NEWS ANALYSIS : Major Difficulties Loom in Creating a New Germany : Diplomacy: Negotiators will be shaping a nation destined to become a dominant power.

The headlong rush toward German reunification has cleared two important hurdles, but serious, potentially volatile difficulties still loom ahead.

Tuesday’s accord in Ottawa on a formula for talks on German unity is a significant step even if it was anticipated.

Although the four major Allied powers that vanquished Nazi Germany 45 years ago had already committed themselves to supporting the principle of unification, the fact that they agreed that the framework to discuss the subject is considered an important step forward.

That the formula itself was conceived by West Germany’s Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher is seen as an especially hopeful sign for those Germans who feared that the victorious powers might try to dictate the terms of reference.

The decision in Bonn by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and East Germany’s caretaker Prime Minister Hans Modrow to begin formal preparations for a currency union was also an important, if predictable, step toward reunification.

The joint commission established to prepare what amounts to a de facto deutschemark takeover of the East German economy will launch the idea of economic and currency union on the path to reality.

For many, the move seemed another nail in the East German state’s coffin, for by ceding control over the national currency, Modrow also effectively cedes a piece of East Germany’s sovereignty.

Despite these steps toward unity, however, the meetings in both Ottawa and Bonn carried with them the seeds of far greater political challenges.

Behind all the congratulations, the Ottawa agreement only begins a larger process by which the two German states, the Big Four powers--the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France--and the other nations of Europe will determine what kind of united Germany eventually emerges.

For all concerned, the stakes could not be higher, for the participants will be shaping nothing less than a mini-superpower that is destined to become Central Europe’s dominant power.

Predictably, there are major differences about just what shape this new Germany should take.

In the West, there is the conviction that a united Germany must remain a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev sees it as a neutral state, tied to neither NATO nor the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, floating on its own between East and West.

Although few expect this Soviet position to carry, it has buttressed the support for neutrality that is already widespread in East Germany as well as among elements of the West German left.

Some analysts believe this additional support for neutrality could eventually play an important role in influencing German foreign policy.

“The Soviets are making a crucial mistake,” maintained Michael Stuermer, director of the Research Institute for International Politics and Security near Munich. “The present Germany of 60 million within NATO is the best they could hope for--involved in the process of European integration, well anchored in Western Europe and basically a ‘do-gooder’ country.

“A Germany of 75 million people, not part of NATO and subject to all sorts of international conditions is unstable, unworkable and dangerous,” Stuermer charged.

Wilhelm Bruns, head of the Foreign Policy and Security Department at the Social Democratic Party’s think tank, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn, described both German neutrality and full NATO membership as unworkable options.

“Neither can achieve a consensus,” he said. “There has to be some kind of middle ground.”

While opinions differ on this and other key points, there is little dispute that the negotiations will be tough.

Those who followed Modrow’s two-day visit to Bonn that ended Wednesday also expressed concern about much of the outcome.

Kohl’s decision to reject Modrow’s request for about $9 billion in emergency aid to prop a fast-unraveling East German economy has done little to boost confidence among a people so dispirited that as many as 2,000 each day simply give up their homes and their jobs and head to the West.

Some political analysts--and many East Germans--believe Kohl’s refusal to provide at least some token additional emergency help is part of a grander strategy to weaken East Germany to a point where reunification talks become little more than an East German capitulation.

While the dejection was visible among members of the large East German delegation as they were shown departing Bonn for East Berlin on Wednesday evening, a certain bitterness was evident among East Germans themselves.

“They are handling us like an African colony,” said Horst Moritz, an official at the East German Academy of Sciences. “There’s a resentment building about their smugness.”