A Soviet View of Using Force as Foreign Policy : Panama: U.S. intervention seems another manifestation of American provincialism--belief that regional policies can be separated from global policies.

The American intervention in Panama has shown once again that traditional approaches to foreign-policy problems are still in vogue in the United States.

I am not a fan of Gen. Manuel A. Noriega, but neither his background nor methods of leadership can justify U.S. interventionism. It is especially regretful that the action in Panama is overwhelmingly supported by the U.S. public--just as it was six years ago in the case of Grenada. Nations and peoples do not change their habits very fast. And that is why I would not like to sound too optimistic about Soviet-American relations by stating that all the current changes in these relations are already irreversible.

The U.S. intervention seems to be another manifestation of American provincialism--belief that the regional policies of the United States can be separated from its global policies. But this is not possible in our interdependent world, and the use of force even at such a low level in Central America will inevitably echo in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere.

For centuries the most reliable, realistic means of assuring national security was deemed to be stockpiling more arms and achieving military superiority over potential enemies. But nowadays betting on such superiority is extremely dangerous and illusory, politically counterproductive and economically ruinous.

If in the past military force was the main instrument of Realpolitik-- and war was its continuation by other means--now it has become impossible to achieve political aims by resort to force in any conflict larger than Grenada or the Falklands.

In the Soviet view, a shift to consistent realism has implied, among other things, an understanding that our own interests will not be served by American difficulties, especially in the regions that are especially sensitive to the United States. In recent months Americans have begun to think more seriously about this, particularly in regard to Eastern Europe.

There are few nations in the world other than the Soviet Union and the United States whose joint and parallel interests outweigh any real causes for conflict, tension and confrontation between them.

Economically, the Soviet Union and the United States complement rather than oppose each other. As for ideological differences, I have never thought of them as an imperative source of divisions and collisions between the two nations. Ideology may play such a role only at the primitive levels of societal development, when fanaticism and prejudice get the upper hand. We should not forget, however, that ideology was frequently used as casus belli for conflicts and wars to cover up for other much more fundamental and deep-rooted causes.

The idea of “de-ideologizing” international relations and overcoming dogmatic stereotypes and prejudices in world politics has already been introduced into official Soviet foreign-policy doctrine and has become a key element of Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s New Thinking. By the same token, it appears that fascination with ideology and ideological “crusades” is falling out of fashion in the United States, while pragmatism begins to play a more important role in foreign policy.

However, as Panama reminds us, there still exists an area of Soviet-American relations that during the postwar period was a constant and often highly dangerous source of conflicts and tensions: our positions in controversies and conflicts that flared up in various regions of the world.

It is on this ground that the worst crises in Soviet-American relations took place. It is here that the foundations for mutual trust were undermined. But looking at world politics of the last four years, we see that the number of arenas for Soviet-American confrontation have dwindled considerably. Humanity has tired of conflicts, civil wars, extremism of right and left. Ideas of national reconciliation are gaining momentum in Central America, Afghanistan, South Africa and Indochina. To my mind, reduction of world tensions is a natural process closely linked to overcoming the bipolar system of the Cold War.

By rejecting blind confrontation and “zero-sum game” approaches to policy-making, by reassessing the need to respond in kind to any action of the opposite side, we may take a more realistic look at our own interests in this world and understand them better. Thus we may come to understand that the era of empires is over, that the cost of maintaining empires is rising while benefits are diminishing. We may also realize that acute Soviet-American confrontation creates a situation where both powers may be dragged into local conflicts even against their will, or where third countries may use these circumstances in their egotistic interests, creating instances where the tail wags the dog.

And finally, we may realize that the Third World would rather be neither Soviet nor American, that it develops for its own sake and in its own interests, according to its own laws, and any attempts to interfere in this development and shape it according to the wishes of a great power are usually counterproductive.

Whatever your attitude, the Cold War is dying, if only because it takes two to tango--and the Soviet Union has adopted a firm decision to opt out of this dangerous and ruinous game. As I told Americans two years ago, we have deprived the United States of the “enemy.” That brings about tremendous overall changes--in traditional political perceptions and institutions that try, for example, to substantiate the rationale of the arms race and of military alliances. A great many things lose the very foundations of their existence.

However, no one should forget that the Cold War lasted for more than four decades. Cumbersome structures were erected, huge mechanisms of confrontation were set in motion. Dismantling these structures and mechanisms and defusing the time bombs scattered all over the world can be done more efficiently if the United States and the Soviet Union act together--of course with the participation of allies and friends of both countries.

Joint Soviet-American efforts had slowed in this area during the 12 months before the Malta summit. The summit, with its decisive shift toward common sense in Soviet-U.S. relations, should give them a new impetus--particularly for treaties on strategic and conventional weapons. If the leaders of both countries are true to their word and their agreement, we may hope that 1990 will go down in history as the Disarmament Year. This would not only mean overcoming the numerous technical obstacles that diplomats in Geneva and Vienna are struggling with, but that both sides would support the negotiations by exercising restraint in military appropriations and programs. In the long run, these policies are even more important than the agreements--which only fix what has already been accomplished.

At Malta, the United States declared in effect that it is ready to terminate the economic war against the Soviet Union. I hope this important declaration will soon be interpreted in practical policy and that the new opportunities for action in many areas will not be missed this time around. Let us also hope that neither President Bush nor President Gorbachev will yield to pressure and attacks from their conservative critics. So much depends on this.