Not an <i> Anschluss</i> , but a Reformed GDR : East Germany: For those demonstrating in the streets, reunification is not even part of the question.

The dramatic unfolding of recent events in East Germany has left Western policy-makers speechless.

Until a few weeks ago, conventional wisdom dictated that the German Democratic Republic, well-off economically and with a weak political opposition, was the country in Eastern Europe least likely to join the avalanche of political change sweeping across the Soviet Bloc. Policy-makers in both the East and West could comfortably maintain that any need to confront the German question could be postponed until some future date.

History has not allowed us that luxury. The largest exodus of East Germans since the building of the Berlin Wall was followed by what may well be the largest pro-democracy demonstrations ever witnessed in German history, culminating in the opening up of free travel between the two Germanys. Yet, mixed in with respect and admiration is a clear note of Western concern that the beginning of the demise of East Germany will make German reunification unavoidable.

What has been lost in the current debate over the future of the German question is what the East Germans themselves have been saying. As Western policy-makers struggle to come to terms with change in East Germany and the ramifications thereof for the German question, they would be well advised to listen to what East Germans themselves are saying about German unity. One call that has thus far been absent among the growing demands among the East German opposition is that of reunification. East Germans have taken to the streets--and crossed the wall into West Berlin--not to demand Anschluss, but to make it clear that they plan on staying in East Germany and fighting for a reformed GDR.

The opposition is presently led by intellectuals whose goal is the creation of their own democratic East Germany. To many of them, the Federal Republic is a country from which they hope to learn a great deal, but not one that they necessarily want to simply copy in its entirety. Furthermore, the notion of a strong reunified Germany that would be compelled to assume a major geopolitical role in Europe is clearly anathema to them.

Such calculations are also reinforced by a very real and human desire to decide their own future on their own terms. There is a very human fear that in any reunification scheme, East Germany would rapidly be overwhelmed by its more powerful and affluent Western neighbor. Having seen a glimmer of hope that they could gain control over their own lives, East Germans are not keen about being dominated by their richer capitalist brethren in the West.

Of course, the current East German opposition wants closer ties to the Federal Republic. They expect considerable West German political and economic support for the reform experiment.

At the same time, having rejected the Soviet model, East Germans do not simply want to blindly embrace the West German model. They would rather work out their own answers to their problems and aspirations. The demand of the opposition is, first, for self-determination for Germans in East Germany, and then consideration of the question of the future of German unity. Their goal is a confederation between the two states that would allow them to have greater freedom and democracy, but in which Germany would not again become a major power and potential threat to its neighbors in Europe.

The as-yet unanswered question is how representative such views are of East German society as a whole. Will the average East German, disillusioned by 40 years of real socialism, be willing to stay in East Germany and work to rebuild his homeland, or will he opt for reunification as the best shortcut to material affluence and political freedom? East German opposition leaders themselves acknowledge that this silent majority will ultimately decide the fate of the German Democratic Republic.

The hope is that the reform process and the opportunity to rebuild a new society will lead East Germans to stay in the GDR rather than flee to the West. The unspoken fear of the current East German opposition is that this past weekend’s freedom binge in Berlin notwithstanding, they are locked in a race with time, that reforms will be introduced in a halting and inconsistent fashion, and therefore not provide the type of incentive and hope that would lead East Germans to stay and fight for a reformed GDR.

Developments in East Germany have indeed placed the question of German unity on the East-West agenda. Yet, unity and self-determination can take different forms. It is in everyone’s interest that East Germans be given the hope and the necessary incentives that will persuade them to remain and to rebuild their society. It is at that point that the Germans in East and West, along with their neighbors, will have to come up with a mutually acceptable answer to the German question.