers the “authority,” as opposed to the “government,” would have in ensuring that the elections would be free and fair. But it was a start and a basis for negotiation.

The Cambodian factions, which had earlier shown some flexibility, took uncompromising, hard-line positions and rejected the French ideas--Sihanouk because it did not incorporate his proposal for a quadripartite government and Hun Sen because he wanted the Khmer Rouge shut out altogether.

One can understand Hun Sen’s insistence on keeping the Khmer Rouge out of the day-to-day administration of Cambodia and especially out of the military establishment. But in his refusal to give the Khmer Rouge any role at all, Hun Sen--and Vietnam--seemed purposely to be blocking agreement on the assumption that, with Vietnamese forces out of Cambodia, the international community would eventually tire of the struggle and opt for normalization of relations. By doing so, they are gambling with the lives of the Cambodian people that Hun Sen’s army can stand up to the Khmer Rouge on the battlefield. This is a questionable proposition. Moreover, by holding fast to their position, Phnom Penh and Hanoi also deny Beijing a face-saving way of backing away from supporting the Khmer Rouge.

Sihanouk’s inflexibility has those same consequences.

Perhaps the United States and other interested outside nations do not have the power to force a compromise on the Cambodian leaders. But we should have the vision and the common sense to back away both from our reluctant but nonetheless de facto backing for Sihanouk’s proposal to bring the Khmer Rouge into the interim government and from the purist moral position of shunning them entirely and wishing them away.

We obviously cannot support any “solution” that will lead to a Khmer Rouge return to dominance in Cambodia. But let’s keep our eye on the ball, which is not to adopt positions that make us feel good but rather to support policies that advance both U.S. national interest and the well-being of the Cambodian people, whom we seek to protect. If the choice were merely between Hun Sen and the Khmer Rouge, neither is ideal, but clearly Hun Sen is preferable. (Even now, the United States should talk with him.) It is not at all clear, however, that this is the only choice. Some more mixed outcome, with a role for non-communist leaders, especially Sihanouk, is still possible and indeed necessary if there is to be a political rather than a long, bloody military solution to this tragic situation.

The responsibility is not only American. Hanoi, Beijing and Bangkok are the most directly involved outside players; Singapore, Moscow, Jakarta, Paris and others are also in the game. But if we are to try to play a meaningful role, then it should be to exert our influence where we can in a direction that is both moral and pragmatic.