Toward an All-Europe Federation : Geopolitics: The former leaders of France and Germany call for a constitutional uniting of European states, including a reunified Germany.

In 1950, Robert Schuman, inspired by Jean Monnet, proposed that the coal and steel resources of France and Germany be pooled. Since then, the Franco-German axis has played a decisive role in progress toward European unification.

Not only our two countries but also, Italy, the Benelux and, more recently, other countries such as Spain have boosted progress toward European unification. But none of the decisive steps forward could have been taken without the impulse provided jointly by France and West Germany.

Acknowledgement of this fact first brought the leaders of both countries closer together, and later the ordinary people. Today, opinion polls show the French and the West Germans are “best friends.”

Can this close friendship survive the situation created by recent events in Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany? Has the Franco-German axis a specific role to play in the policy that will redraw the map of Europe?

We firmly believe that it has. Joint Franco-German action is necessary.

What do we expect it to achieve?

The political leaders of Western Europe are going to have to face up to three problems: the reuniting of the two Germanys, unification of the 12 European Community member states and the definition of new relations with the democratic countries of Eastern Europe.

Regarding the reunion of the two Germanys--a word we prefer to “reunification” since it suggests a return to a previous situation--three attitudes are possible for West Germany’s partners, especially France:

They may try to slow down the process.

They may seek new alliances to act as a counterweight to growing German power.

They may act to incorporate the gradual reunion of the two Germanys into the process leading to a federal union of the states of Europe.

A word of warning against the first two options:

Any obvious intention to oppose the two Germanys’ desire to unite would destroy the climate of confidence so patiently built up between France and West Germany. Opposition to German reunion might ignite a dangerous outburst of German nationalism.

As for seeking new alliances to act as a counterweight to German influence, this would take us back to a trial of strength, particularly to the type of relations existing between European countries before the two world wars.

In practical terms, the problem of the gradual reunion of the two Germanys will arise just after March 18, 1990, when elections will be held in East Germany. The proclamation of these election results will have an impact on world public opinion: It will signal the death of 45 years of communist rule over Eastern Europe.

It is clear that rapprochement between the two Germanys will be at the heart of the political debate in Europe. The only approach consistent with the maintenance of Franco-German friendship and understanding is to incorporate the reunion of the two Germanys into the strategy of establishing a federal union of the member states of the European Community.

Such a federation would include not only economic and monetary union but also the integration of foreign policies, and ultimately of military and security policies--in which France and Germany will have a special role to exercise jointly.

Acting in this way would place German reunion at the intersection of two major movements: the construction of a united Europe and the awareness of ethnic solidarity.

The German leaders must take into account the common concern of all other Europeans to prevent the restoration of German hegemony. And no nation in the world is better positioned than France to lend credibility to the German people’s legitimate wish to unite.

The German government’s answers to the following question will decisively influence the options for the future of a united Europe: From the German perspective, will a united Europe be only a large economic and monetary area with no common personality, or a federal union of the states of Europe?

The first consequence of the German acceptance of a federal union would be the strict and clear recognition, with no legal niceties and no strings attached, of the frontier between East Germany and Poland.

The second consequence would be that reunion must take into account all the rules and obligations that the member states of the European Community have laid down for themselves in their progress toward a united Europe. East Germany will not join forces with a West Germany isolated in a national context, but with a state that is already part of the European Community, abiding by its operational procedures and participating in its institutions.

This means that the steps toward the reunion of the two Germanys will have to take full account of East Germany’s capacity to comply with community obligations. Those obligations are strict and precise.

They led new member countries such as Spain and Portugal to seek and obtain a transitional period for accession.

Similarly, the uniting process will have to guarantee the equilibriums laid down in the Treaty of Rome and confirmed with each subsequent accession, which have seen the European Community expand from being a community of six to a community of 12. With regard to the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers and the number of members of the European Parliament, demographic proportions are not strictly adhered to: The countries with the smallest population are better represented, and a rule of parity is applied to the four most populous countries: West Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom.

That parity will have to be maintained in the event the two Germanys unite.

The reunion of the two Germanys must be seen as part of the process leading toward the establishment of the union of the community’s member states.

The current outlook toward European unity lacks dynamism and clarity. Is Europe seeking a single market in which all member states retain their sovereign powers, or a federation to which member states allot joint powers? It is time that the objective be clearly set out: the institution of a federal organization that respects the diversity of its member states.

The first task to undertake without delay is to clear up any misunderstandings, especially those affecting the United Kingdom. A specific and exhaustive list of the areas that will be the responsibility of the union, and of those which will remain the responsibility of the member states and their local authorities, must be drawn up. That list will be based on the “subsidiary principle,” which restricts the powers and responsibilities of central government to those that can’t be handled at lower levels.

This federation, of a type never seen before, will require a constitution or a “basic law,” because the existing institutions can no longer cope with the rapid pace of European developments.

This task will not come about without a political will operating at the community’s three levels: the European Council, the commission and the Parliament.

The French and German leaders should join together to demonstrate this political commitment. Without their common will, progress will be slow and minimal, as has been the case in the monetary sphere since 1980.

If we succeed in setting into motion the process leading toward the political unification of Europe, the process for uniting the two Germanys will be incorporated into a movement of which it will only be one part, and it will have to take into account both the political substance and the timetable for achieving the other parts of the whole.

As the tide of communism ebbs, and the land left uncovered differs from country to country, France and Germany must together prepare an appropriate response to the popular pleas for rapprochement.

There are two different cases:

Some countries will have the capacity and desire to become incorporated into the community. At the moment, the only probable candidate for a relatively early accession is East Germany. Others, such as Poland, Hungary and, no doubt, Czechoslovakia, will set as the goal of their economic restructuring a standard of living like that which exists within the European Community.

The strengthening of their links with the community may range from association to accession. The proper approach for dealing with these countries is to provide aid. Since this aid comes mainly from public funds, it ought to be channelled exclusively through the community, with France and Germany acting as one.

Although it is right and proper for industrial experts to undertake missions to these countries, why are they undertaken on a strictly national basis? Measures should be taken to send joint French and German business missions, for banks and insurance companies of both countries, to set up joint subsidiaries in those countries. The next Franco-German summit should be devoted to the coordination of the economic and financial operations undertaken by Germany and France in the Eastern European countries.

The growth in economic power of the combined Germanys will have to be offset. If the community has been able to equip itself with federal structures, and if it respects the principle of parity, this increase in power will not become manifest at a national level. But it is clear that industrial and financial cooperation will occur more rapidly based on a common German culture, thus making Germany economically larger than the others. Here we will have to rely on the joint undertakings of the other European countries, within a market context, to balance the new German economic might.

This must be accompanied by the use of community resources for accelerating the development of Southern Europe--Italy, Spain and Portugal--to maintain the existing equilibrium between the different parts of the European Community.

We do believe that, at the beginning of an entirely new era in Europe, France and Germany must act jointly to overcome the dangers and to seize the opportunities as they did daringly through the pooling of resources in the 1950s.

We call on the leaders of our two countries to set clearly the new objective of European union, in which Germany may enjoy its unity while Europe keeps the balance it vitally needs.