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THE MALTA SUMMIT : Gorbachev Pushing for More Than ‘Soul to Soul’ Talks : Diplomacy: The Soviet leader urgently wants to discuss the changes in Europe and a ‘political impetus’ to the arms talks.

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TIMES STAFF WRITER

Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev views his meeting with President Bush this weekend as the start of a new and cooperative relationship between East and West, but one that must be quickly bolstered by understanding on the future of Europe and by agreements on arms control.

Gorbachev wants the broad, philosophical discussion that Bush had in mind last July when he first proposed an informal meeting, according to advisers and other officials who have helped prepare for the summit, and the Soviet president hopes in fact for the deep conversations that Russians call “soul to soul.”

But dramatic developments in East Europe in the past three months have made the future of the Continent another major and more immediate issue on the agenda, and Soviet officials see the Bush-Gorbachev talks as leading to new East-West discussions on a new political and economic order in Europe.

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Moscow has also made clear to Washington its expectation that the two presidents will give what Soviet officials call “political impetus” to negotiations on reducing strategic arms, on cutting back conventional forces in Europe and on controlling chemical weapons.

This, Soviet officials say, could come in the form of joint instructions to negotiators to come to terms in time for the full-scale Soviet-American summit conference planned for Washington in May or June.

Bush has replied, in a handwritten note to Gorbachev last month and later in an interview with the Soviet newspaper Izvestia, that he will not conclude any arms control agreement at this meeting.

“It won’t happen, and I don’t think the general secretary expects it to happen,” he told Izvestia last week. “I hope he doesn’t.”

But Soviet officials distinguish between the formal agreement of which Bush spoke--they agree it is months away--and the understanding they hope he and Gorbachev will reach on the necessity of concluding a strategic arms agreement by May and a conventional arms agreement by the end of next year and the steps that should be taken to hasten the negotiations on both.

“Our leadership feels that Mikhail Gorbachev acutely needs real, concrete results, particularly on arms reduction,” Leonid I. Dobrokhotov, a foreign policy specialist at the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee headquarters, said the other day in an interview in Moscow. “This is a question of political will, and that is what we hope to see demonstrated by the U.S. side.

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“But President Bush also needs results if he is not to fall behind events and let history overtake him. He must show his constituency, I would think, that he is not so timid and that he knows his own mind.”

High Expectations

Although this meeting was described from the first announcement as informal and not intended to produce major agreements, Soviet officials have nevertheless emphasized high expectations from the outset--and have continued to do so while the Bush Administration has attempted to minimize the probable results.

“On the face of it, this is going to be an ordinary working meeting, as both leaders have said,” Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze said not long ago in Moscow. “It is going to be a working meeting, and it would seem that one should not expect major breakthroughs.

“But I do not rule out the possibility of this meeting resulting in substantial agreements. Despite the fact that there is no clear-cut agenda and no special preparations, it has very often been the case that such working meetings have brought very important results. My view is that the meeting will have much importance for progress in disarmament.”

And Gorbachev, speaking in Rome earlier this week, commented, “My meeting with President Bush will, I am convinced, enable us to take a new constructive step in the movement ‘from mutual understanding to mutual action’ in Soviet-American relations.”

Developments in Eastern Europe, as well as the desire for progress on disarmament issues, have not diminished Gorbachev’s desire for a candid exchange on broad, even philosophical issues, according to senior Soviet officials.

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Gorbachev wants to convey as fully and frankly as possible, his advisers say, the tremendous problems confronting the Soviet Union and the critical phase through which its reforms are now passing.

From this understanding of Soviet goals, fears and motives, Gorbachev hopes that Bush will promote broader and more active cooperation between East and West and find ways to ease pressure on Moscow and help its transition toward political pluralism and market socialism.

“There is a need to understand one another in the deepest possible way and to exchange views without the text of a future agreement running through your mind,” Dobrokhotov said. “We do not want to exaggerate the personal element in international relations, but Mikhail Gorbachev is the best person we have to explain the changes under way in our country and articulate our ideas for the future.”

Explaining the Stakes

Another senior official from Central Committee headquarters, who accompanied Gorbachev on his state visit to Italy and the Vatican this week, put it more bluntly.

“Mikhail Gorbachev wants President Bush to understand very clearly what our perestroika means,” he said, “both for us and for the world. George Bush should know, when he considers his foreign policy options, what impact his decisions will have on perestroika .

“And for this he should know where we are going and why, what is at stake and how decisive the coming months will be for us. We think the United States and the world have a very large interest in the success of our perestroika because its failure, should--God forbid--that happen, will be felt in California and Ohio and Florida nearly as much as in the Ukraine, Siberia and Armenia.”

This broader discussion has been overshadowed by the accelerating changes in East Europe, as first Poland and Hungary, then East Germany and Bulgaria and now Czechoslovakia plunge into the maelstrom of political and economic reform sweeping the region.

