In Soviet Asia, Blood Ties Sustain the Fever of Unrest : Azerbaijan: Its conflict may be replicated elsewhere in the region. The West must beware of its potentially incendiary role.

The Soviet Union’s military crackdown against the Azerbaijani nationalist movement seems to have stopped the violence. But its problems with Asian nationalities are likely to get worse, with consequences spreading far beyond Soviet borders.

Events in Azerbaijan point to a widespread malaise in the Soviet empire, as Asiatic peoples assert their cultural identity and demand greater independence. Largely dormant ethnic and territorial conflicts are coming to the fore. Not unnaturally, centuries-old rivalries are re-emerging, drawing in both traditional competitors and new contenders for influence. As Moscow’s grip continues to loosen, both internal and external struggles will intensify. On Tuesday, disturbances related to Azerbaijan erupted in the central Asian republic of Tadzhikistan, where most of the population is ethnically Iranian and Sunni Muslim.

The portents of conflict in the Asian republics are uniquely complicated by their history. First, these republics have scant experience with statehood in today’s sense, nor a clear sense of their nationhood. They also have little experience with anti-colonialism; after the fall of the czars, the party and the army were vigilant in stifling resistance to Russian rule.

The non-European Soviet republics have always been subject to diverse and contending cultural and linguistic influences. This has discouraged the forging of a clear national identity and has presented opportunities for external meddling.

Azerbaijan is a good example. Ethnically and linguistically, Azerbaijan is Turkic. Yet until 1828, when it was separated from Iran, its destiny was linked with Iran’s, and Iranian cultural influence is still strong. Azerbaijan’s predominantly Shia Muslim character provides another source of affinity for Iran.

These influences are reflected in the various political groups formed in Azerbaijan in recent years. One is named in honor of the elite troops of a 16th-Century Iranian dynasty, and posters of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini have been carried during recent demonstrations. By contrast, pan-Turkic sentiments have been expressed through the hoisting of Turkish flags. There is even an ultra-nationalist movement aspiring to an independent Greater Azerbaijan, incorporating the area still within Iran.

If the separatist movement in Azerbaijan gathers momentum, both Turkey and Iran will try to gain a privileged position. The beginning of such a process could be seen during the recent crisis. Both Tehran and Ankara were careful not to become embroiled in a situation that they could not control, and they also wanted to preserve their good relations with Moscow. Yet neither wanted to appear less concerned than the other about the Azerbaijanis’ fate. Demonstrations and commentaries in Turkey emphasized Azerbaijan’s Turkic qualities, betraying latent pan-Turkic ambitions, while Iran put its emphasis on the importance of Shia Islam.

Similar situations could develop elsewhere in the region, involving other Muslim countries. Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Afghanistan has led to a campaign of proselytizing the Wahabi doctrine of Islam, while Pakistan counters with traditional Islamic propaganda.

The erosion of Russian control and the growing linkages between the Soviet Muslim republics and key Middle East countries would inevitably bring this area into the vortex of Southwest Asian politics. This would pose policy dilemmas for the West, which must begin to think about this region beyond its impact on Gorbachev’s political fate, and devise policies in a broader regional context. For example, Western sanctioning of the Soviets’ use of force against the Azeris provoked outrage in Turkey. Other observers in the Islamic world have interpreted that support as another sign of Western anti-Islamic bias. In future crises, the West needs to consider its response carefully, lest it reap unnecessary problems with the Muslim world.

As events unfold in the Soviet Asian republics, the West must also avoid taking sides in regional rivalries that are bound to develop. There has already been a Western tendency to promote an increased role for Turkey in Azerbaijan and in neighboring areas, in part because of strained Western relations with Iran and the fear of Islamic fundamentalism. Pushed to the extreme, however, such an attitude could become self-defeating, as proved by experience in Afghanistan, where the Western policy of isolating Iran has failed.

By contrast, current trends in Azerbaijan and potentially in Central Asia--along with tensions that can emerge in Soviet-Iranian relations--open a fresh window of opportunity for the West. It can end hostility with Iran, provided it recognizes Iran’s legitimate concerns in the region. In short, when looking to the Soviet Asian republics, the West must begin to see them as emerging Islamic nations and not merely as Russian appendages.