There’s Little We Can Do as It Rolls Down the Tracks : Germany: With reunification gaining momentum, we need to cross our fingers and be resigned to getting it done.

The most aggravating aspect of German reunification is that there is not a great deal that the rest of us can do about it. We are in the hands of the leaders of the two German states; they, in turn, are largely in the hands of their people.

It will be a grueling test of the quality of democracy that has been built in the Federal Republic in the postwar era. It could also be a spectacular proving of the new spirit in the German Democratic Republic. But, more likely, the East German contribution to reunification will be small, throwing all the heavier a burden onto West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his colleagues.

The domestic politics of reunification will be more complex if East Germany continues to exist as a cohesive, functioning state throughout the process. But a unification that is jointly managed by both sides over a period of a year or two seems more likely to lay a stronger foundation for the new state than one managed solely by the West because the East has collapsed. This is clearly the preferred option of the 10-point plan outlined by Kohl, or the 4-point plan of East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow. Yet the prospects of such a jointly managed process seem to dim by the week as thousands of East Germany’s most valuable workers stream westward, the economy teeters towards breakdown and the government advances the date of free elections to March.

If the authority of the East German government collapses, all Chancellor Kohl need do in one sense is to pick up the pieces and incorporate them into the Federal Republic. Yet this outcome would minimize the political influence of East Germans within the unified nation and probably create substantial disaffection once the die had been cast. East Germans would tend to feel taken over by the West. It would be far better to allow East Germans the opportunity to form democratic parties and prove their viability among themselves.

Another problem that could flow from a collapse of East Germany is a wave of economic dislocation for the Federal Republic. This is nothing that Bonn could not handle, but it would have its costs.

The position of Chancellor Kohl and the Christian Democrats as managers of the reunification (and probably that of the Social Democrats as well) would be weakened relative to those of the extremes of right and left. Strengthening of the extreme right just might lift it into the mainstream of national politics via the Bundestag, where it would color German politics in hues most worrisome for all neighboring states and especially for the Soviet Union. More probably it would simply reinforce rightist confidence to the point where loud clamor was made for the return of East and West Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia.

At this point the sensitivities of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union would be strongly aroused, leading probably to mutually reinforcing vituperation that would embarrass the German government. Western European states would not like this turn of events, either, but they would face a dilemma in attempting to contain the damage. Public protests and criticism would likely fan the flames of indignation inside Germany.

With reasonable care and fortune, few of these disturbing scenarios will come to pass. Some of those who voice concerns about Germany’s future and its implications for Europe are unduly pessimistic. Yet the uncomfortable fact must be faced: German reunification will not be an unalloyed benefit for the West. If allied concerns are aroused, the United States will be drawn into any resulting wrangles. Hence the Bush Administration has almost as strong an incentive as the governments of Western Europe to see that East Germany can survive long enough to allow its people to build the political framework that will support them in a wider, democratic nation. The doctrine of providing minimal assistance to East Germany while it still exists is very shortsighted.

At the same time, the West must ignore Eastern and Soviet calls for a neutral, disarmed Germany as the price of reunification. Those governments must be made to realize that a strong Germany firmly anchored in the West is a much more secure neighbor than one that is enforcedly neutral and possibly disarmed as well. We can feel confident that the West Germans have learned the lessons of democracy well in the past 45 years, but we cannot forget the severe test of statesmanship posed by possession of great strength and influence in so central a location between East and West. 1989 brought joy and freedom; 1990 will bring worries and problems as we strive to preserve the gains made and build on them to create a strong structure of peace.