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“The situation in Eastern Europe is highly unsettled, very contradictory and extremely sensitive,” Dobrokhotov said. “This is a critical time not only for Eastern and Central Europe but for all the Continent and consequently for East-West relations as a whole.

“Our position is quite clear and very fundamental: Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States should interfere in the process of reform and democratization now under way. Let those countries solve their problems themselves or assist in a positive way. We will ask of Bush just what the United States has asked of us.”

The changes in East Europe lend urgency, Soviet officials believe, to Gorbachev’s calls for two European summit meetings, the first involving the 23 countries that belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact when an agreement is concluded on reducing military forces in Central Europe, and the second to include the 35 countries that signed the 1975 Helsinki Act on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Gennady I. Gerasimov, chief spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said Moscow hopes that the broad discussion of world affairs, particularly the situation in Europe, will lead to “common approaches to current problems” and “from this could emerge very important practical steps” to resolve them.

Andrei V. Nikiforov, editor of the influential Soviet journal USA, said in a Moscow interview: “In Eastern Europe, our premise is that we have to manage the situation politically, especially after the unexpected events in the German Democratic Republic. This is very important so that the process of democratization does not bring instability. We all have a stake in that.”

But Andrei V. Kortunov, a foreign policy specialist at the Soviet Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, asked: “What influence, what control do the Soviet Union and the United States still have over global developments? Certainly there is no possibility of a Soviet-American condominium, despite the fears of some people in Europe, and the idea of ‘superpowers’ as such may be anachronistic in a multipolar world.

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“That leaves Bush and Gorbachev talking about how to influence, how to guide, how to cooperate in ensuring a smooth transition in Eastern Europe. . . . But given the region’s history as the center of conflict in the Cold War, that is a rather amazing development.”

Soviet Suggestions

Gorbachev will suggest to Bush that NATO and the Warsaw Pact begin to transform themselves from military alliances into political organizations that will promote disarmament in Europe and broad cooperation between East and West.

In this context, according to Soviet officials, he may also propose that Moscow and Washington assert their right to be involved in decisions on the future of East and West Germany, and that their forces in Europe be regarded as a guarantee against the “violent, forced reunification” of Germany.

“The United States and the Soviet Union both have political, moral and legal rights to participate in the discussion of the German problem,” Kortunov said. “A Soviet-American understanding on simply this--the right to participate--would be valuable for all Europe because it would mean that neither would play the German card against the other.”

But the strategic arms negotiations, whose goal is a 50% reduction in the nuclear arsenals of both countries, will be the chief measure Moscow uses to assess the Malta talks and their impact.

“Today, it is possible, really possible, to prepare a strategic arms reduction treaty for the Bush-Gorbachev summit in 1990 and then to achieve 50% cuts,” Col. Gen. Nikolai F. Chervov, chief of the Soviet Defense Ministry’s arms control directorate, said in Moscow. “But the U.S. seems to be moving slowly now, slower than before, and adding new issues. This is something that Mikhail Gorbachev will press hard with President Bush. For us it is key.”

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According to Chervov, the Soviet Union is ready to compromise on the outstanding issues in the strategic arms negotiations--how to restrict sea-launched cruise missiles, how to count air-launched cruise missiles, methods of verification and space-based defenses--but has received little response from U.S. negotiators.

“We hope they are just waiting to see how the Malta summit goes,” he said.

There are other Soviet proposals on the table in the negotiations, to reduce conventional armed forces in central Europe, to abolish chemical weapons and to restrict nuclear testing.

“Without the strongest push from the political leaders, all these negotiations will bog down,” Dobrokhotov said. “We see an urgent need for such a push across the board. . . . We see the U.S. as interested in arms agreements, not opposing them, but the details are very complex and difficult. Again, we need a demonstration of political will to push through.”

Soviet officials have watched with considerable amusement the U.S. preparations for the Malta meetings, particularly the debate over whether Bush could handle one-on-one discussions with Gorbachev and whether there would be an attempt to “sandbag” the American President with new initiatives that he would be unable to evaluate, as President Reagan proved to be three years ago when he met Gorbachev at Reykjavik, Iceland.

“George Bush is no international neophyte,” Dobrokhotov said. “He is not lightheaded. He is very industrious, diligent and studious. He takes seriously all discussions, all meetings, all decisions. Americans, particularly those in his own Administration, should have more confidence in their President.”

Another Central Committee official remarked: “Why is it somehow deemed to be ‘dirty pool’ to make a sincere proposal, say, on arms reduction, and ask for its consideration?

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“Look at how shaken so many U.S. officials are by the prospect that we might make a proposal on reducing international tensions. They say, quite publicly, that this would be ‘unfair’ of us. But what does that imply about their own position? We need so very much to end all this mistrust. That’s a worthwhile goal for this summit.”

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